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INTRODUCTION
How does it feel to change the climate? This question seems more absurd 
than impolite. It implies a chain of causation and responsibility that still 
remains invisible and mostly unacknowledged. In fact, some people—a 
billion high emitters—burn oil and otherwise pump carbon dioxide (co2) 
into the atmosphere at a rate dangerous to societies and ecosystems every-
where (Chakravarty et al. 2010). A slice of this population—overrepre-
sented in the United States—disputes the science and scenarios of climate 
change. But explicit denial is less widespread than silence and disregard. 
The bulk of informed consumers simply don’t care a great deal about 
carbon emissions and their consequences. Tobacco provokes stronger re-
actions, indeed sometimes a disgust verging on revulsion. Where is the 
revulsion over flood, drought, and myriad other catastrophic shifts in the 
conditions for life and society on planet Earth? Menacing as it increasingly 
is, climate change has yet to become a moral issue for most people.
Energy without Conscience seeks to explain this persistent banality. I 
am not trying to expose—as others have done—the greed of individuals, 
firms, or governments. Capitalism and convenience certainly underwrite 
the status quo. Yet  means- to- ends reasoning does not account fully for 
the abundance of support for fossil fuels. Cultural meanings also sustain 
hydrocarbons. In the oil profession itself, people drill for noneconomic, as 
well as economic, motives. “The romance [among oil geologists] was not 
really based on money, which was only a way of keeping score,” reminisces 
the Texan John Graves (1995, xi–xii) in an essay on prospecting. His nos-
talgia exceeds his greed. I am interested in such cultural dispositions and 
discourses. As I argue, they obscure responsibility for carbon emissions 
among those most responsible and those most susceptible—technicians 
in and local bystanders to the fossil fuel business (who are often the same 
people). Certain modes of thought inside and outside the industry push a 
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more critical consideration of oil to the margin. Hydrocarbons—as I refer 
to oil, natural gas, coal, and bitumen—seem both invisible and inevitable. 
One notices them only when something goes wrong—when, for instance, 
massive volumes gush into the Gulf of Mexico. Water- borne pollution 
of this sort triggers professional concern as well as public outrage. This 
book, on the other hand, describes the everyday, intended functions of 
our energy system. When platforms, pipelines, and pumps work properly, 
oil arrives safely at the gas tank of a motor vehicle. Then, combusted in 
the engine, the hydrocarbon spews carbon dioxide into the air unnoticed 
and without protest. One might refer to this form of pollution as “the spill 
everywhere.” It far outweighs local contamination, both in volume and in 
planetary effects. Oil, in other words, is most dangerous when it behaves 
ordinarily and when people treat it as ordinary—that is, as neither moral 
nor immoral, but amoral.
Investigating such a nonevent—really the partial absence of mean-
ing—requires an indirect approach. One has to detect the meaning and 
sentiment that prevent an accumulation of feeling around oil or carbon 
emissions. Why do hydrocarbons not inspire disgust—or romance for that 
matter—among more people more often? To answer this question, one 
has to measure the subtle effort expended as informed people avoid reflect-
ing ethically or emotionally upon oil. The right circumstances will throw 
this making of ordinariness into the sharpest relief. I found those condi-
tions at the birthplace of petroleum: Trinidad in the southern Caribbean 
(map i.1). Here, Walter Darwent drilled the world’s first continually pro-
ductive oil well in 1866.1 This larger island of Trinidad and Tobago shares 
deposits with nearby Venezuela. Until recently, it contributed the lion’s 
share of gas imported to the United States. But it does not rank among 
the traditional petrostates, either in production or in reputation. I lived 
in Port of Spain, the capital of Trinidad and Tobago, for the 2009–10 aca-
demic year and conducted ethnographic research among energy experts, 
anti- industrial activists, and policy makers preparing for climate change. At 
that point, Trinidad (as I abbreviate the  nation- state) had never suffered a 
major spill. In terms of environmental harm, the industry was primarily 
committing climate change through co2 emissions. But Trinidadians—
whose per capita carbon emissions ranked fourth among nations—did 
not appreciate this responsibility. My informants considered themselves 
to be victims—and only victims—of rising seas. In these ways, groups of 
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Trinis edged so close to the moral problem of hydrocarbons that they had 
to avert their gaze. Looking historically at Trinidad’s energy systems, as I 
do in part I, I found moments when energy both did and did not prick the 
conscience. Plantation slavery—reliant upon embodied, somatic power—
never achieved stability. Bonded people constantly reminded masters and 
governors of the bondsmen’s individuality, of their will for freedom. Con-
science dogged the energy that harvested sugar. Hydrocarbons arrived 
with no such baggage. Petroleum raised no moral outrage or endorsement, 
and contemporary beliefs, institutions, and forms of expertise helped to 
keep it that way. (Coal, a notable absence, has never been produced in Trin-
idad.) That process of overlooking consequences continues today. Energy 
without Conscience illuminates the people close to and conducting this 
map i.1 Trinidad. Prepared by Mike Siegel of Rutgers Cartography Lab.
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work—subjects both intimate with and untroubled by the carbon bomb 
ticking around them.
I did not approach these women and men dispassionately, and I have 
not written about them with the usual ethnographic sympathy. Frankly, I 
oppose their interests. Partiality is not new to my field: anthropologists 
often take sides, engaging with popular movements and local projects 
(Goldstein 2012, 35ff.). Nancy  Scheper- Hughes advocates a “militant an-
thropology,” eschewing “false neutrality . . . in the face of the broad polit-
ical dramas of life and death, good and evil” (1995, 411). In solidarity, she 
joined desperately poor mothers of a Brazilian shantytown as a compan-
heira. Stop merely spectating, she demands of anthropologists. Practice 
instead an “ethic of care and responsibility” toward your informants (419). 
I have answered that call only halfway. From the beginning, I encountered 
oil as immoral—and as an industry that should go extinct. I hope for a 
rapid and complete conversion to wind and solar power, a change both 
necessary and, experts increasingly suggest, feasible as well ( Jacobson and 
Delucchi 2009). We may still need oil for plastics and for some kinds of 
high- reliability energy uses, in hospitals, for example. Undeniably, how-
ever, I wish an end to the current livelihoods of most of the people—even 
of my friends—described in this book. Therefore, I do not express care 
toward petroleum geologists. I write about them with understanding and 
with ethnographic nuance, but I shall not present myself as a companheiro 
in relation to this social group. Besides, my subjects never asked for care, 
comradeship, or solidarity. Wealthy and powerful, they need no help from 
scholars. Hence, a militant anthropology of elites can afford a certain ten-
sion, emphasizing responsibility more than care. There is a difference be-
tween these two attitudes. The responsible writer looks over an informant’s 
shoulder, prepared to reveal and criticize the wider harm that person may 
cause. Perhaps this is where the social science of climate change needs to 
go: resisting fossil fuels by documenting how their promoters think, act, 
and feel. Complicity, in a word, is the chief concern of this book.
The Ethical Deficit
I arrived in Trinidad expecting abundant art and literature about oil and 
gas. Those two commodities, after all, drove the leading industry in this 
acknowledged petrostate. I thought I knew how to trace the links between 
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energy systems and cultural expression. At that very moment, I was in 
the process of publishing my second book on Zimbabwe (Hughes 2010). 
The ethnography concerned white Zimbabweans, including their repre-
sentations of Lake Kariba. Once the largest reservoir in the world, Lake 
Kariba spawned a literary and artistic soul- searching among the colonial 
population, as it grappled with the contradictions of artificial nature. A 
white population of 100,000 produced more than thirty books—as well 
as countless films and works of art—about this single landscape feature. 
Arriving in Trinidad, then, I expected images and texts on oil everywhere. 
Surely, a nation of 1.3 million would represent its landscape of rigs, sea-
scape of offshore platforms, and ubiquitous burning of oil and gas in cars 
and factories. Initially I found nothing. Art and music—which abound 
in Port of Spain—often depicted nature, more often showed the human 
body, and focused in particular on the annual Carnival celebration. I found 
mere mentions of oil and gas in a handful of calypsos. Scrunter’s ballad 
“Oil in the Coil” (1985) associates petroleum with virility and, indeed, with 
an aphrodisiac quality of men from the petroleum region.2 More chastely, 
Earl Lovelace, Trinidad’s national writer, penned one line in a play: “With 
gladness beating in your heart, like them Texaco machines pumping oil out 
of the earth chest” (1984, 3). I followed up this metaphor of petroleum and 
vitality, but the trail ended there. I met many musicians, writers, and artists 
who all agreed on this  petro- silence. Some mentioned Trinidad’s national 
instrument: in the 1930s, oil workers fashioned barrels into the steel pan. 
Again, though, the beneficiaries of this upcycling focused on the container 
more than on the contents (Campbell 2014, 53). Oil itself fertilized a garden 
of symbols where almost nothing grew.
This strange sterility has more to do with oil than with Trinidad. Across 
the world, a century and a half of petroleum production and consumption 
have imprinted the arts and literature relatively little. In absolute terms, of 
course, there are many films and texts about oil. Analysts of the humanities 
mostly prefer to see this glass as half full. Hannah Appel, Arthur Mason, 
and Michael Watts refer to a “rich loam” for literature. However, they privi-
lege moments “where the normal and calculated course of energy events is 
interrupted” (Appel, Mason, and Watts 2015a, 10, 14). Introducing another 
important collection, Ross Barrett and Daniel Worden forgo their own 
nuanced understanding of “oil’s signature cultural ubiquity and absence.” 
They turn quickly to “spectacle” as a central theory (Barrett and Worden 
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2014, xvii, xxiv). Other observers—with whom I agree more—find hydro-
carbons to be blatantly missing in action. It is “startling,” writes critic Rob 
Nixon, “that not since [Upton] Sinclair’s California saga Oil! [1926] . . . has 
any author hazarded writing the great American oil novel” (Nixon 2011, 
73). Nixon cites a “dramatic deficit”: oil appears less frequently in culture 
than one would expect given its economic importance. The Indian novelist 
Amitav Ghosh diagnoses a dearth of “petro- fiction” and “the muteness of 
the Oil Encounter,” as he terms the social shifts accompanying petroleum 
(Ghosh 1992, 30). Likewise, Gustavo Luis Carrera begins La Novela del 
Petróleo en Venezuela somewhat deflatingly with, “This book relates to a 
novel that does not exist. And in that there is no exaggeration. One does 
not find in Venezuela a fiction of petroleum as, for example there is, in 
the  Hispano- American context, a fiction of the Mexican revolution.”3 A 
petrostate, Carrera argues, scares writers into self- censorship. Ghosh might 
agree, but he diagnoses another lacuna in the social relations of oil pro-
duction. The oil town—in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere—draws workers 
from myriad countries. The resulting amalgam congeals too little to form 
a community that might be narrated. As a final explanation for the scarcity 
of oil novels, Peter Hitchcock advances omnipresence itself. “Oil’s satura-
tion of the infrastructure of modernity,” he argues, “[obstructs] its cultural 
representation” (Hitchcock 2010, 81). Oil flows like the unremarked air that 
industry and consumer classes breathe every moment (Huber 2013, 26). 
Here is a theory of absence rather than ubiquity: state power, social chaos, 
and sheer familiarity all suppress oil fiction.
To these three explanations I would add a fourth, more technical con-
sideration. Petroleum inhabits geological rather than human or medical 
spaces. Some bitumen, the heaviest hydrocarbon, has seeped into public 
sight at Los Angeles’s La Brea tar pits (LeMenager 2012). Much more oil 
circulates through  middle- class life encased in plastics and vehicles. But 
the raw, undisguised substance almost invariably passes unseen from sub-
terranean strata to enclosed pipes and tanks. One can easily confuse the 
contents and the container. The photographer Edward Burtynsky, for in-
stance, titles his 2009 collection Oil, although the images show very little 
oil (Burtynsky 2009; Szeman and Whiteman 2012). Except for views of 
the tar sands in Alberta, the photos frame derivatives: pumps, pipes, re-
fineries, roads, cars, tires, planes, and ships. Crude itself does not appear. 
A consumer injects gasoline blindly, without even glimpsing the liquid. 
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Only the abnormal event—the spill—brings a black goo into view and 
into contact with human flesh, usually the worker’s flesh. The most famous 
photographs of oil itself—taken by Sebastião Salgado (1993, 338–43) in 
his Workers collection—show men plugging wells and fighting fires set by 
Saddam Hussein’s government upon leaving Kuwait (figure i.1). Oil coats 
their clothes and their bodies.4 Still, it doesn’t become part of them; petro-
leum washes off.
Coal, on the other hand, operates surgically on the human body. The 
greatest novel of coal—Emile Zola’s ([1885] 1968) Germinal—refers con-
tinually to the physiology of the French miner. The old man Bonnemort 
“spit black,” explaining, “It’s coal. . . . I have enough of it in the carcass to 
warm myself until the end of my days.”5 He and his coworkers refer proudly 
to the cuts on their backs—made by low roofs in tunnels—as “grafts.”6 
Finally, as a sabotaged mine collapses upon the workers, Zola describes it 
as “an evil animal . . . that had swallowed so much human flesh!”7 People 
enter the earth and the earth reciprocates by giving them silicosis. Diesel 
fumes can also trigger childhood asthma, but many other contaminants 
cause that pathology. Black lung is coal’s signature. That hydrocarbon, in 
i.1 Sebastião Salgado, “Greater Burhan Oil Field, Kuwait,” 1991. © Sebastião 
Salgado. From Contact Press Images.
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other words, conducts a “social life,” made possible by the “intercalibration 
of the biographies of persons and things” (Appadurai 1986, 22). Oil lives 
alone in a studio apartment.
This contrast between the world’s two major fossil fuels runs right 
down the middle of Upton Sinclair’s oeuvre. The famous American anti- 
industrial muckraker penned King Coal: A Novel in 1917 and Oil! in 1926. 
Both stories proceed in the manner of a bildungsroman: the young, naive, 
male protagonist gains knowledge and maturity, specifically discovering 
and then attempting to ameliorate the lot of the working class. A trio of 
characters surrounds this hero: his father, a captain of the given industry; a 
lovely, flighty girlfriend belonging to the same upper class; and a decidedly 
poorer female with a heart of gold. The hero jilts the princess for a life of 
activism with the proletarian woman. So closely aligned in cast and plot, 
the novels differ mostly in their descriptions of the commodity and the 
labor it entails. Sinclair’s petroleum novel introduces readers to the oil field 
by narrating a gusher: “The inside of the earth seemed to burst out through 
that hole: a roaring and rushing, as Niagara [Falls], and a black column 
shot up into the air . . . and came thundering down to earth as a mass of 
thick, black, slimy slippery fluid . . . so that men had to run for their lives” 
(Sinclair 1926, 25). In King Coal, the equivalent passage—positioned al-
most exactly at the same point in the novel—describes a more prosaic, but 
deeper engagement with geology: “The vein varied from four to five feet 
in thickness; a cruelty of nature which made it necessary that the men . . . 
should learn to shorten their stature. . . . They walked with head and shoul-
ders bent over and arms hanging down, so that, seeing them coming out of 
the shaft in the gloaming, one thought of a file of baboons” (Sinclair 1917, 
22). Oil provokes flight while coal calls the very species into question. Later 
in the same passage on mining, Sinclair refers to the colliers as “a separate 
race of creatures, subterranean gnomes” (1917, 22). Men adapted to the 
shafts and tunnels. Writing slightly earlier—and in the wake of Charles 
Darwin—H. G. Wells imagined colliers evolving into a separate popula-
tion. In The Time Machine (Wells 1895), Morlocks—a pun on “mullocks,” 
a contemporary term for miners (Stover 1996, 9)—hunt down the insipid 
descendants of the rich. In other words, this habitat—which one historian 
denotes the “mine workscape”—exerts powerful, mostly negative effects 
on Homo sapiens (Andrews 2008, 123–25). Where coal acts continually and 
viscerally, oil only bursts forth in rare frenzies.
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There is one exception, however. In Nigeria, oil has provoked a moral 
response in literature and more widely as well. Into the delta of the Niger 
River, petroleum has spewed and spilled prolifically for the last half cen-
tury. Nine to thirteen million barrels enter marshes and mangrove swamps 
every year—an annual spill equivalent to the 1987 Exxon Valdez disaster 
(Baird 2010). There, hydrocarbons break into view, as the sheen on water 
and as flames flicking from a ruptured pipeline. A photographer like Ed 
Kashi can capture women baking tapioca by the heat of horrifically toxic 
gas flares (figure i.2; Kashi and Watts 2008, 20–23). The dystopia deepens: 
delta residents attack oil installations, sabotage pipelines, steal oil, and resell 
it in an extensive network of traders, insurgents, and extortionists (Gelber 
2015; Timsar 2015). Oil, in short, busts out of its containers, triggering what 
geographer Michael Watts (2001) terms “petro- violence,” intense struggles 
over the myth and reality of unearned wealth. Nigerian writers—mostly 
unknown outside their country—have fashioned these conditions into a 
genre of “petro- magic realism,” laced with themes of indigenous animism, 
“monstrous- but- mundane violence,” and oil pollution (Wenzel 2006, 456). 
Wealth erupts in spectacle (Apter 2005). At the same time, a palpable “oil 
doom” prevails in representations of that region (LeMenager 2014, 135). In 
short, this oil does not behave in anything approaching the conventional 
fashion. In Nigeria, the economy and infrastructure of oil malfunctions and 
even collapses. Meanwhile, crude generates all the morally rich meanings 
so absent in other oil regions. Nigeria is the exception—the anomalous 
element—that proves the rule of oil’s overwhelmingly banal, amoral in-
terpretation.
Elsewhere, hydrocarbons slip into popular discourse almost as unre-
marked as a cliché. The phrase “black gold,” for instance, exerts little critical 
leverage anymore, if it ever did. That metaphor for money runs through 
the brief canon of fiction and critical nonfiction on oil in the second half 
of the twentieth century.8 Iran’s petroleum, writes the journalist Ryszard 
Kapuściński, “squirts obligingly into the air and falls back to earth as a rus-
tling shower of money” (1986, 347). In Edna Ferber’s Giant—the only U.S. 
novel to rival Oil!—Texas crude simultaneously enriches and debases the 
cowhand Jett Rink. He is “touched by the magic wand of the good fairy, 
Oil” (Ferber 1952, 412). With similar irony, Abdelrahman Munif ’s Cities of 
Salt (1994) focuses on the overwhelming aesthetic of unearned wealth. 
The American oil company throws a party on the beach that stuns the 
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locals: “Sorrow, desires, fears, and phantoms reigned that night. Every 
man’s head was a hurricane of images, for each knew that a new era had 
begun” (Munif 1994, 221). Finally, in Venezuela, petroleum symbolizes “un-
controllable powers . . . seen primarily as a form of money” (Coronil 1997, 
353). Beyond the orbit of these well- known literary and academic texts, 
financial meanings operate as dead metaphors. Dead metaphors—which 
might be thought of as merely sleeping—do connect ideas but not in a 
way that provokes outrage (Kövecses 2002, ix). Oil stimulates the stunted 
emotion Stephanie LeMenager calls “petromelancholia.” Authors of this 
genre express “the feeling of losing cheap energy” (LeMenager 2014, 102). 
What about the feeling of, by contrast, using lots of energy of the most 
ecologically expensive sort? Recall the unprecedented clarity and power 
of Al Gore’s film, An Inconvenient Truth, released in 2006. “The moral im-
perative to make big changes is inescapable,” he intones at the beginning. 
Then, having elevated himself to the top of the  hockey- puck curve of co2 
concentrations, he concludes, “If we allow that to happen, it is deeply un-
ethical” (Gore 2006, emphasis in original). Gore then spoke of obligation 
and a need for restraint. His film reached millions of Americans, but it was 
not enough to attach conscience lastingly to oil.
i.2 Ed Kashi, woman baking tapioca by gas flare, Nigeria, 2008. Courtesy of Ed 
Kashi via VII Photo Agency.
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Paths Not Taken
Conscience centers on alternatives—on options rejected in the past, op-
tions available to us now, and the overlap between these categories. Re-
garding energy—defined broadly as the capacity to do work—Trinidad 
presents such a field of actual and possible plans and fantasies. The earliest 
and most potent alternatives do not involve oil at all. In 1498, during his 
third voyage, Christopher Columbus sailed through the Gulf of Paria and 
the 11 kilometer strait between the island of Trinidad and what is now Ven-
ezuela. From Orinoco River sediment—visibly discoloring the gulf—he 
inferred a continental land mass. And land meant an energy platform. To 
his mind, terrain in the tropics functioned as a kind of solar collector. Rays 
hit the ground vertically—and not always beneficially. Renaissance geog-
raphy classified latitudes south of the Tropic of Cancer as a “torrid zone,” 
dangerously hot and sun scorched. That heat created potential too: Leon-
ardo da Vinci classed the sun as a “generating power” (quoted in Mollat 
1965, 93). Columbus seems to have agreed with the Italian. After his fourth 
and final voyage, he averred, “Gold is generated in sterile lands and wher-
ever the sun is strong.”9 Intermittently over the next two centuries, Euro-
peans returned to the region looking for the city of that gold, El Dorado 
(Naipaul 1969). Not until the 1730s and 1740s did a Spaniard—or one who 
left a considerable enough written record—detect a different potential in 
the Orinoco sun. The Jesuit Joseph Gumilla proposed developing a solar 
colony: a tropical settlement that would thrive on  Spanish- planted cacao 
pulled upward by abundant rays from the nearest star (Gumilla [1745] 1945, 
43–47; Ramos Pérez 1958). Today, we refer to this light, heat, and photo-
synthesis as merely “passive solar energy,” incapable of doing work in the 
mechanical sense.  Eighteenth- century theory treated energy more broadly, 
as a life force, that could inhere in matter both organic and nonorganic 
(Illich [1983] 2009, 13). Trinidad’s sunlight, then, constituted an energy 
system both local and divine.
And almost immediately forgotten: a half- century later another Span-
iard imagined energy and the capacity to do work in very different terms. 
Josef Chacón took up Trinidad’s governorship in 1784 and was the first 
to succeed in that position—until the English conquest of 1797. Like 
Gumilla, he sought colonists to grow an export crop, sugar in this case. 
Mathematically minded, Chacón calculated the inputs necessary for agri-
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cultural productivity. His figures omitted sunlight entirely while enumer-
ating slaves in great detail. How many bondsmen were needed per unit of 
land, Chacón constantly asked, while seeking to import this labor from 
elsewhere in the Caribbean. He recruited settlers—largely French planters 
disaffected with the governance of their islands—as a means to acquiring 
their human property. What he could not obtain regionally, he tried in vain 
to import directly from the African coast. Chacón did not employ the term 
energy. Yet plantation slavery and the Middle Passage propagated a new 
understanding of that category: no longer as a diffuse life force and not 
even as human labor but now as an expendable, consumable fuel. “Arms,” 
as the men and women were called, crossed the ocean in the hold of ships. 
Buyers and sellers measured them in units, stored, used, and—as they died 
from overwork in Trinidad—replaced them. Their agriculture depended 
on the sun, of course, but planters devoted little attention to it. In this shift 
of values, energy lost both its anchor to certain tropical landscapes and 
its divine quality. Chacón, having never read Gumilla, did not appreciate 
his own turn from the sacred. He did, however, wrestle with the practical 
and moral difficulties of objectifying women and men. At times—as when 
slaves fled from their plantations—he had to acknowledge the free will 
and all- too- human qualities of “arms.” Chacón, then, did not quite achieve 
what he, gropingly, set out to do: to establish a pipeline of interchange-
able, impersonal energy units. Chapter 1 considers Chacón’s successes and 
his ethical challenges, scruples that, of course, culminated eventually in 
Emancipation.
After Chacón and after Emancipation, another European converted 
hydrocarbons into an energy form truly without conscience. Trinidad 
contains the most prolific seep of petroleum in the world. Heavy asphalt 
literally bubbles to the surface. Indigenous people and Spaniards had 
used the black goo for caulking ships and similar tasks. Could one burn 
this substance? By the early 1860s, Conrad Stollmeyer—a German im-
migrant to Trinidad—had distilled the material into kerosene and was 
selling it as an illuminant. In 1866, Walter Darwent drilled the world’s first 
productive oil well in the south of the island. But Stollmeyer—unlike any 
other figure in this drama—knew indirectly of Gumilla and his ideas of 
solar energy. Indeed, the German had proposed and planned a utopian 
colony to be powered by sun, wind, and other tropical forces. God- given 
powers, he hoped, would replace not only plantation arms but all forms of 
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hard, manual labor. This utopia failed immediately and abjectly. Then the 
German discovered combustible petroleum. In this interval, Stollmeyer 
juggled all the major energy options—solar, wind, somatic, and petrolic—
in his eager hands. He had an ethical choice to make, but—by that point 
disillusioned with utopianism—he appreciated only its business aspects. 
Through actions more than words, he married oil with human labor in a 
fashion that emancipated no one. As chapter 2 narrates, Stollmeyer’s loss 
of conscience helped craft an energy without conscience. Retrospective 
observers refer to this sort of conjuncture as an “energy transition,” a slow 
but definitive flip from one source to another (Smil 2010, vii–viii). Read-
ing history forward and in its context, however, one cannot pinpoint a flip 
in Trinidad. Stollmeyer and his contemporaries hesitated as they sorted 
through immeasurable opportunities and risks.
I want to reconsider that moment of doubt from an ethical perspective. 
The Caribbean had already witnessed reprehensible acts of breathtaking 
proportions (Khan 2001). Europeans had virtually wiped out the islands’ 
indigenous people, only to replace them with enslaved Africans and in-
dentured Asians. Capitalism, racism, and Christianity all contributed to 
extraordinary violence. But—alongside and partly independent of these 
forces—a new idea of fuel took hold. In Trinidad, producers and consum-
ers of energy came to see it as a transportable, interchangeable commod-
ity. This ideological and moral shift has never figured among the famous 
transformations of the Caribbean—or of anywhere really. Trinidad’s histo-
riography tends to treat oil and gas merely as substances and as unalloyed 
goods for the island and beyond (Mulchansingh 1971; Ministry of Energy 
and Energy Industries 2009). In both world wars, Trinidad’s oil propelled 
British and Allied forces. After Independence in 1962, the country devel-
oped its gas sector, becoming a major exporter of downstream products 
such as methanol and plastics. Oil has given the country economic stability 
and political sovereignty. Thus, thanks to relatively open governance and 
technical competence, Trinidad has largely skirted oil’s frequent “resource 
curse.” The specters of underdevelopment, corruption, violence, and 
pollution do haunt the island. But the Orinoco delta is no Niger delta of 
oil theft and paramilitary politics. Trinidad’s hydrocarbons appear to have 
solved many problems without creating substantial new ones. Energy with-
out Conscience seeks to overturn that comforting account. Trinidad—like 
any state producing or consuming hydrocarbons—must reckon with the 
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contemporary great evil of dumping carbon dioxide in the skies. True, the 
effects of burning oil have taken longer to accrue than did the earlier body 
counts of Atlantic conquest or capture. But damage now becomes more 
evident each year. The historical part of this book (part I) returns to the 
1780s and 1850s, when solar, human, and fossil energy sources seemed si-
multaneously promising and problematic. Revisiting the paths not taken, 
we might discern a better choice. 
Complicity
I have struggled to find a language with which to describe the varied con-
ditions of my informants in Trinidad. Like many of us, they burn hydrocar-
bons at rates higher than the global per capita average. The women and men 
of this first group of Trinis drive cars, live in air- conditioned houses, and 
use energy in all the ways characteristic of the world’s billion high emitters. 
Many of my informants go further than that: they control private firms and 
government agencies that exploit hydrocarbons systematically. This second 
group comprises “captains of industry”—in the quaint phrase used without 
irony in Trinidad’s convention halls and luxury hotels. A third set of infor-
mants captains nothing, not even motor vehicles. The residents of South 
Trinidad’s oil belt consume little oil. They become relevant to this story 
because of their choice not to protest the oil and gas industry. The practices 
I describe then range from promoting oil, to reaping its benefits, to remain-
ing silent about its costs. Environmentalists might describe the first party 
as responsible for climate change and the last one as ignorant of it. Perhaps 
the consumers in the middle—for whom we still lack an adequate descrip-
tor—act negligently toward the atmosphere and everything dependent on 
it. If climate change were solely an environmental problem, then this lexi-
con would do the job: I would present the ethnography of people variously 
enabling one form of pollution. But I don’t consider climate change to be 
merely an environmental problem. It is that and much, much more. The 
commodity chain from hydrocarbons to hurricanes—which I treat as one 
unit—has occupied the land like a far- reaching system of power. Combus-
tion, as Rob Nixon (2011) writes, wreaks a “slow violence” as devastating 
as it is pervasive. Occasionally, a fast Pakistani flood or Louisiana hurricane 
causes death tolls too high to measure with accuracy. Some authors describe 
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this uneven lethality as “petro- dictatorship” or “fossil capitalism.” Climate 
change thus exceeds other ecological crises in both its scale and its delivery 
of force. I am less concerned with labeling this system than with under-
standing those operating within it. They are, I argue, “complicit” with oil.
In this sense of widespread but traceable, anthropogenic harm, colonial-
ism may provide the best analogue.10 Almost as total as climate change, the 
system of rule prevailing over the Americas, Africa, Oceania, and much of 
Asia for as many as five centuries contained fast and slow violence. Around 
1800, outright enslavement and genocide gave way to Christian and other 
“civilizing missions.” European scientists began an “anticonquest” of dis-
covery and description. The geographer and explorer Alexander von 
Humboldt contributed more than anyone to this movement. His and 
contemporary texts, though, could not avoid complicity. So writes Mary 
Louise Pratt, charging various narrators with constructing “cultureless” 
brown and black bodies available for European domination (Pratt 1992, 
53). Pratt may have indicted von Humboldt unfairly (Marcone 2013), but 
she indicates the difficulty any intellectual faces in thinking outside the 
dominant ideology of his or her time. In the twentieth century, though, 
the colonial paradigm began to crack. In 1937, George Orwell denounced 
both imperial working conditions and left- wing intellectuals’ tolerance of 
the same: “In order that England may live in comparative comfort, a hun-
dred million Indians must live on the verge of starvation—an evil state of 
affairs, but you acquiesce in it every time you step into a taxi or eat a plate 
of strawberries and cream” (1937, 159). This charge—holding a large but 
defined group responsible for vast harm—could just as well apply to users 
of fossil fuels today. One can no longer plead ignorance. The information 
that, say, carbon emissions are pushing millions of Indians into starvation 
and displacement is widely available and credible. To choose the car over 
the bicycle, one has to repudiate science. Few people reject climatology ex-
plicitly. Far more high emitters deliberately discount or refuse altogether to 
imagine current and future victims of climate change. That decision takes 
place almost, perhaps entirely, automatically, but it constitutes a discrete 
action: “acquiescence,” in Orwell’s turn of phrase. Small, prosaic actions are 
beginning to accrete to the level of mass death.
At that larger scale, with whom does the accomplice conspire? Com-
plicity, which shares a root with accomplice, implies a partner in crime. 
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Perhaps oil serves as the trigger man. Bruno Latour (2005) might put the 
argument in these terms: networks of human and petrolic “actants” collab-
orate on the basis of complementary properties. The harried commuter, 
in other words, wants to reach her destination, the motor vehicle carries 
her, and the petrol pushes the piston. More recent scholarship focuses on 
the vibrant quality of materials, as if gasoline willed people from suburb 
to suburb and jet fuel flew them personally from continent to continent. 
Certainly, energy behaves in ways that suggest volition (Bennett 2010, 
54). It moves at the speed of electrons or explodes into  atoll- destroying 
mushroom clouds. Many of my informants in Trinidad credited oil and gas 
with an understated animacy. Deposits were constantly welling up, and, as 
chapter 3 explains, petroleum experts portrayed themselves as hardly more 
than helpmates to the nearest gusher. Such modesty actually shifts respon-
sibility to the hydrocarbons themselves, as if humans only lately joined a 
geological plot hatched elsewhere. Ethnographically, I treat such theories 
as a folk belief—or folk science—that obscures political and economic 
relations. On the ground, people populate the network that wills carbon 
emissions—and, therefore, climate change—to happen. Producers collab-
orate with consumers to move oil from underground reservoir to refinery, 
to engine, to atmosphere. Almost all the time, that process unfolds exactly 
as the sentient actors intended, anticipated, or could have anticipated it 
to do. Hydrocarbons are an instrument, like the hammer that one uses to 
pound a nail into a piece of wood. Until something goes wrong: oil does—
let’s say—conspire against people when its volatility causes a refinery to 
explode and contaminate the local environment. The co2 spill everywhere, 
on the other hand, figures only as the last link in a well- functioning com-
modity chain designed and operated entirely by men and women. At oppo-
site ends of a long pipe, consumers act as the party complicit to producers 
of oil, and vice versa.
That multiplex human partnership encompasses only some people, 
some societies, and some states. The bulk of our species—minus the one 
billion high emitters—participates in oil mostly as victims of it. I do not 
share the mounting concern that humanity has become a geological agent, 
ushering us into the so- called Anthropocene era. The chemist Paul Crut-
zen popularized that neologism in 2002 to indicate “mankind’s growing in-
fluence on the environment.”11 By now, a wide range of scholars, journalists, 
and activists defines the Anthropocene as “the first geological era shaped 
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by one species, humans.” That charge assumes an onset of the Anthropo-
cene from the domestication of plants or from the Pleistocene extinctions 
caused by the first Native Americans, as if maize cobs led inevitably to 
megatrucks (Ruddiman 2013). A minority of Homo sapiens—“industrial 
humans” perhaps—developed hydrocarbons and everything they power. 
Today a minority dumps gigatons of carbon into the atmosphere (Malm 
and Hornborg 2014). True, almost everyone buys plastic and other prod-
ucts containing oil and transported by burning oil. Yet the Zimbabwean 
peasant who lights her mud- and- pole dwelling with one  petroleum- based 
candle hardly counts. She practices what Anna Tsing (2012, 95) calls “slow 
disturbance,” artisanal lifeways that mostly recraft biodiversity. The prefix 
anthro spreads blame too widely (Chakrabarty 2009, 216). A small guild, so 
to speak, manufactures lethal climates for mass distribution.
In focusing on that guild, I have written a customary sort of ethnog-
raphy. Part II of Energy without Conscience examines the current life of 
 tribe- sized, faraway social groups so as to illuminate problems in North 
America and Europe. The bulk of my readers, I suspect, live—as I do—in 
the Global North and consume hydrocarbons at a fast clip. My informants 
live in Trinidad and Tobago and engage with hydrocarbons in additional 
ways. But the cultural distance is not so great that I need to familiarize you 
long- windedly with my subjects. The particular hurdle for this book lies in 
describing some of my informants as unusual at all. Crude oil, as the term 
even suggests, is ordinary, pedestrian. To disrupt that normalcy, the activist 
Bill McKibben labels oil, gas, and coal firms as “radicals. They are willing to 
alter the chemical composition of the atmosphere in order to get money. 
That’s as radical an act as any person who ever lived has undertaken” (Cli-
mate One 2011). Trinidad and Tobago’s energy experts find petroleum and 
gas where no one else does, and some of them export their knowledge to 
Africa and elsewhere.
Despite this trail of damage, I do not consider such people monsters, 
motivated by hate or beyond the arc of reason. My informants practice 
their professions in a fashion that both benefits society in the short term 
and uses a natural resource that would otherwise be neglected. They 
contribute only complicitly to a project larger than themselves. To that 
project, additional clusters of Trinidadians contribute less directly. Chap-
ter 4 concerns environmentally minded activists, some of them poor and 
undoubtedly low emitters. These men and women became complicit by 
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omission: they refused to protest the global oil spill, as well as local ones, 
and in so doing crafted a narrow, indeed obsolete, politics of pollution. 
Finally, chapter 5 discusses what I call the climate intelligentsia of Trinidad, 
a loose group of scientists, activists, and policy makers who portrayed Trin-
idad as an innocent victim of climate change. Astonishingly, their rhetoric 
of small, vulnerable islands exonerated the country’s oil and gas sector. 
These individuals all held erroneous assumptions, a fact that most—and 
mostly with humor—acknowledged to me. Some are now trying to move 
Trinidad’s own energy grid from gas to renewables. Most, though, want 
simply to produce another barrel of oil.
The Feeling of Energy
How does it feel to change the climate in sensory, rather than moral, terms? 
Feeling connotes tactile experiences as well as ethical dilemmas. The for-
mer do not immediately lead to the latter. To take things in proper order 
then—as an ethnographic subject lives her life—let me ask, “How does 
it feel, in sensations, to consume energy?” Matthew Huber has already 
probed this issue in relation to U.S. suburbs. They present “an appearance 
of atomized command over the spaces of mobility, home, and even the 
body itself ” (Huber 2013, 23). People feel free, as they flit in cars between 
detached houses and points of consumption. Residents of Port of Spain, 
or at least of its wealthier parts, also know this behavior and its sense of 
liberation. Many wake in the  middle- and  upper- class fringes of the city 
and travel into or through the urban core daily by car. I followed this pat-
tern, sometimes alone and more often sharing transportation. The daily 
journey covered what one might call three energy zones related to different 
objects: automobiles, bodies, and buildings. Port of Spain is what Carola 
Hein (2009) calls an “oil capital.” But it also seems to pulse with something 
more elemental—a kind of mania and revelry in the consumption of en-
ergy per se. Cars, exercising men and women, and air- conditioned edifices 
huffed and puffed visibly, even promiscuously.
The first sensation comes with combustion, the thrum of engines, and 
the pull of g- forces. With my family, I lived in Cascade, on the fringe of 
Port of Spain. We rented the house of Eden Shand, a retired politician de-
scribed at length in chapter 5. As the name suggests, Cascade slides down 
the foothills of Northern Range, off dramatic ridges and into steep ravines. 
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The vistas are beautiful—and mostly accessed by car (figure i.3). In recent 
years, developers have built roads and houses at the very limits of the auto-
mobile. Vehicles will not ascend slopes steeper than those in Cascade and 
its adjoining settlement, St. Ann’s. The landscape then turns commuting 
into something more intrepid and exciting. I rode sometimes with Che 
Lovelace, as he descended Cascade with my son, with other children, and 
with eight long boards for a Saturday surf lesson. We whizzed through sin-
uous, riparian curves, the sea peeping through dense foliage, as Che drank 
a shandy or talked on his cell phone. Elsewhere we might get stuck in a 
traffic jam. But in Cascade driving was fun, and people reveled in it. Cheap 
gasoline—subsidized by the petrostate—underwrote this automobility. 
But a feeling enlivened it. Perhaps it was the thrill of driving in an urban 
geography not quite meant for the car, as shown in the foreground of fig-
ure i.3. To me the lanes always seemed too narrow, the curves too blind, 
and the gradients way too up and down. In this sense, Cascade differed 
from a safe, sedately mobile American suburb. The car in Cascade—as it 
burned petroleum—pulled one up, down, and sideways.
i.3 Port of Spain viewed from St. Ann’s. Photograph by the author.
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At its southern apron, Cascade and St. Ann’s spill into what I would call 
a zone of body energy. The Queen’s Park Savannah, the greensward in the 
middle of figure i.3, separates downtown from the northern outskirts. On 
that very grass in 2007, Eden Shand deployed his body against the car, pro-
testing the paving of a southern section of the Savannah. A truck dumped 
gravel on him, damaging his spine permanently. Around the Savannah 
runs a 4- kilometer sidewalk, which is Trinidad’s closest approximation 
to a pedestrian mall. People don’t merely idle and stroll. Fit women and 
men come to see and be seen as they expend energy. Most go clockwise, 
with the car traffic, and no one crosses the Savannah. Running shoes on, I 
sometimes took part in this crowded rush hour of muscle and movement. 
It peaks in January, as people methodically tone their bodies for Carnival. 
They are enacting a cosmology—with a more positive outcome than in 
Shand’s case. In Trinidad, writes anthropologist Daniel Miller, “the truth of 
a person exists in this labour they perform to create themselves” (2011, 50). 
Those exertions bear fruit as near- naked bodies cross through the south 
stands—along the same Savannah edge—to be judged on Carnival Tues-
day. I “played mas,” as they say, dressed as a bare- chested pirate. With my 
wife and two friends, we “chipped” down the road from sunup to sundown 
for two days. I believe there is no outdoor recreational event where so many 
people work so hard under such equatorial heat for so long. Rio’s Carnival 
takes place mostly at night. The Boston Marathon finishes in a few hours. 
In Port of Spain, masqueraders sweat like slaves, practicing an art form 
derived from slavery. But even as they expend somatic power, they do not 
feel anything like slaves. At the edge of the Savannah, where a parking sign 
instructs, “four taxis facing north,” I ran into the author of a short story by 
that name (Walcott- Hackshaw 2007). She was dancing with herself, with 
her body, blissed out and oblivious to the world.
That taxi rank marks the boundary of Port of Spain’s third energy zone. 
Elites have built an archipelago of air- conditioning. From the point where 
I saw the writer in rapture, one crosses Queens Park West Road into the 
neighborhood of Newtown. Once a frontier of urban expansion, these 
dense blocks contain headquarters of  foreign- owned oil companies: bp, 
Repsol, eog, and British Gas. I did not go into these edifices very often. My 
research centered on Trinidadian firms and organizations. But I wandered 
those streets, sometimes meeting informants in the Rituals Café on Marli 
Street. Even outside one feels the energy of cooling. Frigid air pours out, 
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unimpeded by double doors or any of the other  energy- saving methods 
employed elsewhere. Businesspeople emerge from buildings overdressed, 
scurrying from the tropical heat into  climate- controlled cars. The Guy-
anese novelist Oonya Kempadoo (2001, 17) describes a look of “air con-
dition skin,” conveying wealth and the habit of self- protection from the 
elements. Perhaps a whole neighborhood can wear this aesthetic. Trinis 
themselves remark more frequently on the air- conditioning of another lo-
cale, about a mile south of Newtown. On the Gulf of Paria, the government 
had recently established an International Waterfront Centre. Its Hyatt Ho-
tel and two glass spires—in the right background of figure i.3—deliber-
ately evoked Dubai. The Ministry of Energy and Energy Industries occu-
pied some office space, but most of the square footage stood empty. Trinis 
joked about governmental hubris and speculated on air- conditioning. Dry 
season temperatures exceeded 90˚F every day for months. Was the state 
burning its natural gas reserves to cool vacant acres? Or was it letting them 
bake, and risking equally expensive damage to the buildings? Workers at 
the ministry understood more than the average person about heat and 
energy. One usually burns fuel to raise temperatures. There is something 
miraculous—always seemingly futuristic—about combustion for cooling. 
It involves more artifice and people know it. Certainly, energy executives—
with their “air condition skin”—knew it as they hurried from one vessel of 
privilege to another.
I conducted most of my ethnography along this  energy- intensive tran-
sect of motors, muscles, and manipulated air. In Cascade, I lived near 
some of my informants, but not with the close immediacy of the classic 
peasant or tribal study. “Studying up”—as we call the ethnography of 
elites—requires surmounting barriers against access (Nader 1974). Pe-
troleum geologists live behind walls, in gated communities. I had to meet 
them over lunch, over drinks, or in their offices. Conferences allowed me 
to carry out true participant observation. There—often in the resplendent 
Hyatt Hotel—I joined discussions and receptions with the most accom-
plished and powerful energy experts. To be objects of anthropological 
study alternately flattered and amused them. As I pushed this indulgence, 
attitude became my method. Promoters of oil and gas are wrecking the 
world. This conviction—my feeling about energy—has driven this study 
from the beginning. Initially coy, I gradually deployed this sentiment. If 
you really care about sea level rise, I would say over rum, why don’t you 
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just leave the hydrocarbons in the ground? It was a provocation reminis-
cent of the filmmaker Michael Moore (2004)—who, in one memorable 
scene, asks congressmen to enlist their children for military service in 
Iraq.12 Moore did not amuse his interlocutors. Perhaps because Trinidad 
has a tradition of teasing—called picong—energy experts took my jibes in 
stride. They laughed and then responded revealingly. Still, I wanted more. 
I wanted to find someone who agreed with me. So I left my customary 
corridor in Port of Spain and explored the oil fields and industrial sites of 
South Trinidad. I found people opposed to pollution in their communities, 
and asked, “Would you really be satisfied if this industry left here merely 
to export harm elsewhere, possibly to the whole planet?” Most would have 
been. Again, I learned a great deal while gaining little peace. I found data 
but not truth as moral clarity.
At least, I found complex individuals: the  planner- cum- slaver Josef 
Chacón, the  utopian- turned- oilman Conrad Stollmeyer, the eco- driller 
Krishna Persad, the selective environmentalist Wayne Kublalsingh, and the 
lady- doth- protest- too- much prime minister Patrick Manning. Throughout 
the book, I attend to the consciousness of key figures in the energy trade. 
Many of these men—men have consistently dominated the energy sec-
tor—failed in their own terms. They imagined more than they invented. 
Conditions frustrated their ambitions, or they themselves sold out their 
loftiest ideals. Why should any living or long- dead leader with few follow-
ers then attract followers now? The question or criticism would seem all 
the more pertinent in Trinidad, which has developed a tradition of cynical, 
distrusting appraisal. Eric Williams, the country’s historian turned inde-
pendence leader and first president, rose to prominence by debunking the 
pious sentiments of British abolitionists. Bondage was unprofitable before 
it became unpopular, he wrote in Capitalism and Slavery (Williams 1944), 
rather than the reverse. In the same spirit, Trinidad’s talented calypsonians 
revel in unearthing corruption. Ridicule eventually touches every politi-
cian. Trinis understand complicity all too well. Meanwhile, anthropology 
has never privileged the individual over the collective, or the singular in-
sight over the idea widely shared. In writing something like biographies, 
then, I am cutting against a grain of local discourse as well as the disci-
plinary sensibilities of my own social science. It is necessary to do so. Or, 
rather, my political agenda—to challenge people’s complicity with climate 
change—compels the most thorough search for precedents and examples 
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of life without fossil fuels. In this sense, I resist the label “utopian.” Every-
thing that I and others seek in energy has already happened to someone 
or to someplace.
In Energy without Conscience, I am trying simultaneously to amplify and 
dampen public concern about climate change and fossil fuels. As a cause 
for alarm, this commodity chain threatens the conditions for life on planet 
Earth. Bill McKibben (2010) designates the  carbon- enriched environment 
“Eaarth,” a new spelling for a new, profoundly dangerous age. By 2100—if 
business continues as usual—grain belts will collapse and ecosystems will 
have already hemorrhaged species. Ecologically speaking, nothing this bad 
has occurred since the last mass extinction event, the  dinosaur- destroying 
meteor strike of 65 million years ago. This time, as many observers now 
quip, “We are the asteroid” (e.g., McKibben 2003, 11). Here I would qualify 
the alarm and its misguided universalism. The “we” of seven billion Homo 
sapiens has not acted in concert. As a set of deeds, climate change is spread-
ing in a patchy, discontinuous fashion. Environmentalists see this pattern 
every day. It is a planetary version of the toxic risks and exposures con-
centrated in poor communities of the Global North and South. Burning 
oil constitutes a form of environmental injustice and  human- on- human 
structural violence. This interpretation—suggestive of war—indicates 
helpful, sober precedents. The United States devotes a fifth of its govern-
ment budget to defense. More than a million men and women relinquish 
their liberty to serve as soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Imagine shifting all 
those resources and goodwill to defending ourselves from oil and climate 
change. If motivated by a national emergency, high emitters would replace 
oil and gas with wind and solar, conserve energy, and live differently. Per-
haps considering oil as a merely military threat will help us phase it out 
(Garrard 2004, 107).
Thus, I would like to decelerate and redirect the rhetoric of apocalypse. 
Apocalypse, by definition, arrives without precedent and requires unprec-
edented defenses and adaptations. To relinquish fossil fuels, for instance, 
might require a dictatorship or “climate Leviathan” capable of repressing 
consumer choice in high- emitting democracies (Wainwright and Mann 
2013). That speculation exceeds the bounds of this history and ethnog-
raphy. Energy without Conscience contributes to the debate, nonetheless, 
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by suggesting that people have already envisioned the abandonment of 
oil. I do not share Slavoj Žižek’s (2010, 334) despair in writing that publics 
imagine the end of nature more easily than the end of fossil capitalism. For 
that latter event, many societies have already trained and know—if only 
through their historical archives—more or less what to do. Trinidad once 
planned development without oil. There, in the eighteenth century, a Jesuit 
designed an agriculture powered only by equatorial sunlight. The governor 
of Trinidad harnessed the power of African bodies. Both schemes imag-
ined what we now call alternative energy. A historian—or one narrowly 
tethered to chronology—might consign these failed plans to an ash heap 
of impractical or immoral attempts. As an anthropologist, I have (or have 
taken) the liberty of running history backward, excavating the solutions 
that predate problems, and indulging in counterfactual speculation: what 
if people had not banished God from the landscape, or what if, from the 
wreckage of Caribbean slavery, survivors had salvaged the value of walk-
ing, pedaling legs as useful energy? From off the favored Euro- American 
stage, this study engages in what Svetlana Boym (2008, 4) calls “off mod-
ern” thinking—“an exploration of the side alleys and lateral potentialities” 
of where we are.
There may be no better way to approach the question posed at the 
outset of this introduction: How does it feel to change the climate? How, 
furthermore, does it feel not to care? Where, I might add, is conscience, 
or guilt? Where—and this is what I also mean by conscience—is a sense of 
responsibility or reverence for energy and the world around it? McKibben 
wrote in 1989 about living morally with “the end of nature.” He awakes into 
an “alertness,” akin to the tensing of a swimmer hearing a distant motor-
boat (McKibben 1989, 49). McKibben’s unease mounted so high that he 
founded the first climate change movement in the United States. I would 
like us all to acquire the same fear and to respond with a measure of Mc-
Kibben’s desperation and generosity. My informants stand at quite some 
distance from this position. From petroleum geologists to antitoxic activ-
ists, they mostly don’t care deeply about climate change. They care now and 
then, but they don’t care about global warming in that way that one worries 
over a sick, elderly relative, growing feeble, losing capacity, heading for a 
different state. Perhaps no one cares about climate change in the way that 
that senescent person herself faces mortality and the uncertainty of what 
lies beyond. The absence of those feelings presents a shape. It has contours 
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and boundaries. The ethnographer, in conversation with someone vaguely 
concerned about climate change, brushes against the skin of that silence, 
provoking defensiveness, a glance of recognition, or a joke that both par-
ties know is not funny (cf. Kidron 2009). As much as nonfiction can do, 
Energy without Conscience attempts to illuminate that negative space. Let 
us see not- feeling- climate- change as a concrete thing. It sits among us like 
an antiquated superstition, too customary to discard but too backward to 
celebrate. I wish to expose that belief as retrograde and wrong. With this 
historical and ethnographic story, I hope to crack the chalice of disregard 
still cradling oil, its producers, and its consumers.
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PART I
ENERGY WITH  CONSCIENCE
Trans-Atlantic slaving ship
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FROM ENE RGY TO FUEL , so much has been lost. Anthropologists 
frequently lament the attrition of languages, religions, and cul-
tural customs of all sorts. These aspects of culture live on, but fre-
quently as curiosities and performances for tourists. How many 
people dance only for cameras in hotel lobbies, selling revelry, 
lust, or anger as a global commodity? These practices still mean 
something—possibly more than before—but they lack con-
science. Commerce has hollowed a thickness and density once 
palpable around us. Energy has thinned in the same way. What 
was a multiplex notion of divinity, life, and rightness now denotes 
oil—or, at its most plural, a small portfolio of fuels. This section 
of the book traces that narrowing: from solar power to slavery 
(chapter 1) through a last consideration of both of these possibil-
ities before the final choice of hydrocarbons (chapter 2). Energy 
now fills a tank. In the United States, traces of the former holism 
still remain: the energy in a yoga studio or the energy of New Age 
crystals. But these references bulk small: they are hollow in the 
sense that they hardly offset the overwhelming drivers of what 
has been called fossil capitalism. Modernity runs consistently on a 
 planet- destroying fuel. I am hopeful, though, that shards of other 
cosmologies—recognized and again respected—will inform 
energy policy.
By 1700, the sugar revolution had taken hold just north of Trinidad, on 
Barbados. Another British colony, Jamaica, was also enjoying a boom, 
as did the French isles of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Dominica. Most 
infamously, Saint- Domingue, later Haiti, worked Africans to death by 
the thousands. Plantations soon festooned the Caribbean, pumping out 
sweetness and wealth. With the notable exception of Trinidad: the island 
languished as a colonial failure. Spain neither knew what resources existed 
on the island nor garnered investment capable of exploiting more than 
a fraction of them. A handful of settlers and a small population of slaves 
planted cacao only to suffer a devastating crop blight in 1727. Five years 
later, the Jesuit Joseph Gumilla visited for two weeks and recommended 
rehabilitating the crop: Madrid, he envisioned, would send landless peas-
ants from Andalusia and the Canary Islands to grow cacao without slaves.1 
Solar rays and the natural fecundity of the tropics would guarantee good 
harvests. But the Crown sent no one. Then smallpox struck in 1739 ( Joseph 
1838, 148). The colony teetered on the edge of ruin. “Even the monkeys 
died,” writes V. S. Naipaul, whose novelistic sensibilities capture the era 
better than straight history. “The morale of the settlers broke. For a cen-
tury and more they had lived close to nature. Now, ignoring the Spanish 
code, they left their huts in Saint Joseph and lived, like the Indians before 
them, in the bush” (Naipaul 1969, 123–24). Civilization teetered on the 
brink of collapse, a defeat all the more bitter given its Caribbean context. 
For the region’s easy money, Trinidad possessed sunshine and fertile soil 
but lacked every other necessary element: wealthy settlers of the planter 
class, equipment for sugar mills, and, above all, slave labor. Although no 
one phrased it in quite that way, Trinidad suffered from a crisis of somatic, 
or bodily, energy. For a late sugar revolution, the island needed manpower, 
measurable in  kilowatt- hours but sought then by the boatload.
CHAPTER 1
Plantation Slaves, the First Fuel
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Into this breach strode a man shrewd and calculating enough—and 
just barely ruthless enough—to succeed. In 1783, the Crown and its in-
tendente (administrator) in Caracas appointed Don Josef Maria Chacón, 
a naval brigadier and knight of the Order of Calatrava, to serve as gover-
nor of Trinidad. He was to implement the royal edict, or cédula, of 1783: a 
set of reforms intended to encourage planters with slaves to immigrate to 
Trinidad. Contemporaries described him as polyglot, indefatigable, and 
incorruptible ( Joseph 1838, 160–61, 168). In these qualities, he probably 
did not differ substantially from Gumilla. But, in order to implement the 
cédula, he disregarded—or, at any rate, did not dredge up—the Jesuit’s 
writings. Chacón took as given the need for labor and, in particular, for 
unfree labor. This somatic project, however, created its own problems. 
The governor struggled with the task of objectifying workers. Enslaved 
Africans expressed themselves and acted as individuals, especially when 
they absconded from plantations. Even as he sought shipments of human 
cargo, Chacón could not easily repress the personalities contained below 
decks. Still, he did so well enough to turn the corner in Trinidad. The 
colony began to produce, refine, and export sugar—at nowhere near its 
potential—but at a level respectable enough to attract attention. London 
noticed. Thirteen years into Chacón’s governorship, England captured the 
island from Spain without firing a shot. Chacón, who might otherwise have 
retired in glory, instead returned to Madrid in disgrace.
To the extent that he did recruit planters and slaves to Trinidad, Chacón 
provoked the most profound energy transition of all. He and other traders 
of slaves invented fuel. A fuel stores energy in a measurable, countable, 
transportable, and salable form. Energy becomes fuel as it becomes a re-
source. But resources—such as lakes or forests—need not move. I write 
fuel, then, to emphasize this intrinsically deracinated quality. Solar rays 
bore none of these attributes. Gumilla never thought to package sunlight 
and send it from sunlit to shady areas or from the tropics to the temperate 
zone. Laborers, even slaves, did not automatically assume this commodity 
form either. Some served the master and his family over a lifetime, acting 
as acknowledged persons in a social field. Other slaves—particularly in the 
context of plantations—performed the tasks assigned day in and day out 
with no personal recognition from above. Marx wrote of these people as 
possessing “labor- power” but without the proletarian’s right or ability to 
sell it. Whereas workers might advance by learning new skills, plantation 
plAntAtIon slAves, the FI rst Fuel  31
slaves would gain little or nothing. Lacking incentives to specialize, they re-
mained or became general, interchangeable, and substitutable (Marx 1976, 
1032). Plantation hands became liquid, one might say. Traders transported 
labor power over far greater distances than they had done for wood, the 
Caribbean’s closest approximation to a modern fuel. Cane cutters, in short, 
helped Chacón and his successors to imagine energy for the first time as a 
commodity and as a flow. But by running away and even killing their mas-
ters, they also constantly challenged that understanding. At moments like 
these, Chacón had to consider them as individuals: a prick of conscience. 
The first fuel, thus, flowed imperfectly, slowed by the friction of moral scru-
ple. It flowed well enough, nonetheless, to establish the conventions under 
which we now extract oil and ship it across oceans by the boatload. With-
out intending to do so, Chacón and other sugar revolutionaries imagined 
the true energy without conscience that waited in the wings.
Scientific Slavery
Trinidad entered the slave trade as a scrounger. Spain lacked the West Afri-
can ports and interior networks so useful to Portugal, Britain, and France. 
The empire could only obtain Africans through intermediaries and after 
those parties had satisfied their own needs. Trinidad’s status in the em-
pire—as a backwater of a backwater—limited the options further. How 
could remote Port of Spain, Trinidad’s capital from 1757, direct the flow 
of enslaved Africans to its shores? Scavenging seemed like the only op-
tion. In 1763, as a result of Europe’s Seven Years’ War, Britain acquired the 
French Antilles of Dominica, Saint Vincent, Grenada, and Tobago. Cath-
olic planters stayed in place but chafed under Protestant, foreign rule. In-
centives might induce them to leave—and bring their slaves and expertise 
to Trinidad. In that expectation, the Crown relaxed its highly protectionist 
controls on imports in 1776. Some Frenchmen  island- hopped to Trinidad, 
among them a certain Grenadian planter, Philippe Rose Roume de St. Lau-
rent. Roume immediately sought to recruit more like him. He estimated a 
further 379 families were available on Grenada and on Martinique, where 
ants were ravaging the cane crop. They would bring 33,322 slaves in tow 
and require, Roume estimated, one 3- fanega plot of food crops per group 
of seventy.2 (A fanega comprised roughly 7.5 acres, or 3 hectares [ Joseph 
1838, 162].) These stipulations would, as he put it later, guarantee “the es-
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tablishment of the Colony of Trinidad and means to bring it promptly to 
perfection.”3 Prompted by Roume, the Crown proclaimed the cédula of 
November 24, 1783. More generous than the exemptions of 1776, these 
“Regulations of Commerce and Population” excused Catholic settlers from 
import duties, from the annual taxes, and from other financial burdens 
(Newson 1976, 179–80). Slave masters would receive a basic land grant 
and another 50 percent of that acreage for each bonded man or woman 
imported. With an odd precision, the incentive scheme awarded 21⁄7 fane-
gas per slave.4 The subsidies worked, and planters—whether driven by 
desperation or greed—began to arrive (figure 1.1). Trinidad might finally 
become a sugar isle.
Chacón intended to make sure of that, indeed, to blanket the island 
with plantations. After a delay, he arrived in Port of Spain in September 
1784. Possibly the governor already possessed a familiarity with quantita-
tive measures concurrently applied to estates in Saint- Domingue. There, 
the plantation owner and geographer Moreau de Saint- Méry was in the 
process of establishing a ratio of two hundred slaves for 150 tons of sugar 
(Martin 1948, 122). More broadly, French Physiocrats were enthusiasti-
cally—and for the first time—systematically counting everything from 
births to trees (Scott 1998, 14). In this intellectual movement, Chacón 
played a small, local role: he perfected a quantitative, scientific approach 
to slavery. He began by facilitating trade—or, as the instruction from the 
imperial intendente in Caracas put it (with no irony intended), “to liberate 
the slaves forever from all import duties, in light of the increase that will 
result in agriculture.”5 How much increase would result? Chacón spent his 
first month calculating the relationship between somatic energy, botanical 
production, and financial rents. He treated the land as if it were a giant ma-
chine. Reporting in November 1784 to Caracas, he worked backward from 
the surface area of Trinidad, estimated at 400 square leagues, of which 180, 
or roughly 100,000 fanegas, were arable. Chacón borrowed yield figures 
from French and British isles, while anticipating that Trinidad’s “tierras 
virgenes” would produce more per fanega than did the more settled An-
tilles. Based on prevailing agricultural prices, he then compiled the ideal 
crop mix for the plantations, and, most importantly, the number of slaves 
required per fanega. The governor derived employment rates for sugar as 
well as coffee, cotton, and cacao. Projections of profit favored cane and 
hard work. But the labor intensity of cacao and coffee–1½ and 2½ slaves 
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per fanega, respectively—indicates Chacón’s deeper insight: one could 
measure slaves in fractions—as increments of labor power—rather than 
as whole bodies.6
This calculus completely overlooked the messy realities of plantation 
life. Planters knew better. Sugar barons on Saint- Domingue could not be-
gin to calculate a stocking ratio of labor: they rotated the workforce among 
fields and crops, presumably exploiting the change of seasons and matu-
ration of individual cultivars (Bonnet 2008, 147–48). Even within a field, 
difference frustrated calculation. In Barbados—the archetypical Wind-
ward sugar island—plantations frequently intercropped sugar with food 
provisions, such as maize and sorghum (Roberts 2006, 579). Presumably, 
such polyculture reduced the efficiency of cane harvesting but enhanced 
the overall productivity of the land. Thus, the sugar revolution involved 
more species and more complexity than that catchphrase suggests. In other 
ways as well, Chacón and all counters of slaves were chasing a myth. Barba-
dian planters aimed for a labor density quite close to Chacón’s ideal—one 
slave per two acres—but they knew that slaves differed (Curtin 1990, 83; 
1.1 Settlement of Trinidad, 1784–1797. Created by Mike Siegel of Rutgers  
Cartography Lab.
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Menard 2006, 93). Some were stronger, some weaker; some healthy, some 
sick; some younger, some older; and some were male while some were 
female. Enslaved Africans also varied by what planters called their indi-
vidual or tribal “dispositions.” The  Caribbean- born slave shed much of his 
parents’ resistance. “Contrast the form of Guinea’s offspring wild,” wrote 
a Trini poet some decades later, “With the less fierce, and more happy, 
Creole child.”7 As inexperienced as he was, Chacón must have understood 
these particularities. His model treated them as rounding errors: a fanega 
of cane might require only two industrious slaves or four who dragged their 
feet. To arrive at the average figure of three per fanega, he constructed an 
abstract labor unit. Long before oil—and with materials far more lumpy 
and unruly—Chacón crafted an economic science of fuel.8
Then he needed to build a kind of institutional and cultural pipeline: a 
set of conventions that would siphon somatic power at a regular, predict-
able rate. The governor’s scheme of total cultivation would require 234,373 
Africans, a hundredfold increase over the existing shackled population. 
Roume revised his estimate of importable slaves upward to 40,000—all 
“acclimated” and accompanying masters immigrating from other islands.9 
Even this highly optimistic projection left a deficit of nearly 200,000 labor 
units. Port of Spain would need to procure bodies directly, in bulk, and 
possibly unacclimated. In 1784, therefore, the governor initiated a business 
relationship with Edward Barry, the  Havana- based agent of a Liverpool 
firm (Newson 1976, 217). Chacón struck a good bargain. On October 4, 
the Englishman disembarked 584 slaves, expecting payment only with the 
upcoming January harvest. The labor units, Chacón anticipated, would 
amortize their cost in one season. In a matter of days, however, their pro-
ductivity fell to zero. “The climate surprised them,” Chacón reported on 
October 8. Lacking shelter and even hammocks, they slept on the humid 
ground, where many sickened and died. Admitting his own failure to pro-
vide food and lodging, Chacón reloaded the survivors onto Barry’s ship 
and forwarded them to more capable buyers on the mainland.10 Then, in 
November, Chacón contracted for slaves resident in Cuba, workers who 
would presumably tolerate the climate better. But this trader, referred to 
as Fitch, ran into difficulties with the first shipment. His frigate sailed with 
only 437 of the expected 500 slaves—and after an expensive delay. Trinidad 
still lacked the facilities to accommodate a larger influx. Chacón wrote his 
superiors in February 1785, “We would not have been able to comply with 
plAntAtIon slAves, the FI rst Fuel  35
the agreement without great losses, had [the House of Fitch] delivered, 
over the last four months the 4000 slaves it offered.”11 The island could 
hardly import and maintain all the somatic power it needed to apply.
Still, in the same letter, Chacón doubled down on an increasingly risky 
pipeline bet. “Whatever European trading house succeeds in selling 4 to 
6000 Negros annually at the price of 750 pesos each,” he argued, “can just 
as well guarantee a number of 7000 slaves paid at the end of the first year.”12 
Trinidad, he concluded, would have to graduate from Caribbean scaveng-
ing to  large- scale, transatlantic hunting. “It is one of the tasks that occupy 
me incessantly,” he reflected in 1787. “The slaves from the part of the coast 
of Africa frequented by the Portuguese,” he continued, acknowledging dif-
ferences in disposition, “are preferable to those brought by the English, 
French and Americans, as much for greater docility as for more skills and 
strengths.”13 Chacón sought loans with which to purchase human cargo 
(Soler 1988, 34). In Caracas, however, the intendente preferred to assist 
with tax breaks, having lowered import duties again to “attract colonists 
who have slaves and funds to build houses and dedicate themselves im-
mediately to the cultivation of the land.”14 In fact, the colonists dedicated 
themselves immediately to clearing land, creating a further problem for 
the economy of slavery. Lowland and montane tropical forest covered all 
but a fraction of the 100,000 fanegas slated for plantation agriculture. As 
Frenchmen disembarked, they set their slaves to work cutting primary 
growth, probably the hardest labor in the Caribbean ( James [1938] 1989, 
56). Already in 1784, Chacón reported a death rate of one in three forest 
clearers.15 The inflow of slaves was not sufficient, Chacón worried, to “re-
place the number of those who have died.”16 In 1788 alone, 893 lost their 
lives (Brereton 1981, 27; Noel 1972, 99). Chacón blamed tropical forest and, 
more specifically, “sicknesses caused by the first exhalations of lands that 
had perhaps not seen the sun since they left the hands of the Creator.”17 A 
more humanitarian—or simply more conservationist—governor would 
have encouraged masters to work their chattels less. But Chacón already 
thought like an oil company. He treated bonded people as a substance to 
be obtained and consumed. Rather than restrain consumption—as fuel 
became scarce—he hunted for new supplies.
Somatic power might walk on four legs rather than two. In 1790, the gov-
ernor began petitioning Caracas for mules. Hooves were scarcer than arms: 
five years earlier, Chacón had reported only  fifty- seven of these animals 
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working in agriculture (Noel 1972, 105). Mules, of course, could not hold a 
machete to cut cane. They could, however, turn the mill that crushed stalks 
and squeezed out their juice. As the sugar crop expanded in the 1780s, this 
processing step began to limit production. Caracas proved more useful in 
freeing up this bottleneck, and mules numbered more than a thousand by 
1794 (Soler 1988, 117). Still, in 1796, Chacón underscored “the losses that 
[colonists] suffered this year for lack of mules to mill the canes and carry 
out the other tasks of their estates.”18 Compounding the problem, mules 
dropped dead from too much work and too little feed at an astonishing rate 
of 15 percent per year ( John 1988, 16; Newson 1976, 200–201). Chacón him-
self was suffering from a hoof- focused tunnel vision. Of 135 mills, only three 
operated by water and one by wind. The Trades blew constantly over the 
Lesser Antilles, turning sugar mills on Antigua, among other islands (Sher-
idan 1972, 22). Why did Chacón not seek to replicate that energy system? 
Why did he not, as was the practice in other Caribbean islands, position 
water wheels on the many streams flowing off the Northern Range and into 
the environs of Port of Spain (Patterson 1967, 55)? Chacón’s correspon-
dence reveals no inkling of these  place- based possibilities. Perhaps mules 
succeeded well enough to validate his fixation on muscle. As far as human, 
somatic fuel went, 6,431 slaves worked 1,463 fanegas at the peak (Soler 1988, 
114). Chacón boosted sugar cultivation but came nowhere near realizing 
his megamachine. Shortfalls, however, did not undermine his most lasting 
contribution: the embryonic idea of an amoral fuel, coursing throughout 
the Caribbean. Whether empty or full, a pipeline now connected Trinidad.
Slaves as People
Trinidad needed a constant influx of slaves not only to enlarge the supply 
but just to stay even. Two forms of offtake drove the population slowly 
down. Slaves died—worked to death—and slaves achieved their freedom. 
The former circumstance both resulted from and contributed to the treat-
ment of people as labor units. The most oppressive estates handled Afri-
cans as consumables. Fortunately, this style of management did not last. 
After the British interdiction of the slave trade in 1807, plantations took 
much greater care to ensure that bondsmen reproduced and sustained a 
local population. They treated at least female slaves more like breeding cat-
tle than like the sterile, and therefore expendable, mules. Even in Chacón’s 
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time, conditions for slaves improved. In 1789, Spain adopted the Code Noir 
of revolutionary France. The new rules required masters to baptize and 
evangelize among their labor force, to encourage marriage, to facilitate 
the cohabitation of spouses, and to minimize physical abuse ( Joseph 1838, 
174–76; Newson 1976, 200). Trinidad’s planters were not pleased. Still, they 
manumitted nine hundred slaves between 1784 and 1797, an astonishingly 
high rate for the Caribbean (de Verteuil 1992, 174). Perhaps the limits to ex-
ploitation also eroded the benefit of owning some slaves. Or slaves gained 
recognition as people. “I have been moved to promise them freedom,” 
wrote Don Herbert Roy of his mistress and her child in 1793, “because 
of the great love I have for them” (quoted in de Verteuil 1992, 178). Such 
emotion cut to the core contradiction of slavery: the difficulty of manag-
ing, as an insensate object, a woman or man who obviously felt, thought, 
and acted (Davis 1966, 261). Chacón operated in this murky space—on 
the edge of conscience.
Some slaves exerted their will in ways the governor could not ignore. 
For want of soldiers, his predecessor had failed to control roughly three 
hundred maroons, or runaways, hiding in the forest around Port of Spain 
(Newson 1976, 200). More than 10 percent of the chattel population had, 
in other words, taken their labor elsewhere permanently. In common with 
the authorities on other islands, Chacón paid prizes to the captors of slaves. 
The resulting manhunt itself stimulated laborers to turn themselves in. 
Chacón delivered these individuals back to their original masters, advising 
the latter to watch them closely. “[I have] destroyed entirely the pack of 
fugitive Negros,” he boasted to Caracas in late 1784, although the island 
was not yet “entirely calm with its slaves restrained and secure.”19 Indeed, 
by 1788, the problem had reappeared with a vengeance: Chacón feared in-
cipient “cantons” of absconded property. “I propose to his Majesty,” he 
wrote, “the establishment of a company of Dragons [cavalry and infantry 
combined] . . . sufficient to attack and collect the fugitive Negros.”20 He was 
asking a lot: How could an island then barely able to import mules expect 
to obtain warhorses? To underscore the need, Chacón raised the specter 
of “the English and the Dutch [who have felt] the need to recognize fugi-
tive slaves as independent, buying through shameful treaties a peace they 
could not achieve through force and in which, by consequence, they can-
not secure trust.”21 Still a military man at heart, the governor feared maroon 
ministates of the sort carving out territory in Jamaica and Surinam (Bilby 
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2005; Thompson 2006, 296–97). Conscience would not restrain him in 
preventing this outcome.
What was really at stake in the question of maroons? Each arm exiting 
the sugar fields lowered production and depleted the assets of the grower. 
The maroon also modeled an alternative way of life. The original Spanish 
term cimarrón referred to cattle as well as people. As they crossed the estate 
boundary, slaves went feral, subsisting on wild foods, on what they could 
grow while on the run, and probably on food stolen from the plantations 
themselves. With the exception of this last method—which Chacón did 
not mention in a letter until 1788—maroons made the landscape produc-
tive under conditions of freedom.22 Much as Gumilla had proposed, they 
lived off sunlight and tropical fecundity. Chacón and his associates did 
not make this comparison, but they understood how much maroons hurt 
the colony’s credibility. The governor’s initial instructions from Caracas 
referred to negros cimarrones as causing “grave damage to owners, and to 
themselves, since, as soon as slavery is shaken off, they wander errantly 
and are prone to laziness and vice, from which follow pernicious conse-
quences.”23 At the time, the damage appeared to be mostly symbolic. Ma-
roons demonstrated that slaves did not need masters. Worse than seceding 
as a ministate, self- liberating men and women implied the possibility of a 
full- on revolution, of exactly the sort that ignited Saint- Domingue in 1791. 
Ironically, Roume found himself there, serving as a commissioner of the 
French government (itself undergoing a revolution). A mob captured him 
in 1795, keeping him for nine days in a chicken coop (Korngold 1944, 189). 
Marronage could lead to this: master and livestock traded places, and Hai-
ti’s sugar plantations evaporated into thin air.
In short, the project of imagining slaves as energetic objects almost—
but not entirely—succeeded. Circumstances forced Chacón and slave-
holders repeatedly to consider slaves as people—and, therefore, to apply 
his conscience in dealing with them. Roume got out of the chicken coop 
by signing a decree demanded by the crowd. Whether through violence 
or entreaties, enslaved humans demonstrated their capacity to act. They 
contributed song and dance to Trinidad’s earliest Carnival celebrations 
(Liverpool 2001, 127ff.). More fundamentally, enslaved Africans and their 
enslaved children made personal histories and characters. Such individ-
uality would disrupt any commodity. One can only trade, say, bushels of 
grade A wheat if every bushel carries exactly the same qualities as every 
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other. If every slave worked at the same rate every day, then the master 
could reliably stock his fields with three per fanega. Laborers would func-
tion like barrels of sugar or, better yet, as wood used to heat cane juice 
to a boil: they would serve as the faceless fuel of the plantation machine. 
No commodity plays this role without the constant investment of institu-
tions and power. Through calculation and planning, Chacón tried to insist 
upon a standard, but he came to understand how slaves varied. Bonded 
bodies crossed oceans and seas as “lively commodities,” an uneasy mix of 
standardization and wildness (Collard 2014, 153). In the latter capacity—
sometimes as lovers and sometimes as loafers—they defied the measures 
of volume and ratios of production applied to them. As a fuel, slaves carried 
somatic power. As an imperfect fuel, they also exerted the force of their 
personalities.
Did the concept of fuel demand this shearing away of meaning? “Certain 
forms of knowledge and control,” writes the political scientist James Scott, 
“require a narrowing of vision” (1998, 11). The trader of oil cannot sell it 
efficiently as long as he or she must record and advertise its place of ori-
gin and vintage. A vintage adds value to wine but can do the opposite for 
packages of energy, especially in a high- energy society. One cannot design, 
say, a fleet of Cadillacs to run on the particular sour crude of Trinidad and 
Tobago. Simply put, fuel functions as a commodity in the contemporary 
sense of the term: a crop or mineral traded globally by a standard unit of 
measure. Perhaps, then, Chacón accomplished something akin to what 
Karl Polanyi (1944) calls “the Great Transformation,” the disembedding of 
land, labor, and numerous goods and services from their social context. I 
would not go this far. Anthropologists now dispute Polanyi’s claim, finding 
embeddedness in everything, even in money (Maurer 2006). Energy lost 
something more specific: its landscape. The Middle Passage displaced solar 
power and deracinated somatic power. Partly as a consequence, the ability 
to do work also lost a certain enchanted quality associated with the sacred. 
For Gumilla, sunlight carried virtue and sprang from God, “El Autor de 
la Naturaleza.” Neither slavers nor consumers of oil have tended to treat 
these forms of energy as God- given. One could do so, however. Perhaps, I 
would speculate, we treat oil as mundane for the same reasons Chacón pre-
ferred to treat enslaved African as arms. Standard measures narrow vision 
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enough to obscure sin. The slave trade destroyed individuals and African 
societies. Even before climate change, the oil trade poisoned individuals 
and polluted societies, many in Africa. Consumers have always been able 
to investigate this pain. To do so, though, requires detective work at the 
point of origin. The trace—the vintage of this harm—does not travel with 
the commodity across the seas. Fuel’s great transformation disembedded 
energy from ethics.
Energy without conscience, then, accompanied the rise of capitalism. 
The relationship is not straightforward. Plantation slavery arose before and 
outside the industrializing core of Europe. Industrialism ultimately ren-
dered transoceanic slavery and the plantation form obsolete. Sugar estates 
innovated too little, perpetually leaning on the crutch of cheap energy (Car-
rington 2003). Yet Chacón and his contemporaries did not see themselves 
as stagnant. Catching up to the  seventeenth- and  eighteenth- century sugar 
revolution, the governor and his French planters aspired to run “factories 
in the field” (Davis 2006, 104). The Caribbeanist Sidney Mintz (1985) fa-
mously described sugar plantations as a  satyr- like amalgam of agrarian and 
industrial forms. In a fashion we now associate with Henry Ford’s assembly 
line, they intercalibrated men and materials as a metabolic system. Herein 
lay the lasting innovation of plantation slavery: a cultural understanding 
of production through long- distance, high- volume energy transport. This 
idea need not have eventuated in capitalism, but global capitalism would 
not have flourished in the twentieth century without it. Now, of course, 
solar panels and wind turbines can generate electricity for industry and 
other uses nearly anywhere. But in Chacón’s time—long before the elec-
tric wire—production needed its first pipeline. It was an idea as well as an 
infrastructure. Chacón hardly articulated the idea. His calculations simply 
demonstrated its necessity, requiring no further justification. In this way 
too, fuel avoided a moral reckoning. Shallow questions of infrastructure 
and logistics predominated and still do. Doggedly, unreflectively, Chacón 
filled boats with bodies. Barrels would not be far behind. Trinidad was 
ready for oil.24
Oil could have developed differently. Absent some contingencies, the 
substance might have entered history as a moral category—at least, in 
Trinidad. As a burgeoning set of hopes and ideals, energy with conscience 
lay within grasp. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the term energy 
was gaining currency in Europe, defined as various forms of the ability to 
do work (Coopersmith 2010, 264ff.). With dreams, experts might fash-
ion energy into a tool for reform, liberation, or justice. Or would the first 
combustible hydrocarbon serve only as a fillip for production? At the very 
birthplace of the oil industry, Trinidad and early Trinidadians wavered be-
tween inspiration and indifference.
The man who tipped the scales was the island’s most influential German 
immigrant. Born in Ulm in 1813, Conrad Friedrich Stollmeyer emigrated 
to the United States, where he became an outspoken abolitionist. In the 
1830s, he read the French utopian socialist Charles Fourier, who consid-
ered all hard labor to be slavery. To harness the human body, Stollmeyer 
concluded, was deeply immoral. Embracing leisure, he pledged himself to 
an ideal then gaining currency as the “paradise without labor.” Tropical 
fecundity and solar power would do the job of muscle and sinew. To prove 
the practicality of this substitution, Stollmeyer moved to Port of Spain in 
1844. From that base, he organized a utopian scheme across the Gulf of 
Paria in Guinimita, in newly independent Venezuela. Stollmeyer attracted 
 working- class emigrants from Britain. But they fared far worse than had 
Chacón’s Francophones: fourteen of the  thirty- seven died within months, 
and the colony collapsed utterly. Despite this debacle, Stollmeyer remained 
in Port of Spain and continued to ponder work and energy. In the 1850s, 
he gained a position as manager of an asphalt deposit in South Trinidad. 
With his partners, he found a method to distill that heavy hydrocarbon 
into a light oil that would burn and generate heat. He had, at last, found a 
CHAPTER 2
How Oil Missed Its Utopian Moment
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reliable substitute for human bodies and a means to the paradise without 
labor. Yet chance and historical contingency intervened. In Port of Spain, 
Stollmeyer observed freed slaves not laboring—enjoying their leisure—
and he was appalled. His sentiments flipped entirely: work did not enslave 
men, he now felt, but improved and invigorated them. His oil alleviated no 
toil in the plantations. Instead of sending it there, he sold it for illumination, 
fueling the first streetlights of Port of Spain. As an emancipator, Stollmeyer 
failed because he no longer wished to succeed.
Petroleum failed too. Oil might have obviated the need for mass labor 
in agriculture and manufacturing. Of course, Trinidad, along with the rest 
of the British Empire, abolished slavery in 1838. France freed its slaves in 
1848, and the laggards—the United States, Cuba, and Brazil—followed 
in the last four decades of the nineteenth century. Freedom, however, did 
not abolish drudgery. Men, women, and children continued to labor in 
the hot Caribbean sugar fields and in European factories. In theory, the 
dense bonds of hydrocarbon molecules could have replaced people at har-
vest time and before the loom. Scholars describe such a substitution as an 
“energy transition” or a change of “energy regime” from somatic to fossil 
sources (McNeill 2000). But the change did not unfold that way—not 
in the Caribbean and probably not anywhere. Rather than displacing one 
another, energy sources have tended to accrue. A new fuel usually allows 
industry and agriculture simply to produce more goods (York 2012). Al-
ready in 1922, the American critic George Santayana wrote, “inventions 
and organization which ought to have increased leisure, by producing the 
necessaries with little labour, have only . . . degraded labour and diffused 
luxury” ([1922] 1968, 192). In short, oil could have paid a popular dividend 
of ease, but oilmen—including Stollmeyer—diverted those benefits. Oil’s 
reputation might have profited from slavery’s disgrace.
Imagine a counterfactual in which refined petroleum directly substi-
tuted for unfree labor. Oil and the people who drill it would emerge as 
great emancipators. Given the timing, events might have played out in 
this straightforward fashion. Stollmeyer distilled asphalt, the heaviest hy-
drocarbon, into flammable kerosene in the 1850s. He could have burned his 
way into history as a great emancipator. But the German wanted none of 
this glory for himself or for his product. He didn’t actually like black people. 
Abolition, in his view, enabled resegregation: the return of Africans to their 
own shores. Perhaps because of this racism, he crafted a postslavery, post-
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somatic energetic unit without celebration. Oil flowed as an impersonal, 
placeless liquid. It aroused no moral outrage—and no moral endorsement 
either. In this sense, Stollmeyer persevered exactly where Chacón and other 
slavers eventually faltered. He founded a fuel that would power enterprise 
while passing through port unprotested, mostly unremarked altogether. 
In the longer term, he bequeathed to oil a symbolic flatness—an absence 
of conscience—that would obstruct any political reckoning. Although an 
interesting figure then and now, Stollmeyer helped make oil boring.
Slaves, Iron Slaves, and Sunlight
The contingencies marking oil as merely lucrative began with an energy 
crisis—experienced as a labor shortage. Somatic power still existed, but 
the British prise de conscience had established strict limits on its use. Cer-
tainly, one could no longer work African women and men to death. Even 
the more humane growers of sugar in the Antilles confronted the emanci-
pation of 1838 as a triple calamity. First, as planters now had to buy labor 
power, wages skyrocketed. Second, labor became less available with each 
freedman who abandoned the plantations. Many ex- slaves valued indepen-
dent living—as urban dwellers or smallholder farmers—more than any 
available form of employment. Third, the terms of trade for  British- grown 
sugar began to collapse. Even after France abolished slavery in 1848, West 
Indian growers were competing against slaveholders in Cuba, Brazil, and 
the United States. Inevitably cheaper to produce,  slave- cut sugar squeezed 
the sales of Jamaican, Trinidadian, and Guyanese exports. In possibly the 
first fair trade movement, Anglo- Caribbean growers pleaded with Parlia-
ment for the application of an import tariff or boycott against  slave- made 
sugar—but to no avail. London seemed to want to have its cake and eat 
it: that is, to enjoy the moral satisfaction of freeing slaves without paying 
the resulting higher prices for a sweet cup of tea. This set of transatlantic 
debates became known as “the sugar question.” Under that title, a widely 
circulated 1845 pamphlet proposed what seemed like the only solution im-
plementable by West Indians: the shipment of free immigrants across the 
Atlantic to the sugar islands. “Let Africans populate our West Indian Col-
onies,” exhorted the writer, “until Guiana is as dense as Cuba” (“The Sugar 
Question” 1845, 17). Such a migration promised both to civilize African 
laborers and ensure the continuation and financial soundness of eman-
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cipation. In the event, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Guiana (now Guyana) did 
import cane cutters—from India rather than Africa and as indentured, not 
free labor. In retrospect, Britain answered the sugar question by reinventing 
slavery in a milder form.
In 1845, Conrad Stollmeyer—who dreaded this outcome—proposed 
a third way between slavery and immigration: the “iron slave.” Unique 
among commentators on the sugar question, Stollmeyer defined the prob-
lem as a shortage of energy, rather than one merely of human beings. Work-
ers, free or chained, did not possess sufficient quantities of that ability to do 
work. “It is a law of nature,” Stollmeyer wrote, “that man should not submit 
to more compulsory (by force or wages) labour than he can help, notwith-
standing all the preaching against idleness by interested or  short- sighted 
parties” (1845, 17). Born to a patrician, fairly idle family himself, Stollmeyer 
had become a theist while studying at Stotsingen University. In 1836, he 
emigrated to Philadelphia, finding work as a publisher of  German- language 
books. There he developed his antipathy toward bondage and joined the 
Anti- Slavery Society in Pennsylvania (Stollmeyer 1845, 95). By the early 
1840s, when he left the United States for Britain, he had formed precise 
ideas about labor as a whole. He answered the sugar question with his own 
manifesto, “The Sugar Question Made Easy.” The solution, he began, de-
pends “entirely upon the vivifying power of the sun” (Stollmeyer 1845, 7). 
Metal robots would convert solar power into labor. “one iron slave,” 
Stollmeyer wrote breathlessly, “will do the work of three hundred human 
slaves.” “Go to the iron districts of England,” he exhorted the West Indian 
planters, “have them [the machines] well moulded and cast . . .” (1845, 18, 
emphasis in original). The design already existed, sketched by another uto-
pian, John Adolphus Etzler, and published by Stollmeyer in Philadelphia 
1841 (Etzler 1841). Armed with a variety of tools, this “Satellite” would cut 
trees, plant seeds, or harvest crops. In other words, iron slaves promised to 
resolve the energy crisis.
Yet they were not entirely analogous to human slaves. Here Stollmeyer 
oversold the Satellite. In an effort to persuade planters, he portrayed it sim-
ply as a superior bondsman. “Slaves should be most obedient,” he wrote 
sardonically of shackled humans, “have no will of their own . . . and never 
grumble or break down during the performance of their work” (Stollmeyer 
1845, 17). Such  flesh- and- blood automatons did not exist. As Chacón knew 
so well, slaves ran away as frequently as they performed their jobs reliably. 
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In the fashion of a true automaton, then, the Satellite would outperform its 
human equivalents. Etzler described his invention as “imperishable, [and] 
indefatigable.” It would “furnish as much inanimate power as desired, for 
ever” (Etzler 1841, 1, cover page). This durability marked a crucial differ-
ence between organic and metallic slaves. In Trinidad and in the more suc-
cessful sugar islands, planters worked Africans to death as they imported 
replacements. The land, one might say, ate slaves, like a machine with its 
own industrial metabolism. Chacón’s “arms,” in other words, served as the 
consumable fuel, not as fixed assets. By contrast, the utopians’ iron slave 
would function as a stable machine or an engine, driven by and consuming 
solar or wind power. For solar power, mirrors would focus sunlight on a 
water vessel, producing steam to turn gears. For wind power, enormous 
sails would rotate those wheels directly, pulling the agricultural machine. 
As shown in Etzler’s drawing, the assembly devoted most of its material 
and bulk to the conversion of breezes—themselves generated by solar en-
ergy—into mechanical movement (figure 2.1). “Iron slave” was a misno-
mer then. The two men enslaved the sun and the wind while combining 
the hoe and the machete into a rickety machine.
Etzler and Stollmeyer had met in New York in 1840 at a celebration 
of the birthday of Charles Fourier (Nydahl 1977, xvii). Both admired the 
French utopian. Etzler, also German born, had emigrated to Pittsburgh 
and had been spreading Fourier’s ideas through books and tracts (Stoll 
2008, 42). From Philadephia, Stollmeyer was publishing the works of 
Fourier’s other American disciples. These utopians took issue with Rob-
ert Owen and his brand of agrarian socialism (Brostowin 1969, 266–67). 
Too much depended on long, backbreaking hours spent in the fields. Work 
itself was the problem. “Compared to the idleness and well- being which 
he [the worker] enjoys on Sunday,” Fourier wrote, “this indirect form of 
slavery is not any less physically constraining than real slavery” (quoted 
in Beecher and Bienvenu 1971, 141). It was not any less dispensable either. 
Christians, Fourier insisted, were mistaken when they assumed work to 
be a permanent curse for Adam and Eve’s trespass. “Scripture did not say 
that this punishment would not end one day, nor did it claim that man 
would never be able to return to the happy state he first enjoyed” (quoted 
in Beecher and Bienvenu 1971, 149). People could restore Eden by sharing 
work, dividing each job into short and enjoyable assignments to which 
they were drawn through “passional attraction.” In the community Fourier 
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imagined—known as the Phalanx—tasks would range from farming to 
cooking to light manufacturing, and each member would do many of them 
for each other in reciprocal rotations (Beecher 1986, 454ff.). This paradise 
satisfied more desires than did the Christian one. Fourier gave an example 
of “the young Bastien, [who] to acknowledge Celiante, who has obliged 
him in various services, will hardly neglect to offer the proof of gratitude 
that a young man of twenty years can offer to a lady of fifty.”1 From this 
titillating utopia, Etzler and Stollmeyer deleted carnality, embraced leisure, 
and identified an energy gap (Claeys 1986). The Phalanx needed a means 
of capturing inexhaustible power. By definition—given the purpose—
they sought energy with conscience.
In that search, the utopians carried out what geographers call a spatial 
fix. They reached far outside the world of Fourier—to the tropics and their 
European proponents. In 1804, Alexander von Humboldt had completed 
his epic journey through northern South America, Mexico, and the Carib-
bean. He and his companion, Aimé Bonplan, published their account in 
2.1 Etzler’s Satellite and windmill viewed from above.
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thirty volumes, the last one appearing in 1834. Considered the founding 
text of biogeography, this oeuvre mapped the tropics as a series of botan-
ical and climatic zones. Humboldt and Bonplan also owed much to prior 
European notions of the New World, including those of Gumilla. Like 
the Jesuit—whom he had read and cited—von Humboldt wondered at 
the continent’s bursting fecundity (Ewalt 2008, 7, 181; Gerbi [1955] 1973, 
223n290). His reports of profuse, untamed flora inspired Etzler’s 1844 pam-
phlet “Emigration to the Tropical World for the Melioration of All Classes 
of People and of All Nations.” That document estimated that “twelve to 
25 times the present population of the world would find room and food 
within the tropical zone alone” and “plantains will yield as much nutritive 
stuff on one acre, as 133 acres of wheat or 44 acres of potatoes in Europe, 
according to Humboldt, an undisputed authority” (Etzler 1844a, 5; 1844b, 
2). Stollmeyer, too, echoed the reference, describing “the luxuriance of the 
vegetable world in the Tropics which astounded even Alexander von Hum-
boldt” (1845, 15). Sunlight nourished this growth. Under “solar heat,” wrote 
Etzler, “the atmosphere deposits sugar” in wild and domesticated plants 
(1844a, 6; Brostowin 1969, 237). For mechanical power, he imagined “gi-
gantic powers of nature, of wind, water, and the sea’s waves” (Etzler 1844a, 
346). At low latitudes, Stollmeyer and Etzler believed they had solved the 
problem of want.
Etzler relied upon a dizzying method of quantitative extrapolation. As a 
 single- minded planner of agriculture, the utopian outdid Chacón: he blan-
keted not just Trinidad but half the world with  slave- free breadbaskets. 
The global carrying capacity, asserted in The Paradise within the Reach of 
all Men without Labour, rested on an agricultural yield of food for sixteen 
people per acre, or 10,000 people per square mile (Etzler 1833, 98). He ap-
plied that figure to the entire midsection of the Earth, between 30 degrees 
North and 30 degrees South latitude, irrespective of deserts and moun-
tains. Rafts made even oceans cultivable, irrespective of hurricanes and ty-
phoons. Sometimes, though, Etzler’s enthusiasm snapped his slim tether to 
numerical reason. Regarding solar power, he began with a notion of focus-
ing mirrors first advanced by Archimedes. A surface of 4 square feet might 
concentrate solar rays on an area of only 2 square feet. Etzler multiplied this 
ratio by 100 and then by 100 again to generate “prodigious heat . . . probably 
greater than any ever known” (1833, 35–36). Etzler then tossed calculation 
aside in favor of infinity: “We are under no limit for producing any quantity 
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and degrees of heat by this means.” Mechanical power would follow. By 
aiming solar rays at a boiler—and generating steam—Etzler could outdo 
any existing engine. Again, though, he jumped scale to the cosmos. “Have I 
asserted too much,” he asked, “when promising to show that there are pow-
ers in nature a million times greater than the human race is able to effect 
by their united efforts of nerves and sinews?” (1833, 45). Etzler probably 
did not want a true answer to his question. Events would soon embarrass 
him beyond measure. Even Stollmeyer, who only estimated a modest 300:1 
ratio in strength of iron to human slaves, failed utterly to demonstrate that 
capacity in what proved to be an unforgiving corner of the tropics. Still, at 
that point, his heart and his conscience were in the right place.
The Road to Guinimita
Etzler and Stollmeyer attracted a sizeable and credulous following. Be-
tween 1844 and 1846, the Tropical Emigration Society—based in Bradford, 
England, and led by Thomas Powell—attempted to put the utopians’ ide-
als into practice (Chase 2011). The organization’s weekly periodical, the 
Morning Star, served as the rhetorical vehicle. Oddly, though, the mag-
azine’s editor, James Elmslie Duncan, devoted very little space to what 
should have been a chief concern, the feasibility of the iron slave. Stoll-
meyer and Etzler had traveled to England, and, on September 22, 1845, 
they conducted a public trial of their prototype. Gadgetry clawed against 
the ground with little effect and with no energy source besides coal (Stoll 
2008, 120–21). In the Morning Star, Stollmeyer admitted to “little and acci-
dental causes which hindered us from coming off with a grand éclat” but 
affirmed absolutely “the possibility of performing agricultural operations 
with inanimate powers” of sunlight, waves, and so on.2 A week later, Dun-
can assured readers that a Satellite was “made, tried, and efficient for all its 
purposes.”3 In the new year, Thomas Powell, the titular head of the Tropical 
Emigration Society, reported, “The Satellite, we are sorry to say, is not yet 
completed, but will be ready shortly to come to London.”4 There, quite 
blandly, the matter rested. Meanwhile, on the question of land acquisition, 
extended, florid articles were describing llanos, mountains, and coastlines, 
mostly suitable for European settlement. Duncan writes of the “astonishing 
productiveness of the alimentary plants.”
To underscore the thesis of tropical fecundity, the magazine excerpted 
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and adapted Colonel Francis Hall’s (1827) monograph, Colombia: Its Pres-
ent State in Respect of Climate, Soil, Productions, Population, Government, 
Commerce, Revenue, Manufactures, Arts, Literature, Manners, Education, and 
Inducements to Emigration. Hall had worked as a hydrographer for the gov-
ernment in Bogotá, during the brief postindependence interlude when it 
administered Venezuela (1823–30). “All the energy of nature in the produc-
tion of both animal and vegetable life,” he exults, “is here [in Colombia] 
brought into action . . . into a system which man vainly imagines is for his 
peculiar use and convenience” (Hall 1827, 9, emphasis in original).5 The 
hydrographer pinpoints parts of northern South America where farmers 
might avail themselves of nature’s energy while conserving their own. 
Duncan paraphrases Hall’s description of Varinas, an inland, piedmont 
province consisting “entirely of plains . . . [which will] produce abundantly 
cocoa, indigo, cotton,  sugar- cane, tobacco, maize, rice, and all kinds of 
fruits and vegetables.”6 A handful of other regions offer similar advantages, 
but Colombia includes only one map, of Varinas. Duncan takes pains—
even exceeding Hall’s text—to warn readers away from the coast: districts 
“to the northeast extending to the Golfo Triste [the Gulf of Paria] are . . . 
exposed to inundations, unhealthy, and thinly inhabited.”7 “Black vomit,” 
as yellow fever was known, stalked these shores (Hall 1827, 122).8 Duncan 
may have later wished that he had printed Hall’s diagnosis in bold in that 
decisive summer of 1845. Instead, the editor advised, “We must bid adieu 
to the luxury of linen,” in favor of cotton for the tropics.9 The Morning Star 
treated serious matters trivially and trivial matters seriously.
Perhaps for this reason, two members of the Tropical Emigration Soci-
ety ignored all the available advice. In November 1845, Thomas Carr and 
Charles Taylor established a settlement across the bay from Port of Spain. 
The two men had negotiated for a disused estate named Guinimita (see 
map 1.1). Writing to the Morning Star, they narrated the transaction without 
describing the acreage itself. That truth only came out as Carr and Taylor 
assessed the estate’s interior. “It is a hilly poor land of no account here,” 
they admitted, “but important for us as a sanatory locality for the members, 
being dry and breezy, till the flat land of the valley be made more healthy 
and free from mosquitos by clearing and planting.”10 Their backhanded 
criticism made the worst part sound the best. When that ominous letter 
appeared in the Morning Star, settlers had already paid their deposits to sail 
from England to Port of Spain. Powell went with them, and Stollmeyer, 
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who remained based in Port of Spain, coordinated their passage across the 
gulf. News returned to him as corpses and in the form of letters of expla-
nation. Thomas Carr complained of ailments ranging from perspiration to 
rheumatism and “weak stomach and biles.”11 W. E. Prescod, another writer 
and the previous owner of Guinimita, reported himself fit as a fiddle. In 
twelve years at Guinimita, he and his family had never been sick. “I chal-
lenge the Tropics,” he declared against all geographical explanations, “to 
produce a healthier race than what is on it.” Settlers had been “indiscrete,” 
he explained. One died of sunstroke. A second overheated and, in an at-
tempt to cool himself at night, lay nude on the cold ground. Fatal fever 
followed. Most bizarrely, Prescod diagnoses “burden of ‘black vomit,’ from 
eating to excess rich American cheese.”12 Did settlers debilitate themselves 
by overindulging in Guinimita’s few pleasures?
Neutral observers found fault in the organizers of Guinimita. Stoll-
meyer absorbed most of the published attacks. Like Prescod, he accused 
the victims and exonerated all other factors. “The climate is certainly not to 
blame for the imprudence of any people,” he argued in the Morning Star.13 
Stollmeyer told his side of the story in Port of Spain too, and the Gazette 
of that city responded with a caustic exposé, reprinted humiliatingly in 
the Morning Star. Settlers, the newspaper revealed, had been reduced to 
subsisting on flour and water. Stollmeyer resembled “a man who took it 
into his head that he could teach his horse to live without food and who 
had got him down to a straw a day,” whereupon the horse died in what the 
man called an accident.14 The Gazette—considered the planters’ newspa-
per (Cudjoe 2003, 134)—clearly believed that Europeans could acclimate 
to the tropics. But the process took care. Stollmeyer, they opined, had nei-
ther exercised such prudence nor seemed to have learned it subsequently, 
believing still in “the perfect practicability of European colonization in the 
tropics.” Indeed, his excuses, the paper said, “calumniate the dead as well 
as disgust and shock the living.”15 Ironically, one reader of the Morning Star 
had predicted the mortality in a fashion both precedented and prescient. 
In that fateful summer of 1845, a letter suggested “succinct rules for the 
guidance of the society in the choice of a locality for the settlement of the 
Colony.” Avoid moist ground, the author urged, as “it will be found charged 
with the worst exhalations.”16 The  miasma- fearing Chacón had been right: 
tropical nature might kill, just as well as nurture, those who attempted to 
farm it.
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Chacón’s slaves actually expired from a combination of overwork and 
environmental conditions. So did the newcomers to Guinimita. While 
waiting for the Satellite slave, they used their somatic energy to excess. 
Between the lines, supporters and critics of Guinimita depicted morbidity 
through labor. Whitehead, the first to perish, appears to have been doing 
the laundry of  thirty- seven people. Mr. Tucker, who died after evacuation 
to Trinidad, “had been overexerting himself working twelve to fourteen 
hours to construct a boat.”17 That half- finished craft is very possibly the 
same “hulk of a schooner [to which] they [the settlers] could retire for shel-
ter during their labour.”18 Construction of a proper house advanced, “how 
slowly, with all one’s endeavors.”19 The iron slave certainly would have been 
useful. Utopians must have remembered Etzler’s promises of “leisure and 
freedom from care and drudgery [which] will beget a desire and taste for 
the refinements of life” (Etzler 1844a, 18). Those refinements might have 
included cheese. But all the ridiculous and sublime aspects of that vision 
depended upon an enormous infusion of mechanical,  forest- clearing en-
ergy. Amid the debacle, few even recalled iron slaves. Was Powell referring 
to them when he wrote, “Mr. E. . . . lacks the energy necessary to set his 
own machines going”?20 The letter is unclear. In any case, in 1845, settlers 
saw only one energy source that could make Guinimita bloom: themselves. 
Like fuel, they had crossed the ocean in a boat, duped rather than chained. 
They could have functioned as energy with conscience, powering an in-
tentional community. But these arms were too few. Stollmeyer’s paradise 
without labor required more labor, toil, and drudgery than he had ever 
imagined possible. Or it required oil.
Somatic Power Reconsidered from the Vantage of Oil
In the next twenty years, Stollmeyer—still living in Port of Spain—ac-
quired all the means necessary for a nearly  labor- free paradise. Having re-
covered rapidly from the disgrace of Guinimita, he found an energy source 
commensurate with his utopian conscience. He gained control of the larg-
est natural hydrocarbon seep in the world. The colonial governor, Lord 
Harris, introduced Stollmeyer to Thomas Cochrane, Earl of Dundonald, a 
semiretired naval officer, abolitionist, and one- time hero of the British na-
val blockade against slavers. Cochrane had acquired a concession to extract 
bitumen, known as pitch, from a deposit in South Trinidad, the Pitch Lake. 
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He was experimenting with bitumen as a substitute for coal. Mostly absen-
tee, Cochrane delegated these ventures to Stollmeyer. In the 1850s, the two 
men refined bitumen into the first form of combustible petroleum—and 
founded the Trinidad Petroleum Company (Higgins 1996, 14). Their work 
required more ingenuity than one might expect. At the Pitch Lake, hydro-
carbons bubbled up steadily and in enormous volumes, but in an extremely 
viscous form. Sir Walter Raleigh had used this pitch to repair his ships. In 
the twentieth century, pitch, also known as asphalt, would cover roads all 
over the world. How could an industrialist convert this heavy goo into a 
fuel light enough and volatile enough to burn and release energy? By 1860, 
Cochrane and Stollmeyer had solved that problem through a process of 
heating and purification. They produced kerosene, which rapidly replaced 
whale oil as a fuel for illumination (Williamson and Daum 1959, 56). “Pitch 
lamps” soon cast their wan, flickering glow over nighttime Port of Spain. 
With a higher energy density than any other  nineteenth- century hydrocar-
bon, kerosene delivered light and warmth in a small package. Conceivably, 
this fuel could replace somatic power. Here, at last, was the necessary ingre-
dient for iron slaves and an island with less labor. Yet by that point, neither 
man viewed economic development in remotely utopian terms.
Stollmeyer—whose ideals had been loftier than Cochrane’s—had 
already sold them out in a rapid, well- documented fashion. Even before 
the dust of Guinimita had settled, Stollmeyer applied for a government 
position in agriculture. He sought to train otherwise idle freedmen as 
small farmers. Did he wish to make them work? Perhaps not: his letter 
of application referred to Trinidad’s “most productive soil, which requires 
so little labor to yield abundant food.”21 Port of Spain denied him this job, 
but, in 1852, Stollmeyer took over editorship of the Trinidadian weekly 
newspaper. Its previous editor, George Numa Dessources, had departed 
with a hundred settlers to found another (failed) encampment in Venezu-
ela, called Numancia. “Never despair,” Stollmeyer exhorted these readers, 
seemingly unaware of his own checkered reputation. “You will have to 
suffer and work much and hard in the beginning to obtain ‘paradise 
without  labour’ in the end.”22 Stollmeyer’s calculus was shifting: lei-
sure would now arrive after an investment of sweat equity. On Trinidad, 
too, the German now recommended felling, hoeing, and weeding. “This 
fertility of the soil,” he reported in late 1852, “in a very short time repays the 
toils of the industrious laborer.”23 The editor was responding to an alarm-
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ing development. Large numbers of ex- slaves had exited the countryside, 
regarding agriculture altogether as oppressive (Wood 1968, 48). Colonial 
legislation restricted their rise in urban professions. The frustrated black 
man, Stollmeyer wrote, “leads a careless life, and falls into indolence and 
dissipation, . . . branded with the epithet of the ‘lazy, worthless, slovenly, 
dirty creole.’”24 Did Stollmeyer himself subscribe to this antileisure think-
ing? Certainly, his argument cast labor positively—as a good withheld by 
greedy whites. Stollmeyer still believed in fecundity—now complemented 
with toil. The editor of the Trinidadian began to embrace the agrarian mus-
cle that he had come to Trinidad to abolish.
In the next year, 1853, Stollmeyer’s interests expanded from farming 
to mining and manufacturing. Focusing on pitch, he praised Cochrane 
for “the establishment of this new branch of industry [that] will become 
the most important event in the history of our island.”25 “May we not 
then cherish the hope,” Stollmeyer asked his readers, “that from this 
accumulation of wealth a radical change will take place throughout the 
civilized world towards the amelioration of suffering humanity  . . . ?” 
Yes, answered the editor, but he no longer equated “suffering” with 
work. Quite the opposite: the same editorial referred to “thousands 
and thousands who will be employed in the different manufactures to 
which our mineral treasure is susceptible.”26 He proposed a new settle-
ment scheme, this one importing freed blacks from the United States. 
Stollmeyer promised them “a home . . . where in a short time they may 
be able by their industry, and assisted by the productiveness of our soil, 
to acquire a position for themselves.” And, further, “with a population 
reinforced by thousands of industrious immigrants . . . provisions [food 
crops] would become abundant.”27 Here, Stollmeyer married this new 
value of industry and hard work to a productive, tropical biome. A few 
years later, he discovered a conflict between these two forces, wherein 
nature undercut industry. “This climate and the rich soil of the island,” 
he wrote in a private letter in 1855, “enable men who have very few wants 
to live isolated as squatters idling away 9/10 of their time.” They lived like 
maroons, provoking a moral unease similar to that of Chacón. This time, 
blacks in the hills posed no military threat, but Stollmeyer echoed the 
former governor’s more diffuse concern: lazy freedmen, he wrote, “have 
only the animal instincts developed.”28 In short, Stollmeyer reversed the 
moral positions of toil and leisure. What was once virtue turned to vice, 
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and the paradise without labor became a contradiction in terms. Energy 
lost its conscience.
A second public humiliation probably accelerated this ideological 
conversion. This scandal unfolded in early August 1853 as a certain Mr. 
J. Kavanaugh barred Stollmeyer from entry to his private club. The dis-
agreement centered on Stollmeyer’s nonpayment of membership dues, 
on Kavanaugh’s objection to one of Stollmeyer’s editorials, or on both of 
these issues. At any rate, Stollmeyer publicized the conflict in his newspa-
per. Feeling himself libeled, the elderly Kavanaugh, shortly thereafter, hit 
Stollmeyer with a stick in the streets of Port of Spain. The next issue of the 
Trinidadian decried this “brutal assault,” which very nearly rendered “our 
beloved wife and our five children orphans.”29 Stollmeyer pressed charges 
and demanded damages of 500 pounds. The judge found Kavanaugh guilty 
of assault but cut his damages to 5 pounds. The defense debunked every-
thing from the thickness of the stick to the ferocity of his  seventy- year- old 
assailant to Stollmeyer’s self- described counterattack reminiscent of “our 
dueling days.” Finally, the defense criticized his grammar. Referring to him 
sarcastically as “Sir Oracle,” the attorney asked, “Was there ever anything 
so ridiculous as the editorial we in this case?”30 Stollmeyer reaffirmed, “We 
have taken up the pen in the holy warfare of the Press against oppression, 
ignorance, vice, and intemperance.”31 By the end of it, though, he may 
have been looking for a way to leave the Trinidadian. His final editorial 
mentioned the destruction of the paper’s printing press through fire but 
characteristically gave greater weight to his own shift in preferences. “It is 
time for us to think about more profitable modes of employing our time,” 
he wrote, still with the royal pronoun, “and to concentrate all our efforts 
upon the fashionable and praiseworthy object of making money.”32 Greed 
replaced generosity as black goo oozed from the earth.
In fact, pitch and other hydrocarbon fuels proliferated in the 1850s, and 
Stollmeyer made a careful, if utterly mercenary, choice among them. The 
sugar refineries burned wood and crop residues known as megasse. These 
cane stalks constituted a diffuse, rather than dense, fuel. To keep cane 
juice boiling, stokers had to transfer megasse rapidly and continuously 
(Mathieson 1926, 64; Mintz 1985, 50; Smil 1994, 117). Bending constantly 
and under intense heat, they worked—the social critic Lewis Mumford 
(1934, 235) later noted—as virtual “galley slaves” long after emancipation. 
By the 1850s, Trinidadian growers had mostly shifted to coal imported from 
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Britain (de Verteuil 1848, 77). The new fuel probably improved working 
conditions in the factories: since coal’s energy density stands at double 
that of crop residues, coal could easily cut the stoker’s lifting job in half. 
Bitumen, which was available locally, might achieve the same efficiency. 
Stollmeyer advertised this hope as fact in 1853. The Trinidadian ran his 
signed advertisements for “cheap fuel . . . equal to coals,” cash preferred.33 
By 1871, experiments sponsored by Stollmeyer and Cochrane proved the 
energetic equivalency. “With perfect combustion,” Stollmeyer touted to 
planters, “a ton of raw asphalt will give as much heat as a ton of the best of 
the best stone [anthracite] coals.” The new,  island- produced hydrocarbon, 
then, promised to make the labor savings achieved by coal economically 
sustainable in the long term. The same publicity, however, suggested an 
additional step, cutting the asphalt into smaller pieces. A machine would 
actually split the asphalt, but “manual labour” would sift and transfer the 
pieces.34 Still, shifting from megasse to bitumen—or even adding bitumen 
to the fuel mix, as occurred more frequently—surely alleviated some of the 
toil in sugar factories. If so, the ex- utopian Stollmeyer reduced work only as 
an unintended by- product of business objectives.
Indeed, Stollmeyer rejected a second petrolic means of saving labor as 
simply unprofitable. Also in the pivotal 1850s, he and Cochrane perfected 
a technique for distilling pitch into kerosene. Their Trinidad Petroleum 
Company produced the fuel for illumination in Port of Spain and further 
afield (Wiltshire 2007, 23). Why did Stollmeyer and Cochrane not send 
kerosene to the sugar factories? Kerosene’s energy density exceeded that 
of bitumen and anthracite coal by a significant margin (figures 2.2 and 
2.3). At the boiler, a stoker would have to lift and move proportionately 
less kerosene than coal. Furthermore, the liquid quality of kerosene might 
obviate stoking altogether. Kerosene could travel in pipes, either with 
gravity or with relatively easy pumping uphill. The fuel could convert at 
least one stage of sugar production into a paradise without labor. Yet no 
country besides tsarist Russia—which produced enormous volumes of 
kerosene—replaced coal with kerosene (or petroleum) in the nineteenth 
century (Mitchell 2011, 31).35 Elsewhere, kerosene did what only kerosene 
and whale oil could do: keep the lights on. And, beginning in the 1870s, 
Trinidad’s whalers—along with the entire Atlantic fleet—exhausted the 
supply of whale oil (de Verteuil 2002, 254–55). Cetacean extinctions forced 
the price of kerosene up. From then on, one might sell kerosene for pur-
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poses other than illumination, but only at an opportunity cost. Stollmeyer 
obeyed these incentives of supply and demand almost unthinkingly, miss-
ing multiple chances to alleviate toil. In 1866, not far from the Pitch Lake, 
Walter Darwent had drilled one of the first oil wells in the world. Petro-
leum, which was also distilled into kerosene, quickly undercut Stoll meyer’s 
share of the illuminant market. Stollmeyer might have then developed 
other markets for kerosene, where it would have replaced somatic power. 
Instead, he gambled upon the exhaustion of oil. “It would be safer to spec-
ulate,” he wrote in 1866, “upon the great prize in the Frankfurt lottery than 
upon the finding of oil- wells in Trinidad.”36 He gambled wrong, of course, 
but only money—not liberation—was now at stake.
2.2 Energy density and 
lifting labor associated with 
various fuels. Prepared 
by Mike Siegel of Rutgers 
Cartography Lab.
2.3 Energy options for 
Trinidad’s sugar boilers. 
Prepared by Mike Siegel of 
Rutgers Cartography Lab.
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With this change of heart—perhaps accelerating it—Stollmeyer’s la-
tent bias came into the open. The sight of freedmen enjoying their lei-
sure actually appalled him. He confided these sentiments to relatives and 
friends, rather than to readers of the Trinidadian. In 1854, he complained 
to his mother, “The former conditions under slavery have spoilt the la-
bourers here and they hate to work.”37 “The Blacks are as lazy as possi-
ble,” he wrote to an American utopian in 1855, “ignorant rum drinkers with 
few exceptions, they are worse off than in the time of slavery.”38 His com-
plaint echoed—and may have borrowed from—the famous 1849 tract of 
Thomas Carlyle. Published in London, his “Occasional Discourse on the 
Negro Question” referred to freedmen as “indolent two- legged cattle . . . 
‘happy’ over their abundant pumpkins” (Carlyle 1849, 675; cf. Wahab 2010, 
167–68). In Trinidad itself, however, such reactionary sentiments soon be-
came unfashionable. In 1858, Louis de Verteuil’s definitive geography of 
Trinidad both documented and excused laziness: “The slave [was] obliged 
to toil for the benefit of his master,” explained de Verteuil, and “viewed the 
obligation of working as a curse” (1858, 489). Cochrane expressed even 
greater sympathy. Caribbean blacks, he opined, were willing to work for 
“those [rare planters] who pay a reasonable price for work and are punctual 
in the payments” (Dundonald 1851, 109–10; cf. Lloyd 1947, 201). How could 
one business partner detect eagerness where the other saw only sloth? Per-
haps Stollmeyer agreed with Etzler, who, back in 1833, had advised readers 
in the United States: “The slaves in your country will cease to be slaves. . . . 
New mechanical means will supersede their employment. . . . You may 
then easily dispose of this unfortunate race. . . . Send them to some distant 
part of the world . . . and make amends for the grievous wrongs they have 
suffered in this country” (Etzler 1833, 14). At root, these utopians did not 
devise machines so as to liberate slaves from their masters. They hoped 
for the reverse: to liberate masters from their slaves—and expel these re-
dundant humans.
Trinidad conceived many possibilities regarding the ability to do work. 
Some of them, however, emerged stillborn. Among those failures, oil 
missed its  labor- saving potential due to a certain convergence of intoler-
ance and greed. Although abolitionist, Stollmeyer developed a sharp preju-
dice: the entrepreneur’s resentment of loafers. By his own admission, Trin-
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idad’s freedmen were living in conditions analogous to Fourier’s Phalanx. 
They enjoyed their leisure and helped each other to get by. Absent the iron 
slave, tropical forest could still generate sufficient nutrition under minimal 
cultivation. Even today, Trinis collect mangoes growing wild or untended 
on public or private land—a practice criminalized as “praedial larceny.” 
Before 1850 or so, Stollmeyer would have admired this carefree, unstraining 
harvest. After that point, however, the German became one of those “in-
terested parties . . . preaching against idleness.” He built his business with 
a strict Protestant work ethic, expecting the same of others. The extraction 
of bitumen, in fact, required much sweat and striving. Men hacked at the 
Pitch Lake with pickaxes and hoisted the material into handcarts. Only 
distillation—later in the commodity chain—produced the liquid fuel that 
flowed and could replace labor power. Stollmeyer appreciated the former 
quality to the exclusion of the latter. “The Pitch Lake is a mine of wealth,” 
he wrote to an investor in 1871, “and, if properly, judiciously, and liberally 
handled, can make fortunes for all at present concerned in it.”39 Stollmeyer 
made his own fortune partly, it was alleged, by cheating workers in La Brea 
through the company store (Massé 1988, 298). In his later years, he directed 
Trinidad’s electricity, telephone, and ice manufacturing companies (Wood 
1968, 89). None of these businesses would have pleased the earlier Stoll-
meyer, the man who named his son Charles Fourier. In 1904, Stollmeyer’s 
obituary praised him for precisely the values he had once sought to render 
obsolete: “industry, energy, [and] indomitable perseverance.”40
Beyond this one man, oil affected the balance of work and rest in ways 
that were contingent and unpredictable. One U.S. gallon of crude oil con-
tains the labor equivalent of nearly six hundred  person- days.41 As this po-
tential came to light, hydrocarbons enhanced the productivity of human 
labor. Turbocharged in this way, a worker could finish the day’s quota 
shortly after breakfast. Few have ever appreciated the radical possibilities 
at hand. In 1880, the Cuban- born socialist Paul Lafargue concluded his es-
say titled The Right to Laziness with a paean to coal power: “the machine 
is the redemption of humanity, the God that will redeem the man from 
sordidœ artes and wage work, the God that will give him leisure and lib-
erty.”42 Lafargue expected what one might call a rest dividend. This “right 
to laziness,” however, never rose above the legal status of an undeserved 
privilege. Colonial governments disparaged it, elaborating a “myth of the 
lazy native” who refused to work for whites (Alatas 1977). As if to disprove 
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the insult, anti- and postcolonial manifestos and constitutions disavow any 
right of repose. Such documents are more likely to enshrine a right to work. 
In so doing, they exploit the opposite side of the hydrocarbon equation: a 
worker who finishes the first task in short order may finish many more by 
closing time. Hydrocarbons allowed workers to do more. Fossil fuels, in 
other words, enabled and still enable either more rest or more activity. The 
former option appealed to Fourier and Lafargue—but not, by and large, 
to states and corporations. Backed by these interests, hydrocarbons have 
driven more activity and the frenzy of capitalist growth. There has been no 
energy transition, only the layering of fossil on somatic power.
As a symbol, on the other hand, oil promoted a subtle transition from 
one form of morality to another. Or, rather, the amorality of oil replaced 
energy systems saturated with religious and ethical meaning. Gumilla 
fairly worshiped the attractive virtue of solar rays. Slavery and wage slavery 
always offended the conscience of many people, not least among those 
wearing the shackles. Participants in the trade, such as Chacón, could not 
avoid the awkwardness of treating people like fuel. Petroleum, by contrast, 
provoked neither offense nor unease. Since it did not spread leisure, the 
new fuel hardly incited celebration or romance either. Petroleum made 
drillers and refiners wealthy, but it did not associate them or itself with that 
signal value of the Caribbean, freedom. Oil, in a word, did not rise above 
the ordinary. Again, though, different contingencies might have produced 
different outcomes, as they have in other cases. Diamonds imply perma-
nence, fidelity, and a love that will not weather. Fabricated by ad men, this 
ideal topples easily. As the blood diamond campaign traces gems to sites 
of civil conflict and slave labor, diamonds increasingly imply devastation 
and death. Luxury flips to exploitation as one glances from right to left 
in Amnesty International’s poster (figure 2.4). Cigarettes have undergone 
a similar inversion of sentiment. Until perhaps the 1970s, smokers asso-
ciated tobacco with sophistication, elegance, and even health. Medicine 
shattered this illusion. Now, especially in the United States, cigarettes in-
creasingly connote ignorance, incompetence, and disease. Admirers of a 
commodity, then, seem prone to reevaluate it. Extreme romance may flip 
to extreme antipathy, as if the commodity itself betrayed a sacred trust. 
No such  about- face has occurred with respect to oil, and cultural condi-
tions do not favor one. There is no trust, admiration, or romance to betray. 
Stollmeyer, like oilmen elsewhere, declined to invest hydrocarbons with 
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such grandiosity. Oil is always already a cynical category. One might almost 
believe that, after the emotional roller coaster of slavery and emancipation, 
the designers of energy sought a source of terawatts without drama, with-
out a “commodity affect” (Mankekar 2004, 408). Intentionally or not, they 
got that: a fuel so flat that the protester finds little traction with which to 
advance. Except when oil spills locally, one treats it as a means, an instru-
ment toward the things that really matter. Useful as it is—perhaps, like 
money—oil only rarely touches questions of moral worth. Banally and too 
easily, hydrocarbons flow and spill everywhere.
2.4 For What Price, These Diamonds, from 2003 billboard campaign “Stop arms 
and raw materials trade with countries that violate human rights.” Courtesy of 
the French Chapter of Amnesty International (aisf).
PART II
ORDINARY OIL
Author’s son, Jesse, with oil pump jack, Point Fortin, Trinidad, 2010
62
S I LE NCE S AR E NOT ALWAYS QU I ET . They can resound with 
noise and quite articulate speech. They are, as I wrote in the in-
troduction, the absences that present a shape. This second half of 
Energy without Conscience explores the contours and discourses 
surrounding—and, in a sense, obstructing—what is for me the 
core issue: a moral reckoning with hydrocarbons and a sense of 
responsibility for climate change. Oil appears all too banal and 
ordinary. In this more ethnographic section, my informants grap-
ple with notions of plenty (chapter 3), with industrial accidents 
in their neighborhoods (chapter 4), and with environmental vic-
timhood (chapter 5). Expert and popular opinions proliferate in 
what seems like a robust debate. Yet nearly all participants draw 
back from the cliff ’s edge. They refuse to consider questions of 
conscience: if (rather than how fast) one should produce oil, or 
whether oil is intrinsically (not incidentally) harmful, or whether 
they have perpetrated (not merely suffered from) climate change. 
In my fieldwork, a handful of self- aware geologists and policy 
makers appreciated these dilemmas. Far more often, their own 
expertise and activism proved so interesting that it distracted 
them from considering alternatives. Perhaps—if silences are 
loud—then complicity is diverting and fulfilling in this way. My 
informants did not cover up a shameful secret, as one might imag-
ine knowing perpetrators of harm to do. Climate change, they un-
derstood, was important, and they would deal with it. But they 
always found something more pressing: oil to locate, toxins to 
fight, or worse offenders to indict. This is the most widespread, 
least reproachable form of complicity: an earnest pursuit of local, 
immediate, rather ordinary concerns in the run up to apocalypse. 
Like stewards rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic, one can eas-
ily lose a sense of proportion.
 But who I am to criticize these well- meaning Trinidadians? 
Many of them, after all, cope with economic circumstances far 
more adverse than those of a university professor (although the 
energy executives enjoy far better conditions). Before such sub-
alterns, ethnographers usually defer.  Waiter- like in their humility, 
they act as if the  customer- informant is always right (Rabinow 
1977, 45). My informants, I concluded, are mostly wrong—ei-
ther mistaken on ecological grounds or conducting environmen-
tal malfeasance. And I write forthrightly in that conviction not 
only because it is true but also because it matters to us all. Here 
again, one might ask why I make Trinidadians’ affairs my business. 
The Indian social critic Vandana Shiva famously accuses North 
Atlantic environmentalists of practicing an imperialist “global 
reach” when they insist, say, that African peasants refrain from 
hunting animals. I agree with her in that instance. Hydrocarbons 
are different. More so than any other form of environmental 
harm or violence, they circulate through the biosphere. Natural 
gas burned in or exported from Trinidad circumscribes lives else-
where. Coastal residents of Bangladesh or Vietnam have perhaps 
the greatest cause for concern. Still, Superstorm Sandy—which 
hit New Jersey after the bulk of my fieldwork—made the threat 
to me, my family, and my community apparent. The Trinidadian 
energy companies I study bring danger to my doorstep. They are 
an empire. So I write with as much anticolonial outrage as colo-
nial arrogance. But above all—and to put aside ill- fitting meta-
phors—I try in this ethnographic section to capture the frustra-
tion and possibility of my own encounter with  climate- changing 
complicity.
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Picture a gusher. Microorganisms have photosynthesized solar radiation. 
They and the zooplankton who preyed on them have died and fallen to 
anoxic depths. Then, over scores of millions of years, sediment has buried 
this organic matter and subjected it to pressure and heat, baking it into 
hydrocarbons. Eventually, pressure has forced the substance upward again 
and, ultimately, into the drillable strata, from whence it may gush. That 
black fountain crystallizes all the economic, social, and psychological dra-
mas of petroleum into one vivid image (Ziser 2011, 321). Recall, if you have 
seen it, Giant, the 1956 epic film of the Texas oil patch. Petroleum rains 
down sensually on James Dean, transforming him from a lowlife punk into 
the crassest tycoon. Today, blowout preventers almost always throttle such 
spills. Still, the gusher maintains a presence in the assumptions, terms, and 
measurements of oil firms. Experts describe the commodity’s path as a 
“stream.” Hydrocarbons extracted upstream descend to midstream refining 
and downstream finishing as plastics or fuels. Gravity—one might imag-
ine—pulls oil to its destination. The industry does not even refer to its 
business as “extraction.” “That is what mining companies do,” explained 
one executive in Trinidad, shocked that I would confuse his business with 
such a nasty affair. An offshore platform, he explained, “produces” oil in 
the way one might produce a fork from the kitchen drawer. The company 
brings forth materials that seemingly belong on the planet’s surface. One 
doesn’t need—in the fashion of miners—to go down there personally 
and haul them up. Another term illustrates this sense of modest effort. An 
oil and gas company “recovers” hydrocarbons, if they are “recoverable,” 
or employs “secondary recovery” to acquire stocks previously considered 
“unrecoverable.” Oil virtually produces itself. Most of it seeps around cap-
rocks—tellingly denoted as “traps”—and rises to the surface. The same 
Trinidadian expert assured me that 95 percent of it had come up naturally 
CHAPTER 3
The Myth of Inevitability
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over geological time. He felt duty- bound to bring home the rest. Other-
wise—to use the final bit of lingo—hydrocarbons currently impossible to 
produce remain “stranded” (Bridge 2004, 396). Oil and gas, in short, come 
up alone, ascend in a rescue operation, or await a delayed release, which is 
both right and inevitable. Where is the space for deliberation—for con-
science—in this seemingly natural plot?
Skeptics do pose two sorts of challenges, a constraint related to supply 
and another related to pollution. According to the first objection, stocks 
are limited. Organic matter must bake under pressure and natural radia-
tion for millions of years to become bitumen or asphalt, longer to become 
petroleum, and longer still to become gas. At a very slow rate of consump-
tion, hydrocarbons are renewable. But industrial societies have exceeded 
that geological pace by orders of magnitude. Everyone in the industry un-
derstands this fact. Only a handful of amateur geologists believe in rapid 
oil generation, and they clamor ineffectually from the sidelines. Still, this 
ultimate limit on supply is easy to ignore. It seems too far out—rather 
like the way in which the sun’s finite nuclear fuel limits agriculture. Those 
concerned about oil supplies notice a proxy variable for dwindling sup-
plies: effort and expense. As companies remove oil from the earth’s crust, 
it becomes harder and harder to find more. In this view, ultradeep drilling, 
hydrofracking, and tar sands all signal physical and financial strain and the 
beginning of the end.1 Are the 1962 predictions of M. King Hubbert coming 
true? Hubbert anticipated a moment when the rate of extracting hydrocar-
bons would fall below the rate of locating new sources. The United States 
passed this point of “peak oil” in the 1970s.2 The world may have already 
passed it. For various reasons—particularly centering on unaudited logs 
of Saudi Arabia’s huge Ghawar Field—peak oil seems to be unverifiable 
(Simmons 2005). Past the peak, oil producers and consumers will descend 
into a “long emergency” of squabbling over scarce, expensive hydrocar-
bons. Amid wars, life becomes nasty, brutish, and short (Kunstler 2005; 
Roberts 2004).
The second limit on production raises a similar specter of decline and 
strife. This constraint—which I call the “climate boundary”—also de-
pends on a mismatch of rates. Oceans, forests, and soils can fix in biomass 
and otherwise neutralize a certain amount of atmospheric carbon dioxide 
per year. Humans could burn hydrocarbons at a stately, sustainable pace. 
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Current combustion, however, substantially exceeds that rate, threatening 
to overwhelm stabilizing mechanisms and throw the climate into accel-
erating shifts. In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
established a warming of 2˚C, leveling off in 2050, as the maximum tol-
erable level. By tolerable, they meant something less than comfortable: 
atoll states would disappear. Warming beyond 2˚C would inundate the 
far more populated coastlines of South and Southeast Asia. How much 
oil can industrial societies burn before provoking such human misery and 
death? In a 2012 article titled “Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math,” 
the activist Bill McKibben compared the carbon content of the world’s 
proven reserves fossil fuels with the climate boundary. “We have five times 
more oil and coal and gas on the books,” McKibben concludes, “[than] 
the climate scientists think is safe to burn.”3 The world will run out of 
storage space for burned hydrocarbons long before it runs out of hydro-
carbons themselves. The sink, in other words, limits industry more se-
verely than does the supply. Again, this diagnosis is not widely disputed—
except by deniers of climate change itself. Within energy firms, their 
influence is both waning and redundant. The industry has found other 
ways to insist upon the banal inevitability of oil despite and beyond the 
threshold of safety.
Those arguments surround the silence of complicity. Myths of oil cir-
cumscribe, delimit, and obscure the moral reckoning with hydrocarbons 
and climate change. They always found something more pressing: oil to be 
located. In large part, diagrams made this choice of priorities, and the evac-
uation of conscience, appear normal. Geologists picture the underground 
in ways that suggest permanent, inevitable flows. This simplified view of 
the world resembles other notions of capitalist growth and technological 
advance: it depends upon particular ways of seeing.4 Among Trinidad’s oil 
experts, I investigated the charts and their dissemination. For a century 
and half, geology had emphasized the dynamic quality of the earth’s crust. 
Substances at depth rose—if not in the past, then now, and if not now, 
then later. In the lifetime of my informants, geologists had married this 
model of upward flows to the economic scenarios of supply and demand. 
Hydrocarbons, they had come to assume, left the ground and entered the 
global market in one natural, entirely ordinary progression. To provoke 
conscience, I occasionally cornered people in conversation. “Fuck you, 
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no apologies, oil is here to stay,” they might have shouted, as ExxonMobil 
apparently did to one observer.5 Fortunately, my West Indian informants 
spoke more politely and, indeed, cared about climate change. Yet even their 
efforts to reduce carbon emissions actually produced more oil—and more 
carbon emissions. It could not be otherwise, they assured me.
Making the Y- Axis
Geology is a science of vertical movement. The things that move are huge 
and heavy and move very slowly. So says the uniformitarian theory, pub-
lished in 1830 by the Scotsman Charles Lyell. In some ways, such gradual-
ism defies belief more than did the earlier catastrophist notions of rapid, 
biblical creation, flooding, and so on. To follow the vertical movement of 
continents, one must inhabit what the environmental writer John McPhee 
(1980) calls “deep time.” Over millions of years, eroded sediments may turn 
a floodplain into a plateau. One plate will dive down, deflecting its adjacent 
plate upward. Describing these acts of elevation requires an otherworldly 
lexicon: Holocene, Pleistocene, Pliocene, Miocene, Oligocene, Eocene, 
and so on going back to Earth’s pre- Cambrian beginning as a lifeless, cool-
ing moon of the sun. The communicative art of geology lies in making this 
deep time comprehensible without, at the same time, utterly dispelling its 
strangeness. Verticality helps strike that balance. The amateur may more 
easily grasp a thousand feet than a million years. The up- and- down axis, 
in fact, compresses time. Then, superposition—the principle that layers 
fall sequentially upon one another—translates descending distance into 
antiquity and shallowness into newness. Geologists distinguish strata as 
upper and lower and periods as late and early, but, as often as not, they 
interchange the terms. The past stretches as an arrow piercing the heart 
of the earth. One need not imagine much to extend that arrow into the 
future—as thrusting, gushing, and seeping movements up through and 
out of the crust. The pressures of profit can easily bake geology into such 
a predictive belief. In this way, Trinidad and other oil crucibles produced 
what one might call a vernacular science of hydrocarbon uplift. As in many 
technical fields, petro experience affords little space for alternatives and less 
for the most challenging ethical questions.
That amoral vernacular is more visual than linguistic. It relies upon im-
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ages of deep time, in whose invention the small island of Trinidad played 
an outsized role. This “visual language for geological science” emerged in 
the course of the  nineteenth- century uniformitarian revolution (Rudwick 
1976). At midcentury, Britain’s Geological Survey applied that theory to 
“see geologically” in Canada and elsewhere in the empire (Braun 2000, 22; 
Stafford 1990). To Trinidad, the survey sent geologist George Wall, accom-
panied by the artist Jas Sawkins. Their 1860 report made use of two newly 
available diagrammatic forms: the cliff face and the traverse section.6 In the 
first of these techniques, Sawkins simply set his sketch pad on the beach—
probably close to  present- day Radix on Trinidad’s east coast—and repro-
duced the strata he saw. Although he surely overemphasized the boundar-
ies between rock types, his drawing reproduced the original proportions 
of strata, scaled against the human form at water’s edge (figure 3.1). The 
cross section, by contrast, took more liberties with the landscape. Consider 
Sawkins’s section of the Pitch Lake (figure 3.2). Neither he nor Wall ever 
saw any such sandwich of shale, sand, and shale. Rather, as Rudwick (1976, 
164) writes, the cross section conducts a “thought- experiment,” proposing 
how the landscape might appear if sliced vertically. Note the absence of 
any scale in the section, an omission that suggests this hypothetical quality. 
The geological report did not include a columnar section, the third type 
of vernacular image. Rather than depicting a particular place, this kind of 
cross section aggregates and interpolates geological layers. In 1912, Edward 
Hubert  Cunningham- Craig published one of the earliest such diagrams 
related to Trinidad. This British early petro-geologist studied the Pitch 
Lake as well as similar outcrops in the nascent oilfields of Burma and 
Persia. Pictographically, he inserted a “Cretaceous inlier” (from 144–66 
million years ago) beneath younger sediments bearing “manjak,” a local 
bitumen variety (figure  3.3). From top to bottom, in other words, the 
cross section descends in reverse chronological order. Time ran parallel 
with depth.
During the first three quarters of the twentieth century, British and 
American scientists both found more oil in Trinidad and drew increas-
ingly refined sections of it. Especially in the heyday of the 1950s, detailed 
traverse sections represented the high art of exploration. They converted 
abstract space into known places (Carter 1987, xxiii). A 1958 rendition of 
the East Penal field—by Peter Bitterli of Shell—catches the eye more 
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than any other (figure 3.4). As depicted, an unconformity of overthrusting 
Eocene shale traps petroleum in Herrera sands. Then, descending from 
the upper left, oil wells puncture that caprock and release the hydrocar-
bons. This and other columnar sections guided the drill bit in a concep-
tual fashion: charts created a geological and economic abstraction. Let’s 
consider a drawing first published in 1958 by a threesome of geologists at 
the major firms on the island. Titled “Summarized Miocene Stratigraphy 
of Southern Trinidad,” the graph represents rock formations as horizontal 
layers associated with prehistoric eras. Columns refer to regions of Trini-
dad, from southwest to southeast (figure 3.5). “Miocene stratigraphy,” the 
3.1  Wall and Sawkins’s diagram of a cliff face, 1860.
3.2 Wall and Sawkins’s traverse section of the Pitch Lake, 1860.
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authors indicate, “is essentially a clay- silt- sand sequence which is divided 
into three major sedimentary cycles, separated by local unconformities” 
(Barr, Wait, and Wilson 1958, 536). Those unconformities—which might 
twist and turn bizarrely—appear nowhere in the summarized stratigraphy. 
Summary required excluding them. Indeed, it required bringing all the data 
into conformity with a linear time- depth axis. Barr and his colleagues flat-
tened the undulating underground topography to show the past simply as 
depth. The y- axis was time, and—when implied in traverse sections—the 
vectors pointed up. Taken together, these works of 1958 show oil in ancient 
layers and oil rising more recently through layers. Petroleum geology thus 
mastered the art of describing and depicting upward migration.
In Trinidad and Tobago, no contemporary geologist has represented 
this verticality with greater expertise or enthusiasm than Krishna Persad. 
Following independence, his generation took over from the geologists of 
British and American firms. Texaco, in fact, gave Persad a scholarship to 
study chemistry in the 1960s. Midway through his doctorate, he switched 
to geology, and this combination of disciplines has arguably made him 
the island’s most successful independent oil producer. Not merely a busi-
nessman, Persad founded the Geological Society of Trinidad and Tobago. 
3.3  Cunningham- Craig’s columnar section, 1912.
3.4 Bitterli’s combined cross section, 1958. aapg © 1958. Reprinted with per-
mission of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists (aapg), whose 
permission is required for further use.
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(Virtually all Trini geologists practice petroleum geology.) In his spare 
time, he travels, paints, and draws (figure 3.6). In 1993, Persad and his 
wife published The Petroleum Encyclopedia of Trinidad and Tobago. The 
volume reassures readers: “There is little cause to worry [about declining 
oil supplies] and . . . in fact, we can expect oil production to continue at 
significant levels for decades to come” (Persad and Persad 1993, 4). In the 
next two decades, even as Trinidad’s oil output fell nearly to zero, Persad 
compiled the magnum opus proving that it need not be so. In 2011, he 
completed The Petroleum Geology and Geochemistry of Trinidad and To-
bago. The volume interprets strata according to plate tectonics—which 
the geologists of the 1950s had not accepted—and in light of the chemical 
principle of evaporative fractionation. The charts themselves reproduce 
earlier work, going back, in fact, to the 1950s. But they also innovate in one 
key respect: they show the migration of oil. Oil, it is now known, matures 
from deposited organic matter in formations of between 7,000 and 18,000 
feet in depth. This layer is known as the “oil window” (Hyne 1995, 171). 
From that source rock, petroleum moves upward and laterally, pushed 
3.5 Barr, Wait, and Wilson’s summarized stratigraphy of southern Trinidad, 1958. 
aapg © 1958. From the American Association of Petroleum Geologists (aapg), 
whose permission is required for further use.
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by underground pressure and by gravitational sorting with water. (Oil 
is lighter than water.) Trinidad, Persad argues, has experienced multiple 
bursts of tectonic movement and faulting, leading to “oil migration pulses.” 
A characteristic sketch shows petroleum rising along diagonal pathways 
marked with arrows (left of figure 3.7). Like Bitterli, Persad focused on the 
unconformities. At the same time, two additional lines recall Barr’s sum-
marized stratigraphy: the horizontal line marked “top [of the] oil window” 
and the vertical arrow labeled “speculative prior . . . pulse.” With greater 
certainty than ever before, Persad’s chart gives oil a position and an upward 
pathway from it. Oil would flow until stopped by a trap. Then, to raise 
production, oil companies would need only to perforate such rock at the 
points Persad indicated.
This sense of possibility and optimism brightened my reunion with Per-
sad shortly after the publication of Petroleum Geology and Geochemistry. 
(We knew each other already.) “This is my legacy work,” he said of the 
new book, agreeing to a discounted price that reflected the lean state of 
public higher education. We talked about oil fractions and the superposi-
tion of gas and lighter oil above heavy, waxy crudes. Trinidad was exhaust-
3.6 Krishna Persad (self- 
portrait), 2012.
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ing the former, but their very existence indicated that dense petroleum 
still lay deeper. “You could be looking at double, triple the reserves,” he 
exclaimed, as we sat in his home office in South Trinidad.7 Possessed of 
a gentle, good- natured humor, Persad frequently slipped between dense 
science and less scientific buoyancy. We met again the next month—Feb-
ruary 2012—in Port of Spain at the Energy Chamber’s annual Energy Con-
ference. To the chamber’s large membership, Persad presented “Finding 
Oil in t&t’s Unexplored Acreage.” The acreage lay below explored strata. 
“If you drilled deep,” he almost pleaded to the suit- attired executives, “you 
would find black oil.” The oil itself was going half the distance. Persad’s 
second slide, titled “Source Rock Maturation,” united two concepts usu-
ally considered separately: the generation, or maturation, of oil in deep 
sediments and its later migration into shallower formations (figure 3.8). In 
the cross section, one pathway took oil all the way to a surface seep. The 
slide show ended with a note of hope and a surprisingly precise scenario: 
 short- term,  medium- term, and  longer- term estimates culminated in a “to-
tal potential upwards of 3 billion bbls [barrels] recoverable.”8 The geolo-
gist’s eyes twinkled at the audience. Such confidence, of course, flowed 
like the liquor at the Energy Conference. Persad enjoyed himself amid the 
glitter of the Hyatt Hotel. Having once told me any conference was worth 
going to “if it helps me produce a barrel of oil,” he made more petroleum 
seem guaranteed.
3.7 Persad’s oil migration pulses, 2011.
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Proving Up
Abundance is not always desirable. Purveyors of goods frequently wish to 
represent their supplies as scarce, especially to those who might question 
a high price. Downstream from the wells, manufacturers of plastics or fer-
tilizer are constantly trying to acquire hydrocarbons more cheaply. So too 
is the car driver, watching numbers dial upward at the gas pump. To these 
buyers, the oil industry invariably asserts that its commodity is scarce and 
difficult to obtain. Almost stubbornly, however, oil continually proves to 
be available. Since at least the 1920s, while producing more and more oil, 
firms have consciously confronted a problem of surfeit. As they extract oil, 
they must also “produce scarcity.” Or, as Gavin Bridge and Andrew Wood 
surmise, executives ask themselves, “How [can we] organize scarcity in 
the face of prodigious abundance” (2010, 565–56)? So- called aboveground 
risks—such as violence and boycotts—help manufacture scarcity. The 
Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, two wars against Iraq, and ongoing sanctions 
against Iran have periodically tightened global hydrocarbon markets arti-
ficially. Yet no producer wants altogether to disguise plenty. An industry 
3.8 Persad’s migration and maturation of oil, 2012. Prepared by Mike Siegel of 
Rutgers Cartography Lab.
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running out of raw materials has no future. To investors, therefore, oil firms 
must represent oil as prolific, such that a billion dollars spent on drilling for 
oil will find oil. The problem, then, centers less on producing scarcity than 
on telling one story to consumers and another story to investors (Olien 
and Olien 2000, 137; Chapman 2013, 97). The spokespeople of petroleum 
must keep their audiences separate and avoid confusing their half- truths. 
In the 1970s, international bodies devised a set of terms and diagrams that 
bifurcated their message graphically—into a story about large resources 
and small reserves. Oil “proved up” from one to the other. That narrative 
has mostly stuck, persuading the people who need persuading. It unraveled 
in Trinidad, however, in the late 2000s. There, in a small country, inves-
tors and consumers sat in the same room—often as the very same peo-
ple—and pushed that contradictory message to its limits. Still, they never 
pushed it far enough to doubt the rightness altogether of oil and gas.
The rhetoric originated with a decision on terminology. In 1926, the 
American Petroleum Institute (api) formalized a distinction between re-
sources and proved reserves. The former referred to all the oil known to 
exist while the latter denoted only stocks obtainable at a profit (Wildavsky 
and Tenenbaum 1981, 171–72). Somewhat counterintuitively, then, reserves 
lie closer at hand: they are not reserved at all. The profits they bring, of 
course, depend on conditions. Regulation, factor prices, or high wages 
might make certain ventures unviable in economic terms. Such ephemeral 
circumstances vastly complicated the calculation of barrels above and be-
low what came to be known as the “commerciality threshold.” Even seem-
ingly stable conditions could shift rapidly as the industry expanded and 
wells reached deeper, older formations. From its inception, the binary of 
reserves and resources had to permit the reclassification of oil. Another 
term, proving, conveyed precisely this shift. Again, somewhat at odds with 
the conventional meaning, the proof referred not to the oil’s presence but 
to its profit margin, or commerciality. An oil company might prove up re-
sources by developing, say, drill bits capable of penetrating harder strata. 
Here, in fact, the industry borrowed from the language of settler colonial-
ism. The Homestead Act of 1862 obligated newly arrived whites to show 
“improvements,” that is, planting, cultivating, tree cutting, and so on. The 
government awarded titles to such investors and ejected the others, as-
sumed to be mere land speculators. As oil supplanted agriculture in Texas, 
Oklahoma, and Southern California, then, new occupiers demonstrated 
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their worthiness in established terms. In Los Angeles, wrote Upton Sinclair 
in the same year as the api agreement, “Dad . . . had made a big success, 
and proved up a lot of new territory, and was hailed, again as the benefactor 
of the Prospect Hill field” (1926, 121, emphasis added).
The preposition in this pivotal phrase opened up another field of pos-
sibility for graphic representation. Homesteaders proved “up” land in a 
sense that was mostly metaphorical. That elevation change hinged on mod-
ernization, civilization, and other processes imagined as linear. Once the 
api classification took hold, oil companies proved up petroleum before 
removing it. In reality, resources became reserves while in the ground. As 
described in language, however, the geological formation itself climbed the 
ladder of progress. In all these ways, the word up suggested a y- axis, and 
the api and related institutions eventually charted one. But this search for a 
visual vernacular encountered more obstacles than in the case of geological 
cross sections. Oil production depended on two variables that were easily 
confused: the volume of oil and its commerciality. Even if one could firmly 
distinguish between these indicators, institutions had to agree on assigning 
one to the x- axis and the other to the y- axis. After much uncertainty, Vin-
cent McKelvey—a coworker and unstinting critic of Hubbert—provided 
a workable diagram (Mann 2013). In 1972, as director of the U.S. Geological 
Survey, McKelvey proposed a “Classification of Mineral Reserves and Re-
sources” (1972, 35; figure 3.9). In his chart, the vertical axis corresponded to 
commerciality or, in McKelvey’s terms, “feasibility of economic recovery.” 
The horizontal axis measured certainty with respect to the existence of 
oil. This rendering clarified Proved as a category of oil both profitable to 
recover and known to exist. Despite these useful corrections, McKelvey’s 
chart contained an anomaly impossible to reconcile. Shaped like a back-
ward L, the “resources” block included a portion of economically recov-
erable oil deemed almost certain not to exist (in the upper right). Such 
conjunctures could occur. But, by including them in a corner of the graph, 
McElvey interrupted the sense of a linear trajectory from discovering oil 
to producing it. The chart suggested right turns and detours on route to 
riches.
Flawed as it was, McKelvey’s graph stimulated better solutions in the 
1980s and thereafter. In 1987, the World Petroleum Congress—which 
united the api with other bodies—issued a report on classification and 
nomenclature systems. This document presented two simpler charts—
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almost flow charts—side by side (figure 3.10). The position of Discov-
ered to the left of Undiscovered suggested an x- axis of certainty regard-
ing existence. More tellingly, the left- hand column of discovered oil and 
gas arranged layers vertically from unrecoverable to unproved reserves to 
proved reserves to production. The y- axis, then, represented a commer-
ciality threshold and even a literal flow of hydrocarbons—except that Pro-
duction lay at the bottom of the chart. The vertical axis inverted geology, 
suggesting that oil and gas moved downward. Still, this chart portrayed 
petroleum in the ground and leaving the ground with enough deceptive 
literalism. A notation “not to scale” advised readers not to compare the 
sizes of the boxes (Martínez et al. 1987, 266). This warning passed into the 
now- definitive chart first proposed in 2001. “Guidelines for the Evaluation 
of Petroleum Reserves and Resources” united the recommendations of 
three expert bodies: the Society of Petroleum Engineers, the World Petro-
leum Congress, and the American Association of Petroleum Geologists. 
Their chart distinguishes a y- axis of financial risk—also denoted as “proj-
3.9 McKelvey’s 1972 chart. © World Petroleum Congress. Prepared by Mike 
Siegel of Rutgers Cartography Lab.
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ect maturity”—from an x- axis of existential certainty (figure 3.11). Proved 
reserves lie in a corner, at the intersection of high certainty and low risk. 
This chart set the standard. In 2011, the same three expert bodies wrote 
it into their Petroleum Resources Management System, or prms.9 Even 
before that point, the chart was becoming a visual icon for the oil and gas 
business worldwide. The graph constitutes what Edward Tufte calls “beau-
tiful evidence”: through it, “seeing turns into showing” (Tufte 2006, 9).
This artifice relies upon a subtle conflation of geological and com-
mercial tropes. One might easily confuse the two y- axes: denoting, re-
spectively, migration of geological substances and maturity of investment. 
Looking very much like summarized stratigraphy, the prms chart super-
imposes reserves upon resources. And resources move up in the same way 
petroleum rises toward the surface. A manual accompanying the chart con-
flates these two processes. “Budget decisions,” the text concludes, “should 
focus on increasing project maturity [a]s a specific accumulation moves 
up the system” (Society of Petroleum Engineers 2001, 22). That sentence 
shifts subtly from fiscal to lithic measures. In the latter sense, accumulation 
3.10 The World Petroleum Congress’s 1987 chart (fig. 1). © World Petroleum 
Congress. Prepared by Mike Siegel of Rutgers Cartography Lab.
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denotes a pool of oil stuck below a caprock. The hydrocarbons accumulate 
precisely because they are not moving up the stratigraphic system. But, in 
the imaginary of the prms, they do move from reserves to resources. Here 
metaphorical and literal meanings seem to fuse, as if a financial reclassi-
fication equated to changes underground. Probably few readers noticed 
the “not to scale” warning, presumably retained to avoid liability. Like-
wise, few readers reflect upon what is not in the chart: combustion and, 
further downstream, global climate change. In this  consequence- blind, 
 conscience- free fashion, the prms chart established a “zone of qualifica-
tion,” wherein “objects and practices are assessed to common standards 
and criteria” (Barry 2006, 239). A quality of upward motion reconciled the 
dissonant measures of commerciality and stratigraphy. Or, in Rudwick’s 
terms, the prms established a “stylistic analogy,” which allowed disci-
3.11 Petroleum Resources Management System (prms), 2001 (the first version, 
published under a different title). © Society of Petroleum Engineers (spe).
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plines and sciences to borrow seamlessly from each other (1976, 168–69). 
Thenceforth, geologists and economists played the prms chart like a 
board game, forever advancing pieces toward the upper left corner.
The name of the game is “reserve replacement,” and it is a sport of pub-
lic relations. Reserves exit the chart on their way to refineries, fertilizer 
manufacturing, and so on. Meanwhile, oil and gas companies prove up 
resources to refill the depleted reserves. At a rate of 100 percent, replace-
ment maintains reserves at an even level. At higher than 100 percent, re-
serves actually expand. Unless one discounts estimates from the Middle 
East, global reserves are keeping steady. In that case, the larger aggregate 
of resources becomes the real measure of supply, and policy makers need 
not worry about an impending peak. The credibility of this message de-
pends—more than any other factor—on the commerciality threshold. 
Timothy Mitchell describes a “gap between the declining quantity of oil 
known and the quantity of expanding, yet- to- be- discovered oil” as a “space 
to be governed by economic calculation” (2011, 251). The prms chart rep-
resents commerciality as a line between contingent resources and reserves. 
The line is always moving. One might say, in fact, that producers push that 
barrier downward into the layer of resources as they prove up the affected 
resources. So the top stratum of resources—which is not actually higher up 
geologically—waits in a kind of antechamber. From 1987, the World Petro-
leum Conference tried to dispel this ambiguity. The authors of the report 
“rejected, for proved reserves, the concept of estimating future economic 
conditions . . . restricting these estimates to the amount recoverable under 
the economic conditions at the time of the estimate.” Proved reserves, in 
other words, “are the estimated quantities, as at a specific date,” irrespec-
tive of deregulation or cheaper technology anticipated in the near term 
(Martínez et al. 1987, 265). This effort to freeze time unraveled somewhat 
with the prms chart. That graph inserted a layer of contingent reserves 
just below the commerciality threshold. To make matters worse, futures 
contracts in the 2000s created an “oil vega,” or persistent instability regard-
ing quantities and prices (Moors 2011). Mazen Labban (2010) refers to a 
“financialization,” where markets operate independent of oil’s material dis-
position. Especially under these conditions, the prms chart allows the oil 
and gas business to present its raw materials as scarce to consumers but as 
constantly replaced to investors—without actually lying.
In Trinidad, this sleight of hand can become embarrassingly apparent 
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as the two messages continually cross. In a small country—containing 
the entire commodity chain—the same firms both consume hydrocar-
bons and invest in their production. Having experienced the decline in oil, 
managing directors follow natural gas with both expertise and concern. By 
July 2010, proven reserves had been falling steadily, and the annual press 
conference—at which the gas audit of the previous year is announced—
could no longer avoid this fact. Held at the Hyatt Hotel, the event began 
with a slide presentation from Larry McHalffey, of the  Houston- based 
auditor Ryder Scott. McHalffey and his team had reviewed proprietary 
well data from every driller and condensed their numbers into the only 
summary that would be made public. The picture was not reassuring. A 
retrospective slide showed proven reserves falling from almost 20 trillion 
cubic feet (tcf) in 2000 to a bit more than 14 tcf in 2009. “There has been 
a steady decline in reserves in most categories,” McHalffey related laconi-
cally. Trinidad produced roughly 1.4 tcf in 2009. Straightforward arithmetic 
indicated a mere decade of gas remaining. As a subsequent slide showed, 
the  reserve- to- production ratio stood at 10. Yet the auditor chose his lan-
guage carefully. He avoided linking the figure of 10 to years or any measure 
of time: the  reserve- to- production ratio is a unitless “performance indica-
tor,” he explained. And, he continued in closing remarks, this number “goes 
hand in hand with reserves replacement ratio.” One could not predict the 
future. McHalffey labeled the y- axis of his chart Project Maturity. Time was 
on Trinidad’s side, he implied, if its leaders followed orders: “Target at least 
100 percent reserves replacement each year,” he concluded, perhaps pa-
tronizing his audience. The situation, in short, was imperfect but certainly 
remediable—as long as one overlooked climate change.10
The minister of energy took over exactly where the auditor left off. At 
that point, Carolyn  Seepersad- Bachan had served for only two months—
having arrived with the new government in May—and was soon to be 
removed in a cabinet reshuffle. She had worked in the downstream sec-
tor, as chairperson of the National Petroleum Marketing Company, and 
did not project confidence regarding matters further upstream. (Being fe-
male among oilmen did not help either.) At the press conference, though, 
 Seepersad- Bachan acquitted herself admirably. Briefer than McHalffey’s, 
her slide presentation contained no numbers or charts. Instead, she showed 
the map of gas acreage, stretching far out to sea. Promising, ultradeep wa-
ters billowed eastward behind Trinidad like a parachute. Replacement was 
84 chApte r 3
coming, already begun in fact. Smiling attractively, the minister assured 
her audience, “We have been able to transfer exploration resources into the 
reserves category.” And, moreover, the government was planning “continu-
ous  exploration- based activity . . . at an optimal level.” The ministry would 
contract with British Petroleum, British Gas, and other foreign firms to 
drill below 5,000 feet of water. In this way,  Seepersad- Barchan promised 
magically to “prove up supplies.” David Renwick, the dean of Trinidad’s 
energy journalists and editor of Energy Caribbean, spotted a contradiction. 
Posing a question from the press bench, he referred back to McHalffey’s 
slide of reserves and resources since 2000. Resources in the Exploration 
column had fallen from 30 to 26 tcf. What did this drop bode for the future? 
Raised with surprising modesty, Renwick’s query provoked no response 
from the minister or from McHalffey.  Seepersad- Bachan simply repeated 
that she would explore more and prove up—a prediction that could never 
be falsified. The next day, Trinidad’s  highest- circulation newspaper, the 
Express, reproduced McHalffey’s slide of reserves from 2000 to 2009. “Ten 
years left,” blared the headline.11 Had the performance failed?
Actually, no: it sustained faith in abundance among the adherents who 
mattered most. Despite skepticism, Renwick mostly agreed with the minis-
ter. In Energy Caribbean, his headline after the 2008 audit had read “Reserves 
Being Replaced on a Yearly Basis” (Renwick 2008b, 16). “[The] proven 
reserves have fallen,” he admitted after the 2009 audit, “[but] the probable 
and possible reserves have not.” That article explained the logic of prms 
in some depth: probable reserves lay above the commerciality threshold. 
They were just not known to exist. If they did exist, in other words, these 
accumulations of gas would augment Trinidad’s  profit- producing stockpile. 
Renwick converted that contingency to a certainty. “Some of that [gas] will 
inevitably feed into the proven category,” he promised readers, “though it 
has not been happening as fast as industry watchers would like” (Renwick 
2009, 74). Renwick and I happened to meet for the first time just the day 
before the 2010 press conference. Having lunch at the house I had rented, 
he dismissed much of the concern regarding reserves. Well versed in eco-
nomics, he considered that discipline to be “the driving factor, not geology 
at all: the geologists just tell you where to go and drill.” Hydrocarbons lay 
in the earth, accessible as and when funds permitted. This attitude and the 
audits themselves kept policy focused on when and how—not whether—
to extract hydrocarbons. I suggested switching to renewable fuels. “You’ve 
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got to be practical,” Renwick responded gamely. “The world’s economy is 
based on energy, and that energy is based on fossil fuels.”12 Nothing in the 
press conference the next day changed Renwick’s outlook. To this extent 
then, the gathering achieved its purpose: it announced scarcity to the im-
pressionable public while telling the experts a  supply- rich story they could 
assimilate. Neither alternatives nor conscience ever entered the discussion. 
“Take [exploration] action now,” the Energy Chamber urged determinedly 
in a letter to the Express, a week after the audit.13
By 2012, however, even loyal experts were becoming confused. In the in-
tervening two audits, Ryder Scott had tracked a decline in gas reserves to 13 
tcf. Rumors of scarcity abounded, and the industry needed to rebut them. 
“I know what Ryder Scott says,” began Philip Farfan, “but I know nothing 
about Trinidad’s reserves. That is quite a statement.” Farfan was leading the 
Understanding Reserves workshop on the last day of the 2012 Energy Con-
ference. Pacing before a slide of the prms chart, Farfan began by recalling 
the moment in 2003 when the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(sec) redefined reserves. “Overnight everybody had to dress their figures 
down. It was a catastrophic event.” Rather than proving up, they actually 
“wrote down” marketable assets back into the netherworld of resources. 
But—and here was the good news of the workshop—no oil moved phys-
ically that night. Changes to the rules proved how arbitrary—not geolog-
ical—the rules were. Farfan and his cofacilitator, Tony Paul, had worked 
as hydrocarbon economists for decades in American, international, and 
Trinidadian firms. For their workshop audience of journalists and civil 
servants, they sought to create, rather than dispel, confusion. From the 
front row of that perplexed audience, Renwick asked for a comparison of 
the various guidelines. “We have won,” Farfan responded joyously. “This 
is the success of today!” The bulk of the presentation tracked the fortunes 
of an imaginary Trinidadian gas field and gas company. Wells produced, 
drawing down reserves, except at three points. At those moments, the firm 
proved up reserves, in the first instance, by injecting water to force gas out, 
then by securing a new set of buyers, and last by injecting gas to bring up 
more gas. This story furrowed the brows of the uninitiated while tickling 
the genuine oilmen who had stayed around after the energy conference. “A 
good oil field usually gets better,” interjected a jolly Texan. Farfan ended 
by comforting readers of the Ryder Scott report. “Don’t be obsessed today 
with your reserves. Be obsessed with your resources.” Resources, in other 
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words, can cause reserves to grow. “Whether it is nine years left or three 
years left, what does that mean? . . . What matters, of course, is continuous 
exploration. You are bound to find something.”14
Are you really? I asked Farfan, when we met again, nearly a year later. I 
wanted to know how deep his confidence ran and whether ethical scruples 
troubled it in any way. He had organized the 2012 workshop because Roger 
Packer, president of the Energy Chamber, confessed to concerns about gas 
reserves. “I said, Roger,” Farfan recalled, “for fuck’s sake get real! I’ll show 
you why it’s crap.” Farfan seemed bent on personally embarrassing the sec 
and Ryder Scott for imposing unfairly pessimistic expectations on Trini-
dad. Since 2003, proving up required a production contract. Hydrocarbons, 
in other words, could not be booked as underground reserves until they 
were at the very point of leaving the ground. What about leaving them 
below, I asked? Farfan parried with his professional ethic: “I feel that it is 
my responsibility to get as much out of the ground as possible.” On the 
question of scarcity, he admitted to an outer boundary: “That is true about 
everything on the planet. I mean the sun is going to be exhausted.” When 
I mentioned climate change, he jumped scale again: “It’s hard if you’re not 
a geologist to put the planet in perspective. . . . In a million years do you 
want us to be like this?” Perhaps, he concluded, we would learn from the 
Neanderthals, who evolved so admirably in response to global warming.15 
It was a strange—but not uncharacteristic—evasion: one that united 
the timescale and the inevitability of geological forces. Farfan knew his 
business and cared deeply about the fraternity of men and women in oil 
and gas. But, beyond this coterie, humanity faded into the fog of bipedal 
gropings toward something better. Farfan tacked from the serious to the 
flippant. “We got here evolving under crisis,” he joked, walking toward the 
large car that had actually brought him to me.16
The Circular Back Stream
By 2010, Trinidad’s oil and gas club was addressing climate change substan-
tively—but still under an assumption of oil inevitability. The sector was 
beginning to treat environmentalism as an “aboveground risk,” in a class 
with sabotage and nationalization. The risk lay in the possibility that scien-
tists and activists might persuade consumers to cut their carbon emissions 
radically. In Trinidad as elsewhere, hydrocarbon insiders imagine such a 
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scenario only with difficulty. Their term for it—“demand destruction”—
suggests violent pathology.17 As one of the milder forms of such tampering, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change had considered estab-
lishing markets that would debit for releases and credit for the capture of 
atmospheric carbon. Having little forest with which to fix carbon in bio-
mass, Trinidad would not benefit from substantial credits. Meanwhile, the 
debits would hit Trinidad’s petrochemical sector and its high- emitting cit-
izenry. To forestall this misfortune—and concurrently with the debate on 
gas supplies—the hydrocarbon fraternity devised an engineering project 
to lower the country’s net emissions. They would inject carbon dioxide 
generated at downstream industrial sites into geological formations. This 
“back stream” would return carbon to its underground source, exonerating 
Trinidad of responsibility for those megatons (Bridge and Le Billon 2013, 
37). Like all forms of what is known as geoengineering, this proposal relied 
upon technology barely tested (Hamilton 2013, 45–47). Risk abounded. 
Unanticipated losses—beginning with the Trini cow already killed by a 
leaky co2 pipe—could easily overwhelm the benefits of carbon capture 
and storage. Still, those advantages promised to be substantial. Through 
“enhanced oil recovery,” the scheme would use injected carbon dioxide to 
push hydrocarbons up. Trinidad’s back stream would reconnect to the up-
stream and recover unrecoverable oil. Boosters called it a win- win scenario.
Always looking for such Panglossian business propositions, the Energy 
Chamber began to promote carbon capture in 2008.18 The officers of this 
institution saw climate change less as a moral problem than as the sort of 
political crisis that yields opportunities. But first they had to persuade the 
businessmen and politicians governing energy policy. Thackwray Driver, 
the chamber’s  British- born chief executive officer, viewed climate change 
with a jaundiced eye. In 1998, he had written a geography dissertation on 
colonials’ misplaced fears of soil erosion in Lesotho (Driver 1998; cf. Driver 
1999). He had also moved from London to Port of Spain, married his Trini 
sweetheart, and taken up work in Trinidad’s Forestry Department. Among 
foresters, he encountered the same stale, colonial dislike of rural settle-
ment, shifting cultivation, and large families. Bravely defending squatters, 
Driver (2002) challenged the long- standing imperial aversion to popula-
tion growth. “I don’t believe Malthus very much,” he later told me, “but I 
hold that view very lightly: I mean I could be wrong.”19 Then he laughed. 
I got to know Driver—or “Dax,” as he is called everywhere—quite well. 
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We both lived in Cascade and drove each other’s kids to school. “I’ve al-
ways been a bit skeptical of the big claims people make,” he once explained 
languidly on the retreating shore of Maracas Beach. “Let’s muddle through 
and see what happens.”20 The chamber hoped that profits would happen, 
and, in late 2008, it drew national attention to Clyde Abder’s scheme for 
carbon capture. An engineer, Abder mastered the details and controlled 
the risks. Men die on gas platforms, he informed me, in a moment’s inat-
tention. He sized his students up for potential drug use. Perhaps surpris-
ingly—perhaps seeking a cheerier form of competence—Abder teamed 
up with the ubiquitous Krishna Persad.
Two years later, in 2010, Persad presented their plan to the Energy 
Chamber in the glittering Hyatt. This time, his humor nearly got the better 
of him. Persad’s slide show emphasized profit, and a Midas touch. “Let me 
waft you,” Persad invited his audience, “to a land with castles where co2 is 
transformed into black gold.” Amid references to Dorothy, The Wizard of 
Oz, and streets paved with gold, Persad recruited partners to “do good and, 
in the process, make a lot of money.” After this jarringly whimsical pitch, 
Persad explained Trinidad’s comparative advantages in the nascent field of 
carbon capture: the Point Lisas Industrial Estate converted natural gas into 
ammonia and, as a by- product, dumped pure, high- quality carbon dioxide. 
Existing pipelines could carry that pollution to the oil belt, where his com-
pany would inject it into depleted, depressurized oil reservoirs. Carbon 
dioxide would repressurize the formation and cut the viscosity of the re-
maining petroleum. Like the injected water and gas in Farfan’s presentation, 
this technology would cause hydrocarbons to flow. Indeed, oilmen in East 
Texas had been conducting this kind of “huff and puff ” operation since the 
1970s. Their wells puffed carbon dioxide down underground and huffed 
out oil—along with most of the co2. Persad would do better. By capping 
the well deliberately, he would trap up to half of the injected carbon dioxide 
for an indefinite period. As described, these back stream operations more 
than compensated for the resulting upstream ones: the puff outdid the huff. 
Oil coming to the surface, Persad told his audience, is “net cleaner than 
[the original] natural gas.”21 I was skeptical. Could one really capture more 
carbon than one emitted at the end of the day?
My search for the answer to this question began as soon as Persad 
stopped talking. Were carbon capture and enhanced oil recovery “con-
tributing to the problem or to the solution regarding carbon emissions?” 
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I asked after his presentation. “I have no clue,” Persad responded without 
embarrassment. In the coffee break, when the investors were no longer 
listening, he confessed to me, “Someone else can do the math. In that area 
I have no skill.” On the net outcome, he revised his earlier statement: “It’s 
neutral at best—at best.”22 Persad retreated even further when we met a 
month later in the oil belt. Inexpertly, he ran through conversion rates, 
admitting, “You are losing.” In net terms, his back stream emitted carbon. 
Then he calculated some more—muttering, “My initial gut feeling is that 
it is negative”—and reached for the phone. “I cannot replace that carbon 
footprint by injecting co2?” he asked Abder himself. Persad listened som-
berly, hung up, and reported, “He said that it is not debatable.”23 I called 
Abder myself, and we met at his office at the University of the West Indies. 
“You will never have a positive carbon balance,” he lectured, “by injecting 
carbon dioxide to produce oil.”24 The matter was obvious, in fact: gas al-
ways replaced liquid at a lower density. And long petroleum molecules un-
avoidably hold more carbon than does  three- atom carbon dioxide. Finally, 
stored co2 could leak out later (cf. Metz, Loos, and Meyers 2005). On this 
issue, Persad referred me to Shiraz Rajav. Rajav had recently retired from 
capping wells for Petrotrin, the national oil company. Known confusingly 
as “well abandonment,” capping could hold the carbon dioxide in place, he 
believed. But whether “carefully abandoned”—in the amusing phrase—or 
not, Persad’s wells would exacerbate climate change. “[For] the amount of 
carbon you’re going to produce in the air,” Rajav reasoned, “you might as 
well have not put the co2 down there.” Then, looking out from my balcony 
in Cascade, Rajav grieved for the Kilimanjaro glacier which he had visited 
twenty years earlier: “We are human beings before we are oilmen.”25 I had 
my answer—carbon capture was a net loser—and another question: why 
did most of these human,  conscience- capable oilmen seem so unperturbed 
by that outcome?
Opportunism clouded judgment, especially at the highest levels. Con-
current with my doubtful probings, the Ministry of Energy was preparing 
to push Persad’s scheme forward. A week after I met Rajav, as an unusually 
hot dry season was getting worse, the ministry announced the creation of 
a Carbon Reduction Strategy Task Force. The group would include Persad 
and Charles Percy, the current president of the Energy Chamber. Percy 
spoke at the press conference—held, of course, at the Hyatt—asserting 
that carbon capture is “the only technology known to reduce up to 90 per-
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cent of emissions from industry.” The statement was true—but only if one 
discounted the possibility of running an industry 100 percent from solar 
or wind power (or not running the industry at all). Selwyn Lashley, who 
managed renewable energy for the ministry, might have corrected Percy. 
Instead, he heaped further praise upon carbon capture as “an important 
element in the improvement of oil production.”26 I met Lashley later at 
the ministry—immediately adjacent to the Hyatt—where he served as 
chief technical officer. Flanked by two female aides, he began by setting 
the task force in context: Trinidad and Tobago had “pursued this path of 
industrialization. It’s a reality we have to deal with.” He, Percy, Persad, and 
the rest would search for “absolute reductions in a tangible and sufficient 
amount.” Carbon capture, I ventured, did not qualify as an absolute reduc-
tion in emissions. As I laid out Abder’s quantitative, physical reasoning, 
Lashley and his assistants shifted uneasily. “It comes down,” he responded, 
“to how you do your accounting and where you put your envelope.” An-
other country would burn the oil produced from Persad’s wells. “You,” he 
affirmed—meaning Trinidad and Tobago—“produce nothing that goes 
into the atmosphere in your boundaries.” The ministry, in short, would 
lower carbon emissions at the national level while raising them at the global 
level. “They’re piggybacking on a nice concept to get business as usual 
done,” I learned through a leak at the ministry. “It’s an energy thing. It’s not 
about the climate.”27
Such cynicism rested on a more widely shared conceptual foundation 
of energy without conscience. The reigning  geological- economic model 
made oil production appear inevitable. With or without carbon capture, 
the oil in South Trinidad was supposedly coming up. As Clyde Abder put 
it, “We gonna produce that oil one way or another. . . . As long as the world 
needs oil, oilmen will find it, and they will produce oil.”28 The dry season 
broke, temperatures cooled, and Persad invited me to a cricket match. Lu-
gubrious as the West Indian side began to lose, he spoke about the heavy, 
viscous oil lurking at the bottom of his “stripper” wells. He had injected car-
bon dioxide into a few of them and doubled production from 4 to 8 barrels 
per day. He had proved up resources, I told him with a feeble smile that he 
well understood. But this happens anyway, he continued: “In the fullness 
of time, they [resources] will be transformed into reserves.”29 We met again 
socially on my  follow- up visits to Trinidad but did not take up the matter of 
carbon capture until January 2012. By that time, the minister of energy had 
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praised Persad’s method in a speech and—in response to my question—
misleadingly claimed “no net carbon dioxide will be released.”30 Persad’s 
huff- and- puff operation was releasing 20 barrels per day. After three vodka 
tonics in San Fernando, I put the matter as bluntly as I ever had: why not 
simply keep the 3 billion barrels Persad was seeking in the ground? Ecuador 
was negotiating a deal to do just that with oil reservoirs under a protected 
rainforest (Davidov 2012; Finer, Moncel, and Jenkins 2010). Persad would 
have none of it. Someone else would then get the hydrocarbons, and, “You 
can’t be held responsible if the rest of the world doesn’t do what it should.”31 
He reminded me of our first conversation on the topic, during which he 
had told me, “It’s going to take a while for the world to change, and mean-
while the train is going down the track.”32 Like a commuter, the oil would 
arrive on schedule.
Ultimately, any policy to address climate change would have to permit 
the continued combustion of oil and gas. This consensus became apparent 
at the 2012 Energy Conference. Dax announced “Striking the Balance” as 
the theme. Panels on upstream and downstream concerns left little time 
for other issues. Climate change appeared in the interstices, almost as an 
afterthought. On the first day, Vincent Pereira of the Australian firm bhp 
Billiton raised the topic of solar and wind, in a backhanded way. “There 
is going to be growth in energy demand,” he began blandly. Appearing 
open- minded, he predicted, “Renewable energy is going to grow, but,” 
firmly now, “the reality is that fossil fuels—oil, gas, coal—are going to be 
80 percent.” He specified no date, but it was clear that energy production 
would expand dramatically, allowing hydrocarbons and renewables both to 
grow. What if the global movement against fossil fuels destroyed demand? 
I queried from midway down the Hyatt’s plenary hall. Pereira responded 
coolly, “Having taken on challenges like this before in our industry, I have 
to believe that it can be solved.”33 The next day, Peter Wyant presented one 
of those solutions. Persad had invited him from Saskatchewan, where his 
agency was monitoring storage in the biggest carbon capture project in the 
Americas. At the province’s Weyburn Field, injected carbon dioxide was 
delivering oil to the surface. Innocently, I popped my question about the 
net effect, and Wyant assured me that he was storing more co2 than he was 
releasing. Persad found me immediately after the presentation, excusing 
his friend with, “He misunderstood your question.”34 The next day—on 
my way to the reserves workshop mentioned above—I bumped into Wy-
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ant in the corridor. This time he understood my question and gaped in a 
 fifteen- second stutter. Then he explained his assumption, really more of a 
wish: whoever burned Weyburn’s petroleum would send the resulting co2 
somewhere else for storage.35 We didn’t discuss whether that carbon diox-
ide would push out another round of hydrocarbons. In any case, the train 
of complicity would roll on. Seemingly, people eager to mitigate carbon 
emissions cannot but climb aboard.
Petroleum institutions suffer from a diagnosed “inevitability syndrome” 
(Nader 2004, 775). In this perverse perception, the world always needs 
hydrocarbons, and the substance must satisfy the demand (Huber 2012, 
309; Sawyer 2010, 67). Oil and gas will themselves to come up, to be pro-
duced. Or the earth wills them to gush on top of James Dean. The text of 
Giant refers poetically to the “earth- pent oil his labors had just released” 
(Ferber 1952, 364). In the course of this release, petroleum experts develop 
an almost animistic belief in geological agency. “The oil (or gas),” writes 
Rick Bass, “always tries to climb higher than it is: moving, like a miner, 
through and between pinhead spots of porosity, trying to get up to the area 
of least pressure.” It travels, continues the geologist from Mississippi, “back 
to the earth’s surface, where it used to be.” Hydrocarbons—like salmon 
swimming to spawn—fight upward to their point of origin. This notion of 
return, of course, emphasizes continuity more than rupture. It suggests an 
unbroken itinerary from vegetation to sediment to accumulation to the gas 
station. The voyagers pause only when impermeable layers trap migrating 
molecules. Bass and his coworkers drill through that rock. “Then the oil or 
gas . . . is just about obliged to come out. It is as daring a rescue,” he congrat-
ulates his profession, “as ever there was” (Bass 1989, 27–28). The charts and 
categories of his profession display this operation as it takes place. They are 
what Andrew Barry calls “projective devices” (2013, 14). By graphing depth 
as time and time as depth, the geological cross section implies and predicts 
upward flow. Then men drill, making the prophesy self- fulfilling. The plot 
of petroleum always runs forward, downstream.
Why is this graphic novel so believable? It conflates geology and com-
merce, the natural and the artificial—and does so with particular persua-
sive power as regards the notion of maturation. A widely used textbook 
on oil defines “maturity” as “petroleum generation . . . in a source rock.” 
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But a later chapter refers to “mature areas that have been relatively well 
drilled” (Hyne 1995, 172, 224). In this double use, petroleum matures as it 
bakes underground and as wells and pumps—and ultimately consumer 
demand—bring it to the surface. To describe this multiplex uplift, my in-
formants frequently deployed the term reality. That  conversation- stopping 
word imputed a monolithic quality to the petrochemical industry and its 
various commodity chains. The term naturalized what were merely deci-
sions, taken every day in Port of Spain and other energy cities. The “reality” 
also obscured what should have been obvious limitations. Sediments hold 
only a finite amount of oil and gas. Demand cannot renew a nonrenewable 
resource. Yet experts assume that hydrocarbons will not run out as long as 
governments, corporations, and people don’t want them to. Tyler Priest, in 
a history of Shell Oil, captures this fuzzy thinking unwittingly. He writes of 
the exploration team going offshore “in the race against depletion” (Priest 
2007, 106). In the real reality, they were racing toward depletion. In the 
reality of charts, however, Shell proved up resources so fast that reserves 
grew. There is no Malthusian absolute scarcity in this economic thinking. 
Meanwhile—and of more immediate concern—the atmosphere is impos-
ing its own limitations. The oil fraternity has trouble focusing on this fact. 
“The Earth has become abstract,” writes Bill McKibben, “and the economy 
concrete to us” (1989, xxiii).
Individuals may have also faded into a strange obscurity—even within 
the macho hydrocarbon industry itself. “Oil is found in the minds of men,” 
my informants occasionally told me (cf. Yergin 2011, 717). But when the 
conversation turned to climate change, even the most accomplished ge-
ologists felt oddly powerless. In Trinidad, most understood the way in 
which hydrocarbons were changing the climate and threatening life. Many 
wished they could do something about it. It took me some time to com-
prehend this form of passivity and complicity. For social scientists, climate 
change has thrown human agency into stark relief. High emitters of carbon 
dioxide now stride across the planet as “geological agents” (Chakrabarty 
2009, 206). Yet the experts of oil have not yet adjusted to this inversion of 
deep and shallow time. Krishna Persad cared enough about climate change 
to create a  solar- powered eco- resort on Tobago. Not merely an object of 
greenwashing or corporate social responsibility, the  family- run enterprise 
occupied his thoughts and moved his spirit. Why, then, did he at the very 
same time explore for new supplies of oil in South Trinidad? If not him, 
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someone else would, he always said, as if submitting to an unwelcome fate. 
Finally, I put it to him that he was the best geologist in the country, a mind 
that regularly found oil. He also took greater economic risks in enhanced 
oil recovery than any other producer (Renwick 2008a, 20). Just possibly, 
oil he did not personally discover or flush out might stay there, and that oil 
trapped in sediments might keep the world within the safe climate bound-
ary. Persad wavered, taking the scenario seriously: “If I was going to be re-
sponsible for tipping the whole world over, then I can’t do it.”36 He brushed 
against the boundary of conscience.
I saw Trinidad’s Pitch Lake first in the National Museum (figure 4.1). An 
1857 watercolor hangs on the second floor, in a kind of shrine to the is-
land’s first professional painter, Michel Jean Cazabon. Cazabon, the son of 
wealthy French planters, helped launch a national consciousness among 
the island’s polyglot, multiracial population. Through the brush, he con-
verted a space hardly known or valued by its own inhabitants into known, 
named, beautiful places (Cudjoe 2003, 154). Thus, the pleasant watercolor 
titled Asphalt Lake stands as an exception to my general finding of sym-
bolic thinness regarding hydrocarbons. The image is still more improb-
able. As I discovered upon visiting the Pitch Lake, Cazabon saw a scene 
both banal and unpretty. At 114 acres (48 hectares), the feature resembled 
a large, puddled parking lot. I toured the lake dutifully and then looked 
for people in La Brea, the adjoining town named in Spanish after pitch. 
Activists were fighting a proposed aluminum smelter, a threat to the en-
vironment and human health. I had met these critics in Port of Spain and 
then renewed my acquaintance at their homes and in political meetings. 
Were these  working- class Afro- and Indo- Trinidadians concerned about 
the current danger from oil as well as about potential toxins from a smelter? 
I probed in this way and hit a wall. To a person, these activists—as well as 
their allies in Port of Spain—expressed a positive view of hydrocarbons. 
Without citing the painter, they shared Cazabon’s rosy of view of asphalt, 
petroleum, and gas. I continued my quest. On repeated visits of a day or 
two from the capital, I crisscrossed South Trinidad looking for dissenters. 
Trinis were preparing for Carnival, but I hoped to find, at least, someone 
concerned about global and local oil spills. Yet as I moved east and north 
from La Brea—passing Cazabon’s home region of Naparima—I encoun-
tered complicity and silence. In the oil belt, I met many earnest, environ-
mentally minded people but no kindred spirit.
CHAPTER 4
Lakeside, or the Petro- pastoral Sensibility
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Oil’s natural quality shields it from a degree of interrogation and fear. 
Remember, petroleum geologists believe that 95 percent of all the hy-
drocarbons ever formed in Earth’s crust have come up without human 
intervention (chapter 3). People extract the small, stubborn remainder 
and—crucially with respect to the climate—burn all those stockpiles. 
Combustion releases carbon dioxide, most of which, again, already exists 
in nature. The entire hydrocarbon fuel system, in other words, generates no 
new substances. Plastic manufacturers do convert oil and gas into artificial 
compounds. But on the energy side of downstream production, refineries 
and power plants generate nothing so exotic as the radioactive isotopes 
minted in any nuclear station. Human actions, therefore, only amplify 
petrolic activity that preceded industrial life. Of course, that amplification 
bursts the bounds of moderation. Global climate change makes that clear. 
Locally, in the Niger delta,  jagged- edged pipelines and lurid gas flares pro-
voke rebels, writers, and photographers alike. With a similar starkness, the 
vast strip mine amid Canada’s tar sands overruns boreal forest. Observers 
near and far criticize these oil fields as environmental and social atrocities. 
Less extreme cases attract less criticism than one might expect—nearly 
4.1 Asphalt Lake, watercolor, Michel Jean Cazabon, 1857. © Michel Jean Caza-
bon, Courtesy of the National Museum and Art Gallery.
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none, in other words. In Texas, Oklahoma, and California, pump jacks 
sway like horses, a metal rodeo bucking up oil. After so many decades, they 
seem to belong amid tumbleweeds and alkali soil. The literary scholar Leo 
Marx names this aesthetic compromise the “technological sublime” (1964, 
230). Americans have applied it in appreciating railroads, bridges, and sky-
scrapers (Nye 1994). Oil wells too: in the eye of the tolerant beholder, rigs 
thrum gently, undisturbingly. Offshore, fish and aquatic vegetation colo-
nize production platforms, as the Houston aquarium is eager to display 
( Jørgensen 2014, 267–68). To the resident, this oil land is home: a mosaic 
of water, soil, plants, animals, and a gooey mineral widely sought and con-
tentedly consumed (Campbell 2014, 83, 101).
Such an imaginary—which I call the  petro- pastoral—shaped my en-
tire experience in South Trinidad. In this chapter, I relate the “infinitely 
malleable” pastoral genre to cultural sensibilities among Trinidadians who 
actually write very little (Garrard 2004, 33). Outside Trinidad, pastoral au-
thors have long applauded  small- scale, communitarian alternatives to the 
capitalist, technological city. In villages, one should live a less regulated 
life, keep one’s own hours, and marry for love. The English poet William 
Words worth wrote famously of the beauty of Cumbrian landscapes filled 
with lakes and interspersed with fields, forests, and meadows. These aes-
thetics run like a red thread through contemporary England’s rural nostal-
gia and frequent romance with agrarian life (Williams 1973). Trinidad is dif-
ferent. Even without oil, this sort of conventional pastoralism would hardly 
enter into its literature or calypso (Rohlehr 1992, 203). Caribbean farming 
has frequently evoked brutal, rather than gentle, times (Deloughrey 2004, 
299). Sugarcane, the island’s chief crop, carried the taint of slavery and in-
dentureship long after the abolition of both institutions. Amid that legacy, 
the country’s first president, Eric Williams, industrialized with a palpable 
“scorn for agriculture” (Miller 2011, 54). He applied nostalgia—or, at any 
rate, assumptions of rightness and belonging—to the energy sector. In-
flected by the “petro,” Trinidad’s pastoralism applauds the oil well, rather 
than the village water well. Even when the well damages ecosystems and 
human health,  petro- pastoralism underwrites a surprising tolerance. That 
indulgence frankly frustrated me—but not enough to impede my eth-
nography. On the contrary, I kept moving through South Trinidad, try-
ing to find an antioil sentiment. Stubbornly, I sought a conscience about 
hydrocarbons and climate change in the most unlikely place. Meanwhile, 
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movements complacent toward hydrocarbons brought the party founded 
by Eric Williams to its knees. One government left office, and the other 
replaced it, but no policies or practices changed with respect to hydro-
carbons. I lived through a historical turning point that—because of the 
lakeside aesthetics of La Brea—failed to turn.
Defining the Lake
Hydrocarbons straddle the boundary between two forms of nature: the 
biosphere and the lithosphere, the landscape and its rocky substrate. From 
antiquity, naturalists have favored the surface. Among the first geogra-
phers, Hippocrates titled his most influential work on the environment 
Airs, Waters, Places while Strabo later focused inquiry on inhabited space 
(Glacken 1967, 80–81, 103). The underworld remained deeply foreign. 
That sense of strangeness—surviving religious and philosophical shifts far 
too complex to describe here—allowed most Europeans simply to forget 
the lithosphere. Even in the modern period, painters of nature depicted 
rocky mountains rather than deep rock (Schama 1995, 385ff.). In fiction, 
Jules Verne did send Professor Lidenbrock on his Journey to the Center 
of the Earth (1864). Scarcely imagined since, that subterranean trek still 
seems original. This sort of surface bias has long run through popular and 
academic discourse in North Atlantic societies and their colonial settle-
ments (Scott 2008, 1857). The subsurface, after all, lies behind a veil, and 
 literal- minded folk draw, describe, and remember what they see. Oil, how-
ever, breaks into view; it is one of the few aspects of deep geology to do so 
regularly and in many parts of the world. Seeping slowly through a fissure 
or spurting out through a well, hydrocarbons demand an explanation. Are 
they vegetable or mineral, topographical or geological, a product of soil or 
of deep rock? The Pitch Lake—which appears in Charles Lyell’s (1830) 
foundational Principles of Geology—received perhaps the earliest and most 
thorough scrutiny of any single petroleum deposit. Ultimately, that debate 
would determine whether La Brea stood in the vertical column or on a hor-
izontal plane. Did it perch perilously atop an unfathomably deep volcano 
or comfortably alongside a pastoral lake?
The extended first round of this enquiry reached a reassuring topo-
graphical consensus—but not before considering other, more outlandish 
possibilities. During his 1732 visit to Trinidad, the Jesuit Joseph Gumilla 
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encountered pitch as well as the indigenous people living near it. The sub-
stance appeared to him like a “spring” that ran “inexhaustibly.” The neigh-
bors appeared to live in terror. Just before Gumilla’s arrival, “a piece of land 
had sank . . . and then in its place had appeared another pond of pitch, to 
the fright and fear of the residents, suspicious that, when they least ex-
pected it, the same would follow inside their settlements.”1
A century later, Lyell concurs with this Amerindian account. In his view, 
“the frequent occurrence of earthquakes,” “volcanic action,” and “subter-
ranean fire” both produced petroleum and ejected it to the surface (Lyell 
1830, I:218). Not long after this observation, George Wall and Jas Sawkins 
(see chapter 3) disputed it. The two men bored into the pitch lake—
through the Pitch Lake, in fact—to a bed of clay. Sawkins drew the deposit 
as a set of convection cells resting on a “supposed solid surface” (figure 4.2; 
Wall and Sawkins 1860, 140). Wall’s main text concluded unambiguously, 
“The origin of the asphalt, is in the stratum itself, and not referable to any 
process of distillation or ascension from below” (Wall and Sawkins 1860, 
143). Asphalt did not flow into the lake, then; it came into being as the lake 
converted the remains of plants and animals into more asphalt. Six years 
later, Wall described the “direct production of bitumen from vegetable re-
mains” (1866, 236). Tropical air at 80˚F simply baked rotting vegetation. 
There was no underground mystery, he concluded: “The generation of bi-
tumens is easily explained by the operation, at ordinary terrestrial tempera-
tures, of chemical laws” (1866, 239, emphasis added). Like most aquatic 
lakes, pitch simply occupied a depression in the ground.
That comforting judgment held—until fears of a pitch shortage re-
opened the entire issue. Conrad Stollmeyer and others extracted and sold 
asphalt so rapidly that the lake began to shrink (see chapter 2). In 1901, 
the colonial government convened an Asphalt Industry Commission, but 
before it could issue its report an upstart geologist published his own short 
pamphlet. Actually trained as a civil engineer, Oscar Messerly disputed the 
reigning description of the lake as “simply a large puddle of pitch which 
has oozed out of the sandstone and collected in a  basin- like depression in 
that rock” (1902, 18). Had Wall and Sawkins drilled in the right place, they 
surely would have found deep “chimneys.” These fissures, which Messerly 
sketched (figure 4.3), linked the Pitch Lake to “an enormous quantity of or-
ganic matters” deposited beneath the Gulf of Paria as the Orinoco scooped 
that “meditaranean sea [sic]” into existence (Messerly 1902, 8). Bitumen 
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then rose through the chimneys to “orifices,” which included the Pitch 
Lake and similar features in Venezuela (30). Extraction appeared to prove 
this point. As one dug pitch, Messerly observed, the substance flowed in 
to fill the hole. It toppled in from the sides, certainly, but also welled up 
from the bottom of any hole or cavity. “Vertical pushing” smoothed the 
asphalt in La Brea (19). Were it not so, depressions would remain at the 
sites of extraction. The earth’s crust, in other words, always replenished 
what one digger had taken from another. This upwelling suggested new 
nomenclature. Messerly chided those authorities who had “very improp-
4.3 Oscar Messerly’s chimney in the Pitch Lake, 1902.
4.2 Wall and Sawkins’s cross section of the Pitch Lake, 1860.
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erly given the name of Lake, as it offers not one of the topographical con-
ditions which may justify such a denomination” (5). More likely, powerful 
subterranean forces operated below La Brea. In his brash, undiplomatic 
way, Messerly almost made the catastrophic theories of Gumilla and Lyell 
fashionable again.
Then the Asphalt Industry Commission buried Messerly and his geo-
logical theory in a thousand pages of transcripts. Doubt reigned through-
out the hearings. Consisting of a geologist and two barristers—and at-
tended by the attorney general and six other legal men—the commission 
first interviewed a series of asphalt professionals. It spent the better part of 
a day, for instance, with Mr. G. F. Bushe, an agent responsible for Stollmey-
er’s portion of the lake. Bushe initially echoed Messerly’s view of vertical 
pushing. In any given hole, he testified, “The amount that comes up in 
three months’ time is too large to come from the sides, and therefore it 
comes from below” (Colony of Trinidad 1903, 45). The next witness dis-
counted all forces but subterranean ones: “The whole pressure comes up 
from the bottom,” claimed Arthur Protheroe, the owner of a lake lot. “You 
can see it rising.” The attorney general led the witness: “You believe there 
is some underground supply?” “I believe so,” Protheroe rejoined (65). He 
had watched diggers excavate to an apparent clay basement. Then the clay 
rose up, more than a foot in a night. Protheroe had supervised another 
20- foot hole. “Did you get to the bottom of the pitch then?” pressed the 
attorney general, Nathaniel Nathan. “No, Sir,” answered the witness (74). 
Interviewed on the next day, Francis Duncan claimed to have dug down 
twice as far. The pickaxes cut through clay and encountered more pitch. 
“Did you get to the bottom of that pitch ever?” asked Nathan (127). At 40 
feet, Duncan had still not exited the stratum of bitumen. Finally—for this 
phase of the hearings—the pitch digger Alfred Rogers conjectured about 
a structure akin to Messerly’s chimneys: Asphalt “comes from vents, as 
it were . . . all the time” (137). Clearly unconvinced, Nathan derided the 
witness’s “constitutional impossibility of measuring lengths of time” (131). 
Some commissioners had already made up their minds.
That skepticism toward the diggers eventually won out. After  twenty- 
 two grueling days of testimony, Nathan and the others concluded that 
pitch was shallow, a topographical form. The commissioners explicitly en-
dorsed Wall and derided Messerly. Although they rejected Wall’s model 
of ongoing asphalt production from vegetation, they characterized pitch 
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emphatically as superficial (Colony of Trinidad 1902, 7). No “earth pres-
sure” pushed pitch through chimneys, asserted the garrulous attorney 
general late in the hearings. “I think we may all assume,” he declared rather 
 heavy- handedly, “that pitch was formed in situ, where it was found, and 
is not a volcanic product” (Colony of Trinidad 1903, 345). With evident 
scorn, the commission’s final report referred to Messerly’s ideas as “too 
visionary to need examination” (Colony of Trinidad 1902, 12). Had all the 
witnesses who concurred with him suffered from similar delusions? No, 
the commissioners explained, they were merely missing the forest for the 
trees. Shallow hydrostatic pressure could push up in a fashion indistin-
guishable from deeper geological pressure. Asphalt surrounding a hole be-
haves rather like water pressure in and upon a cup pushed underwater. Or, 
as an amenable witness had illustrated, “Here’s my hat. It has a flat bottom. 
Press the sides, and crown goes in” (Colony of Trinidad 1903, 203). This 
liquid property, then, gave the impression of upwelling and increase, when 
pitch was finite and actually decreasing. On this point, the commission 
ruled definitively: “The amount of asphalt in the lake and the land deposits 
is strictly limited and . . . the surface level of the deposits must be lowered 
by any mining upon them” (Colony of Trinidad 1902, 15). Pitch was falling 
rather than rising, a lake receding from its shore.
Largely forgotten now—even in La Brea—the Asphalt Industry Com-
mission made history by what it did not say. It did not describe pitch as a 
deposit, outcrop, seep, or any other geological term in contemporary usage. 
It did not label bitumen as a pollutant from the underworld. Speculate 
for a moment on the counterfactual: the commission could have traced 
bitumen to Verne- like deep structures and processes. Perhaps Trinidadians 
would have read and reported this finding as an affirmation of the Amer-
indian myth. Perhaps La Brea residents would have treated the Pitch Lake 
and its products with greater caution. Like Messerly, they might have inter-
rogated its designation as a  still- water lake at all. A more scientific version 
of the story was soon proved true: pitch did seep up from deep below. 
Over the course of the first half of the twentieth century, petroleum ge-
ologists reached consensus on the migration of hydrocarbons from deep 
in the crust (Kropotkin 1997). Messerly had got it right after all. But this 
reversal in the dominant judgment came too late to disturb the hard- won 
consensus. In the wake of the Asphalt Industry Commission, practice es-
tablished the Pitch Lake’s reputation as a purely terrestrial, topographical 
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body. Tourists visited, walking carefully so as not to sink into the liquid, 
sticky parts. Like many, I bathed in the healing, sulfurous waters lying in its 
crevasses. As popularly understood, the landscape cupped and contained 
its dark pond. Almost in Wordsworth’s pastoral sense, La Brea became a 
lakeside village.
The Nonindustrial Industry
If, as Raymond Williams writes, rural nostalgia contrasts capital with com-
munity, La Brea created useful history of both kinds in the twentieth cen-
tury. In the wake of the Darwent well (see chapter 3), oil production spread 
throughout the southern tier of the island and to the Pitch Lake. La Brea 
became an oil town—as well as a pitch town—surrounded by the infra-
structure and staff housing of British and American oil companies (Higgins 
1996, 180ff.). Wells, oil tanks, and ponds of water filtered from oil dotted the 
environs. The industry cut many corners in those early days. The infamous 
Dome Fire of 1928 killed sixteen workers and bystanders (de Verteuil 1996). 
Outside the actual fields, all the companies practiced blatant discrimina-
tion. They limited the rise of black and Indian workers and squeezed them 
into crowded, segregated accommodations known as barracks. Frustration 
eventually boiled over in strikes, riots, and sabotage in 1937. By midcentury, 
however, the industry seemed to have overcome these growing pains. It no 
longer caused visible, violent damage. Trinidadian workers advanced, gain-
ing in expertise and managerial positions. Meanwhile, as its oil fields were 
depleted, La Brea suffered a slow decline. Natural gas, liquefied nearby 
in Point Fortin, became the country’s leading natural resource. Still, La 
Brea did not go bust. Unlike its codiscoverer of petroleum—Titusville, 
Pennsylvania—South Trinidad stayed in the hydrocarbon business (Black 
2000, 189). The town continued to bring up pitch and some oil, leaven-
ing the technological sublime with a measure of nostalgia. Born in 1928, 
Arthur Forde recalled the La Brea of his youth as the “industrial capital 
of the Caribbean”: “We were more modernize [sic] than any other village 
in Trinidad.”2 Misty- eyed, his memory called to mind a hamlet of machin-
ery—and reconciled all the apparent contradictions in that sensibility.
At his snack shop—across from seeps that sometimes burned spon-
taneously—Forde also gave me a lead. Agatha Proud, he confided, once 
owned the Pitch Lake. Chasing these rumors became my obsession. Peo-
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ple referred me to Ethelbert Monroe, another elder inhabiting one of the 
many vintage houses tilted wildly in  pitch- infused soil. Monroe remem-
bered “Miss Proud” as a “Negro woman” who owned “the whole of the 
Pitch Lake.” She also claimed the adjacent parcels, belonging legally to oil 
companies and rented to tenants. She visited the latter, demanding rent 
and “threatening to move them from the land.”3 Errol Jones, who sculpted 
bitumen into tourist art, corroborated these details and added more: Miss 
Proud had worked as a servant for an American family, who pretended 
to possess property claims to the Pitch Lake. Dying without offspring, 
the family willed its supposed entitlement to Miss Proud. She pursued 
that claim until a fire—perhaps due to arson—destroyed all her docu-
ments. I believed this version, but Jones concluded, “They say she was 
 screw- loose.”4 Other residents recalled Miss Proud as more sane and more 
deeply rooted in La Brea. Proud was “probably one of the last of the na-
tives living here,” recalled a guide at the Pitch Lake.5 The woman, who was 
likely born around 1900, died or disappeared in the 1960s. No further facts 
were available. Although she had pressed her claim in court, I could find 
no record of it. Finally, I tracked down a neighbor of Miss Proud, born in 
roughly 1920. (She did not know the exact year.) Over tea and biscuits, 
Virginia Piper spoke as vociferously as her frailty allowed: “This t’iefing 
company . . . t’ief Miss Proud.” Piper was referring to Trinidad Lake As-
phalt, the current holder of Stollmeyer’s original concession. Proud, she 
continued, had inherited the land from her grandparents, at least some of 
whom were Amerindian.6 Piper grew agitated recalling injustices recent 
and antique. Perhaps, Proud’s ancestors had met Gumilla.
As I found, Piper’s account crossed the generations in La Brea. On an-
other visit, I walked along the main road, also buckling from pitch migra-
tion, to the house of Joshua Logan. Handsome and in his twenties, Logan 
taught drama at Vessigny Secondary School. While earning a bachelor’s 
degree at the University of the West Indies, he had written a one- act 
play about the Pitch Lake called The Price of Progress (Logan n.d.). The 
story centers on the Bird family: a man known as Bird and his deceased 
 great- great- grandmother. This ancestor, called “Mamma” by all her de-
scendants, represents Agatha Proud. A French planter owned Mamma. 
When his child falls desperately ill, he asks the slave for an African remedy. 
Upon the cure, as Bird recounts in Scene II, the master frees the slave and 
grants her a wish: “Mamma say she want de Pitch Lake,” narrates Bird, 
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and she gets it. Why—so long before Stollmeyer and others began selling 
it—did Mrs. Bird want the asphalt? “It had healing powers,” the younger 
Bird continues, and Mamma “wanted de Pitch Lake for everybody.” Later, 
she refuses to sell to extractors because “people does use it, and it is sacred.” 
When we met at his house—just across the street from Monroe’s—Lo-
gan explained the avian reference in Mrs. Bird’s name. He wanted to link 
Miss Proud with the Amerindian myth of the Pitch Lake and with “that 
oneness with nature.”7 The play thus represents hydrocarbons as nature’s 
gift to wellness—stolen by capital. Avaricious firms collude with the state 
to swindle the Bird family. Just as, in Logan’s experience, oil companies 
pollute the water and destroy the local fishery. But the penultimate scene 
undercuts the author’s own criticism. Bird dies suddenly and bequeaths 
a small fortune to the fisherman whose livelihood is most threatened by 
pollution. It is a win- win: the worker need no longer work, and capital can 
continue business as usual. Tempered in this way, Logan’s drama advanced 
to the national Best Villages competition.
Meanwhile, the real- life toxic drama of La Brea appeared to be heading 
toward a less happy ending. Logan’s uncle, Noah Premdas, led an environ-
mentally minded group called La Brea Concerned Citizens United.8 Im-
placably, the group opposed the government’s plans to build an aluminum 
smelter. Meanwhile, these activists took no stand against hydrocarbons. I 
first encountered their paradoxical sensibility one evening in 2009 after a 
meeting of the group. Liming (hanging out) in Premdas’s open garage, the 
activists recalled the violent destruction of their forests and lakes. In 2004, 
before the government even imagined siting a smelter in La Brea, the state 
had ordered bulldozers to flatten the trees and workers to club the fleeing 
animals to death (deGannes 2013, 31; Sheller 2014, 218). Up to that point, 
people had recreated in the woodland, often, as one activist put it, “giving 
thanks for the virgin environment, the untouchedness.” This virginity still 
accommodated quite a bit of touching. When municipal water supplies 
failed, as they frequently did, families had collected their drinking supplies 
from nearby ponds. They drew a ring on the water with soap, recounted his 
colleague, “the soap used to push the oil [away from the water being col-
lected]. . . . They were like little scientists. They were experimenting.”9 At 
that, everyone giggled. The site’s three lakes, I later learned, resulted from 
the dumping of “produced water,” the highly contaminated fluids separated 
from oil. Locals knew this history of the 1930s: they called the pond with 
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the most obvious sheen the “oil dam.” An environmental impact assess-
ment—carried out before the bulldozing—showed levels of oil and grease 
8.7 times Trinidad’s health standard.10 In effect, my informants treated haz-
ardous waste as a minor irritant, like sand blowing on their beach picnic.
If oil in water caused no alarm, the infrastructure for producing oil al-
most provoked celebration. In La Brea, the site cleared for the smelter had 
contained derelict oil storage tanks and  twenty- seven petroleum wells. 
When the government capped those wells in preparation for construction, 
onlookers misinterpreted the operations as more drilling. They greeted 
this development with equanimity. “It is only when people started to see 
the magnitude of the clearing,” Premdas recalled, that they realized a more 
sinister project was afoot. Premdas, in fact, worked as a well survey super-
visor for Petrotrin, the national oil company. “People actually live with—
you can say—oil fields in their yards,” he explained, “a few feet from their 
houses.” He defended oil and attacked the smelter by saying, “We for any 
industry that doesn’t create a health risk to the communities.”11 Of course, 
he was also for an industry that employed his neighbors and himself. But 
the other activists—as I spoke with them before and after the meeting—
nearly overlooked the economic benefits of oil. They remembered life with 
oil, rather than a living from oil. A Rastafarian, Isaac Gregory wore his hair 
in dreads and considered the earth sacred (figure 4.4). He put me up for 
the night after the meeting, gave me breakfast the next day, and submitted 
to my questions on the pump jacks that used to suck oil from nearby wells. 
“There was no hamburg,” he responded, using a Creole word for problem. 
“We used to get up and ride on those,” he continued with amusement. 
“They used to look like horses.”12 Adam Chalant smiled at the same diver-
sions: “I always like[d] the area . . . nice, quiet, serene. You could do what 
you want.” Did the whirring of pump jacks disrupt that quiet? I asked. No, 
he replied, “You’d see more or less a puddle of oil bubbling. It wasn’t, to say, 
dangerous.”13 We sat at the protesters’ encampment, just outside the gate of 
the construction site. Their signs labeled aluminum a “death industry,” and 
one—perhaps written by Gregory—referred to “Smelter Babylon.” They 
also labeled it a “heavy industry” and vowed to keep it from a community 
and ecology otherwise at peace.
To me, however, bitumen seemed the heaviest of all the products in 
question. How could one assimilate the mining of pitch to the activists’ bu-
colic image of their locale? After some difficulty, I gained access to Trinidad 
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Lake Asphalt. Having exported material for major bridge and tunnel proj-
ects worldwide, the company had recently perfected the bitumen pellet. 
In this bullish atmosphere, the firm hosted its annual calypso competition 
just before Carnival. I bought my ticket and, as a foreign curiosity, soon 
found myself in the deafeningly loud vip section. While amply wined and 
dined, I heard two songs mentioning the smelter. Alfred Antoine’s lyrics 
sympathized with a woman protesting aluminum, regretting that “indus-
trialization, it come to stay.”14 I followed up with him. A casual worker—
possibly uneasy in the head office where we later met—Antoine backed 
away from any criticism of the smelter. “I for industrialization,” he assured 
me, but he associated the term with future projects only.15 Trinidad Lake 
Asphalt fell outside this category. The second calypsonian, Roger Achong, 
worked as a well- paid chemist. His calypso praised “Mother earth [who] 
will bless and see you through” and pronounced the smelter “an environ-
mental blight.” At the same time, he endorsed “fires of progress . . . burning 
bright” and criticized oil and gas only for their depletion.16 In our conver-




sation, Achong clarified the distinction between pitch and aluminum. “It’s 
a natural project,” he assured me, gesturing toward bitumen samples in his 
office. “We are like caretakers.” Achong contrasted this stewardship with 
his earlier experience working in Trinidad’s methanol plant, the largest in 
the world. That industry synthesizes ammonia gas at intense temperatures 
and pressure (Hager 2008). There, “you have a chemical change taking 
place from the beginning to the end,” he explained. “This [Trinidad Lake 
Asphalt] is just a mining operation with a still. It’s a joke.”17 Laughably 
simple, the still heated asphalt to 150˚C—boiling away the water—while 
maintaining atmospheric pressure. Asphalt, in other words, was less indus-
trial than moonshine and equally compatible with rural life.
As critics of the smelter reiterated their tolerance for oil, I scouted far-
ther for someone willing to criticize both of them. Where was the con-
science of energy in Trinidad? Searching for it, I followed the hydrocarbons 
from upstream production to sites of midstream refining and downstream 
manufacturing. Just east of La Brea lay San Fernando, the unofficial capital 
of the oil industry and a town large enough to produce its own Carnival 
parade. Most revelers bought masquerade costumes from a small number 
of producers, chief among them the  award- winning Kalicharan family. In 
early 2010, the Kalicharans introduced eight costumes. Focused on the 
theme “Outta d’Rain Forest,” the skimpy outfits evoked macaws, leopards, 
and similarly colorful creatures. This biodiversity harbored one oddball, 
however: a blue- black, fringed bikini advertised as “oil spill.” Thinking I 
had at last found an antipetroleum artist, I took the ferry from Port of Spain 
to San Fernando. No, Wendy Kalicharan explained, the  slick- like bathing 
suit did not indict hydrocarbons—sponsored, as it was, by Lenny Sumadh, 
Ltd., Automotive, Petroleum, and Industrial Supplies. Mrs. Kalicharan 
only objected to oil spurting, or “sputing,” as she put it. Producers “need to 
be a little more environment friendly and look into that,” she said, before 
referring me to her daughter, the real mastermind of the costumes.18 Ayana 
Kalicharan worked for a hydrocarbon firm on matters of health, safety, and 
environment. Her employer, she assured me, was “going green,” as were 
many others.19 The ambiguous costume, she clarified, referred to oil spills 
elsewhere, not in Trinidad’s rain forests. Ayana had studied Occidental Pe-
troleum’s horrific spills in Ecuador and used these events as a cautionary 
tale in the brochure distributed at Carnival (cf. Sawyer 2004). “Fossil fuels,” 
promised the Kalicharans in that document, “can be extracted in an envi-
lAkesIde, or the petro- pAstorAl sensIbIlIty  109
ronmentally friendly way.”20 Once again, complicit parties gave blue- black 
crude a whitewash.
Still seeking a  nature- minded criticism of oil, I continued slightly north 
of San Fernando. Since Molly Gaskin founded it in 1966, the  Pointe- a- 
Pierre Wildfowl Trust had operated on the grounds of the country’s oil 
refinery. In that facility, pipes snaked everywhere, as gas ignited in flares. 
To me, the lurking smell of sulfur—and constant warnings against fire, 
sabotage, and even taking pictures—blared danger at every corner. I drove 
through  Pointe- a- Pierre vigilantly. Gaskin felt these sensations too. But, as 
she explained to me at one end of the bird pond, “once you are inside here, 
you don’t know that there is a refinery out there.” The abundant avifauna 
did not appear concerned either. Their water, Gaskin continued, had not 
spurted from an oil well. Rather, the refinery had pumped up liquid from 
aquifers and stored it in ponds to cool the machinery. Water waited, so 
to speak, upstream before—rather than downstream after—an encoun-
ter with hydrocarbons. Still the entanglement appeared to shape Gaskin’s 
efforts at environmental education. I was struck by a poster on the pond’s 
shore that mentioned “industrial pollution in the atmosphere, including 
gas and oil.” Was a  conscience- stricken Gaskin blaming Petrotrin for cli-
mate change? No: she disclaimed the billboard as a donation from the Or-
ganization of American States. She would have modified the indictment 
of oil and gas with a caveat regarding “proper checks and balances.” On 
her own account, Gaskin had printed a poster, “What You Can Do,” which 
recommended mildly that one inflate one’s car tires fully and turn off un-
used electronic devices. A “balanced” smelter might proceed too because, 
as Gaskin elaborated, “if you are totally unreasonable . . . you don’t make 
any sense.”21 Among industries, only the nuclear sector lay truly beyond 
the pale. Gaskin had first made news in 1995 when she invited Greenpeace 
to help protest the transshipment of nuclear waste through Trinidadian 
waters. Her elastic environmental sensibility embraced any pollutant short 
of radionuclides.
A final push northward took me outside the oil belt, to the Point Lisas 
Industrial Estate—and to the most full- throated endorsement of hydro-
carbons. Amid factories heaving petrochemicals, I did not expect to find 
critics of industry. Engineers employed at Point Lisas saw oil—and alu-
minum too—as beneficial. Indeed, hydrocarbons, they believed, might 
neutralize the most severe threats to health and the environment. I found 
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Reeza Mohammed in the office of the National Energy Corporation. For 
that parastatal firm, he was coordinating environmental projects, including 
some proposals in the vicinity of the smelter. With a doctorate in physio-
pathology, he had served in 1999 and 2000 as Trinidad’s first minister 
of the environment. I asked Mohammed about water quality in La Brea. 
Given the high levels of oil and grease in the reservoirs, why had residents 
not succumbed to widespread illness? Mohammed, who warmed to his 
topic of expertise, misunderstood my question. He was concerned about 
fecal coliform bacteria: the water “was so bad, if you put a spoon in it, the 
spoon was standing on its own.” “For the life of me,” he continued, “I could 
not understand” how people avoided diarrhea. Oil and grease might have 
actually restored gastrointestinal function. “The seepage of hydrocarbons 
in the area,” Mohammed speculated, “would have affected [reduced] the 
pathogenicity of the bacteria.”22 Other experts ridiculed his theory, but the 
model of oil as salve applied more widely. Douglas de Freitas ran a com-
pany specializing in bioremediation. From offices close to Point Lisas, he 
oversaw the cleanup of contaminated sites in La Brea and elsewhere. “It’s 
the perfect site,” he enthused about La Brea. At 20 or 30 feet below ground, 
pitch provided “a natural sealant.” “We have those massive tar sand deposits 
below us,” he boasted to me. As he advertised to potential clients, nothing 
would leach through the town’s bituminous shield.23 Hydrocarbons pro-
tected people and the environment from contaminants far worse.
At root, industries generated dread in and around La Brea—and of-
fended conscience—only when they involved fast, high- risk processes. 
The industrial sociologist Charles Perrow distinguishes such operations 
from mere mixing, separation, or fabrication. Thoroughly artificial, these 
transformations occur at high temperatures and pressures, accelerating be-
yond humans’ ability to monitor and control. Fission, as Perrow’s (1999, 
9–10) quintessential case, sustains itself independently in a nuclear power 
station. Aluminum stands closer to such self- piloting than to tool- like be-
havior. In a smelter, raw alumina flows into room- sized pots where it is 
bathed in cryolite and aluminum fluoride, heated to 1000˚C, and submit-
ted to powerful electric currents. This Hall- Héroult process creates alu-
minum while coating the pots with a highly hazardous residue and some-
times releasing dangerous vapors of hydrogen fluoride. In the event of an 
accident, human operators can stop the reactions, but not immediately. 
Some of the well- educated activists from Port of Spain understood these 
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specifics. More vaguely, members of La Brea Concerned Citizens United 
feared smelting as a kind of juggernaut. Adam Chalant defined heavy in-
dustry as making noise “all day all night” with “shifts.” In light industry, 
“you have an opening time and a close off time.” Trinidad Lake Asphalt, 
whose equipment slept at dusk, harmonized with nature and the land in 
this way. Down the peninsula, residents of Pont Fortin drew even finer 
distinctions: some waxed nostalgic for the blue- yellow flare of the refinery, 
replaced by the orange flare of natural gas liquification (Campbell 2014, 
63). In La Brea, from where one can glimpse all these flames, an activist 
still contrasted this local “scenery” with the unwelcome “bright life” of Port 
of Spain.24 In the bucolic night, Chalant had even seen the deity known as 
Papa Bois.25 Having survived since the French planters, this forest spirit 
now presumably flits among the pump jacks of South Trinidad. Ultimately, 
the specter of aluminum made oil appear even safer than people already 
considered it to be. For residents of La Brea and the oil belt, petrolic pas-
toralism involved no contradiction in terms.
The Island against the Mega
At the national level, the movement against smelters began with tropes 
closer to standard, agrarian pastoralism. In 2006, the government first sug-
gested manufacturing aluminum at Chatham (deGannes 2013, 3). Down 
the Cedros Peninsula and past La Brea, this village lay beyond the arc of in-
dustrial sites. Indo- Trinidadians raised crops and fished in a string of inland 
settlements and beachside villages. They occupied a patchwork woodland 
described in Jamaica as “ruinate” (Cliff 1987, 1; Maisier 2015, 117). The pres-
ent seemed to constantly churn through the past. This temporal topogra-
phy fit the popular “racial landscape” of South Trinidad—where descen-
dants of indentured laborers still worked the land (Khan 1997, 4). Prime 
Minister Patrick Manning and his mostly Afro- Trinidadian cabinet seemed 
bent on industrializing that village life. Then a fortuitous discovery both 
deepened the heritage of Chatham and gave it African roots. In August 
2006, archaeologists uncovered Bou’Kongo, an early  nineteenth- century 
settlement of slaves freed in the Middle Passage by the British navy. Bur-
ton Sankeralli, a public intellectual attached to the University of the West 
Indies, accompanied the expedition. Later, he published his diary. “An 
African liberated village,” he narrates breathlessly, “the Congo nation, 
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the cradle of the Chatham community. In the bush . . . our history in the 
bush . . . not quite lost” (Sankeralli 2009, 163, ellipses in original). In the 
same volume, Sankeralli explains, “This African village sources the ongo-
ing living presence and soul. It provides a grounding for the ongoing living 
Spirit of struggle” (2009, 63). That struggle—in which Sankeralli became 
a leading voice—encompassed much more than the environment. “My 
notion of rights is tied with the notion of community,” he explained to me 
when we met for lunch in Port of Spain in 2009.26 He practiced Orisha, 
an  African- derived religion, and was writing a dissertation on it. For San-
keralli, Bou’Kongo constituted a sacred site, a place where Africans had 
disembarked as free. Only blasphemers would bulldoze it for aluminum.
The most public opponent of the smelter, Wayne Kublalsingh, situated 
aluminum in a similarly historical and cosmic drama. Prior to entering 
politics, he had written children’s books and occasionally lectured at the 
University of the West Indies. Then, although a slight man, he had under-
taken a one- person hunger strike against the smelter. Kublalsingh moved 
with grace and spoke with a quiet calm that inspired the other activists 
around him. “He is doing this from something in his core,” a follower told 
me, “motivated from some deep sense of connection to the land . . . and 
people being able to reap healthy living off the land.”27 When we met at his 
home in Central Trinidad, Kublalsingh began with first principles: “Span-
ish conquistadors smashed the Amerindian culture. . . . We’ve always been 
small and vulnerable.”28 The we referred to any and all Trinis, past and pres-
ent. A week later, at a strategy session, he predicted a rocky road to legal 
reform: “over the past five hundred years of our history . . . constitutions 
have been implemented . . . through vast violence and blood.”29 The future 
might repeat the past. So it appears in the blockbuster film Avatar (2009). 
Kublalsingh watched the movie—wherein humanoids on planet Pandora 
eject an American mining corporation—and it reminded him of Trinidad’s 
struggle. In a newspaper editorial titled “The Avatar Threat,” he warned 
readers of “the corporation imperialist’s [sic] wars . . . which natives, some 
in Chatham and La Brea . . . and certainly all natives on the planet, must 
confront as this century wears on.”30 Only Kublalsingh could stretch Ca-
ribbean history and identity to this extent and get away with it. He and 
his followers descended almost entirely from involuntary migrants rather 
than from Amerindians. Yet—compared to aluminum—even transplants 
to Trinidad’s social landscape appeared authentic. Cans and foil glinted 
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menacingly—at once hypermodern and bloodthirsty. Kublalsingh (2009, 
72) emphasized the use of this light, strong material in advanced weaponry. 
Once called a “magic metal,” aluminum exceeded the limits of even the 
most flexible pastoral sensibility (Sheller 2014, 27).
Rhetoric that worked in Chatham, however, gained less purchase in La 
Brea. In 2007, the government relinquished its first proposal and recom-
mended a smelter for the site already deforested. In that depressed town, 
the smelter’s promise of jobs garnered distinct support, creating awkward 
conditions for La Brea Concerned Citizens United. At the national level, 
this change of setting challenged the newly formed Rights Action Group. 
Living in the comparative comfort of Port of Spain and its suburbs, these 
activists found it difficult to oppose industry outright. Indeed, when I met 
Kublalsingh and his allies in late 2009, they refused to identify themselves 
as environmentalists at all. The problem, they insisted, was the size of a 
given industry. The footprint of development projects, they assumed or 
asserted, should be commensurate with the given landmass. In 2008, the 
economist Denis Pantin had specified this principle in a number of widely 
circulated essays. His text on “mega- projects in small places” recom-
mended that planners apply an “irreversibility principle.” “Given our small 
island reality,” he wrote, “if we make an error, there will be little or no room 
for correction. The nuclear accident at Chernobyl affected a geographical 
area, for example, several times the size of Trinidad!” (Pantin 2008, 2). I 
met with Pantin in early 2010 in his university office and suggested that all 
places were small and fragile. No, he argued, larger nations are “in some 
way able to pick up the slack in terms of providing alternative space.” “If 
you have one wetland,” he further illustrated, “it’s a different thing [than] 
if you have a thousand.”31 In other words, parts of continents were inter-
changeable and replaceable. Islands were unique. The activists’ pastoralism 
pivoted from the agrarian to the merely small.
At exactly this time—as the smelter suffered insults in the press and 
at public rallies—the government raised the stakes on megaprojects. It 
announced an infrastructure project that seemed to burst the bounds of 
Trinidad’s scale and its history. The Rapid Rail would connect Port of 
Spain to San Fernando and other major cities. Eric Williams had torn up 
Trinidad’s first rails in the 1960s, creating conditions for widespread car 
use and gasoline combustion. Surely, a commuter rail system would ben-
efit the environment, not to mention decreasing traffic congestion as well. 
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“Stupidity. That is total stupidity!” denounced Norris Deonarine, head of 
the National Food Crop Farmers Association, referring to the claim that 
rail would lower Trinidad’s carbon emissions. The way to do so, he insisted 
over (imported) coffee, was to become self- sufficient in food. He reminded 
me of the slogan “No smelter—agriculture!”32 As fate would have it, Rapid 
Rail’s tracks would pass through a coastal corridor of Indian small farm-
ers, who flooded angrily into three public consultations on the project. 
Such an expensive project would surely encourage government corruption, 
many argued. Less explicitly, the memory of indentureship haunted these 
gatherings. At one of the consultations, Deonarine referred to himself and 
others as “generational farmers,” who had improved the soil quality by two 
grades.33 “They now fear,” explained the member of parliament at another 
consultation, “that all their lands that their grandparents toiled very hard 
to give to them are now going to be taken away.”34 Rapid Rail threatened 
to undo all that liberation, taking farmers back to the time of Trinidad’s 
colonial railway, “when our people had no say whatsoever.”35 That train 
had carried  plantation- grown cane. These occasionally far- fetched asso-
ciations and equations demonized the proposed train as a one- way ticket 
to exploitation and landlessness. The rail corridor would bifurcate and 
eviscerate a dozen Bou’Kongos. Pastoralism of the agrarian sort made a 
comeback.
But the corridor also provoked acute anxiety related to scale. At the con-
sultations, two participants compared Trinidad to the former metropole. 
Trinidad was “smaller than London and smaller than Europe,” asserted 
Stephan Kangal of the Caroni Assembly of Villages.36 Presumably Port of 
Spain needed neither the Tube nor the Eurostar. A few minutes later, An-
derson Wilson of Beetham Estate took the microphone. “I travel London. I 
travel the world,” he asserted—rather improbably, given that Beetham was 
notoriously poor—“Trinidad is too small for this thing.”37 In part, farmers 
were voicing a conventional not- in- my- backyard complaint. Few seemed 
to realize how narrow a rail corridor would be.38 Just as important, though, 
opponents of Rapid Rail associated trains with a kind of futuristic infra-
structure and streamlined mobility they thought foreign to Trinidad (cf. 
Larkin 2013, 334). The Rights Action Group joined publicly with the farm-
ers. “We need to lessen the speed at which we are moving,” Kublalsingh 
elucidated intently to me at a mall restaurant. “It is more of a metaphysical 
issue. . . . [The rapid rail] would give a metropolitan feel.”39 I felt that way 
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about the  eight- lane highway running by us and parallel to the proposed 
tracks, but Kublalsingh accepted the existing roads. Petro- pastoral sensi-
bilities accommodated asphalt more easily than train carriages made of—
or looking like—aluminum. By metropolitan, Kublalsingh also denoted 
an unwelcome, continental scale. The preferable short, insular distances, 
he believed, did not require a faster pace than that of the bicycle. Size—
whether imagined as the footprint of the infrastructure or the way in which 
the technology would further compress Trinidad—seemed to trigger en-
vironmental alarms. Meanwhile, the promoters of Rapid Rail distributed 
and posted on the web predictions regarding cuts in carbon emissions. As 
motorists switched to rail, they would release 85 percent less co2 per pas-
senger kilometer (Trinitrain 2010). The claim fell on deaf ears. Not a single 
participant in the public meetings even mentioned carbon or other forms 
of air pollution. Unassumingly, complicitly, the quality of the atmosphere 
simply mattered much less than the quantity of Trinidadian landscape.
By its very nature, this  hectare- focused vigilance gave climate change, 
all hydrocarbons, and the specific power source of the smelter a free pass. 
The relevant resources lie underground and exit though tubes 30 inches 
wide. Of course, rigs, refineries, storage tanks, and the occasional spill en-
large this lateral spread. But, in terms of their efficient consumption of the 
earth’s surface, hydrocarbons have no equal (Dukes 2003; Mitchell 2009, 
402). Like a skyscraper, they save lateral space. At a Carnival fête, I asked 
Dennis Pantin about oil and gas. Did the sector constitute a megaproject 
and a worry for him? Not at all: “No problem,” he shouted over the music, 
so long as rigs lay far enough apart.40 In La Brea, the National Energy Cor-
poration had always planned to build a 720- megawatt gas- fired power plant 
near the smelter so as to supply aluminum’s huge need for electric current. 
Opponents understood this plan. Indeed, they initially spoke of a smelter 
complex that included a new port as well and would release multiple pol-
lutants. Partly due to this strategic choice, the Rights Action Group never 
devised criticism specific to the power plant. On June 9, 2009, Gary Aboud 
of the organization Fishermen and Friends of the Sea issued a “national 
call” to demonstrate against the generator.41 Aboud’s electronic broadsheet 
railed against the interrelated waste of electricity, money, and natural gas. 
Regarding gas, the rhetoric of the Rights Action Group dwelled on the 
shortage of supply, rather than on the contribution to climate change. Fi-
nally, however, another member of the Rights Action Group did address 
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carbon emissions. In November 2009, at a People’s Democracy rally in Port 
of Spain, Cathal Healy- Singh cited “the age of global warming—when hu-
manity itself is at risk.”42 Would he, therefore, throw his support behind 
public transportation? No: two months later, Healy- Singh denounced the 
Rapid Rail as a megaproject “contaminating this tiny land mass that we re-
side on.”43 No one—inside or outside the group—appeared to note these 
contradictions. In per capita terms, Trinidadians stood as fourth highest 
emitters of carbon dioxide in the world. Rail would cut Trinidad’s national 
emissions by 1 percent and the power plant would raise them by 6 percent 
(figure 4.5).44 Trinidadians ultimately chose the least sustainable option.
As it finally went down in defeat, aluminum production completely 
overshadowed and displaced the issue of carbon dioxide. The Rights Ac-
tion Group contributed substantially to a wave of disgust with Manning’s 
corruption and arrogance. Thinking he would win and silence his critics, 
the prime minister called an early election in May 2010. The smelter—but 
not the power plant—immediately became a focus of debate. I attended 
a candidates’ forum in my neighborhood and asked through the modera-
tor, “How do you assess Trinidad and Tobago’s responsibility for climate 
change and for the reduction of carbon emissions?” “Very poorly,” shot 
back the main opposition candidate for parliament, Annabelle Davis. The 
moderator resumed reading my question: “And how would you suggest 
that the country fulfill that responsibility?” “No smelter!” Davis retorted to 
hearty applause. “Simple!”45 But it was not so simple. Davis’s People’s Part-
nership ousted the People’s National Movement and shelved the smelter 
as well as the Rapid Rail. The government continued building the gas- 
4.5 Trinidad and Tobago’s options for per 
capita emissions, 2010. Prepared by Mike 
Siegel of Rutgers Cartography Lab.
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fired generator at La Brea, this time with Kublalsingh’s blessing. “Keep the 
power plant, keep the port, stop the smelter,” he urged in the newspaper.46 
At a conference in early 2011, I asked Kublalsingh about the gas- fired power 
plant, then nearly complete. “I’m not worried about pollution there at all,” 
he assured me. “It can be mitigated.”47 He seemed to forget about carbon 
dioxide. Kublalsingh and Sankeralli were in the audience when I presented 
this work to the University of the West Indies, mentioning the 6 percent 
figure. Afterward, I asked Sankeralli what he thought of that outcome. He 
looked at the ground, still digesting the information. Then he answered me 
with a pithy, less- than- scholarly expression of regret.
Sankeralli’s “Oh, fuck”—to quote the unquotable—represented a break-
through in my efforts to practice engaged ethnography.48 I had spent an 
awkward year in communication with the smelter’s opponents. They sus-
pected me of supporting aluminum, even of working for the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency. I repeated continually that I opposed the smelter but 
perhaps not for the same reasons as every one of them. This declaration 
of partial solidarity could have initiated a far- reaching dialogue. How do 
you weigh the risks of global climate change against those of purely local 
import? I asked—although rarely so directly. (One learns more from ex-
tended listening and observation than from blunt interrogation.) I tried to 
be an engaged or activist ethnographer, that is, one who “collaborates with 
an organized group in struggle for social justice.”49 La Brea Concerned Citi-
zens United and the Rights Action Group were certainly struggling for jus-
tice: they fought against the imposition of environmental risk upon Trini-
dad’s underclass without a democratic endorsement from below (Hosein 
2007). Conscience mostly ended there. I observed in meetings, speeches, 
and declarations a consistent neglect of hydrocarbons, carbon emissions, 
climate change, and all of their unjust effects. Smelting aluminum does 
not produce carbon dioxide. Only the source of electricity for smelting 
would do so. Indeed, when driven by hydrocarbons, that extraordinarily 
 energy- intensive process releases an average of 13 tons of carbon dioxide 
for each ton of aluminum (Sheller 2014, 19). The gas- fired power plant, 
therefore, presented activists with an opportunity to protest and restrain 
Trinidad’s carbon emissions. But they grew strangely silent. My informants’ 
“sense of place” overrode their “sense of planet” (Heise 2008). By defeat-
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ing rail and tolerating gas, they opted for the highest of three emissions 
scenarios. Even in opposing aluminum alone, Kublalsingh and his allies 
strove to relocate—rather than abolish—toxic smelting. Another island 
or continent now endures the risk of producing the aluminum that La Brea 
would have manufactured. On the radio, Healy- Singh cited the interest of 
“anthropologists” as evidence of the smelter’s severity.50 Until Sankeralli 
expressed his shock, though, activists had not valued my perspective.
La Brea’s own protesters had long shielded the oil industry from criti-
cism. Lakeside, pastoral aesthetics occluded both environmental facts and 
possible political strategies. Wells had rendered their community a toxic 
brownfield. In the United States, residents might have mobilized to de-
mand the remediation of contaminated water and soil. They might have 
further claimed rights to restitution for cancers and other illnesses linked 
to industrial plants (Bullard 1990). Or, like those surrounding Shell’s re-
finery outside Buenos Aires, they could have waited. Javier Auyero and 
Débora Swistun (2009) describe a limbo in which victims hope alter-
nately for health or for provable, actionable pathologies. Residents of La 
Brea, by contrast, considered oil, gas, and bitumen as neither a threat nor 
a mystery. Bitumen cures the sick after all. Other hydrocarbons—and the 
machinery for their production—formed part of the surface topography 
of houses, gardens, forests, and ponds. The lake land encompassed wa-
ter,  petro- aqueous mixtures, and—in the case of pitch—nearly pure hy-
drocarbon. La Brea’s flexible, even contradictory, pastoral approximated 
the antiurban sentiment of the Martiniquais writer Patrick Chamoiseau. 
“Texaco,” he narrates in the novel bearing that title, “was what the city con-
served of the humanity of the countryside.”51 Texaco is, in fact, a shanty-
town at the site of that company’s former refinery in Fort- de- France. The 
first squatters notice the smell and danger of gasoline, but Chamoiseau 
emphasizes hazards from across the harbor: “The city stutters pollution 
and insecurity. . . . It threatens cultures and diversity like a global virus.”52 
For La Brea, aluminum and other megaprojects posed this sort of metro-
politan threat. Ultimately, smelting may have made its opponents appre-
ciate hydrocarbons all the more, as both more humane and more natural 
than the alternative.
At root, these politics of place do not serve the unfolding battle against 
 carbon- intensive development. Hydrocarbons often enjoy the most sup-
port precisely at the point of their production. There they benefit not only 
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from pastoralism but from the entire sentiment of local belonging and his-
tory. Amid pollution, residents stretch agrarian language to accommodate 
hydrocarbons. The cornfield becomes an oil field. Perhaps the experience 
of La Brea demonstrates again the need for an ecological politics of the 
entire planet. Of course, this kind of global reach—the sleight of hand 
whereby American and other environmentalists claim authority over dis-
tant elsewheres—recapitulates numerous colonial missions (Shiva 1992). 
Still, the sensibility of an interconnected, interpolluting globe would add 
much to Trinidad’s environmental debates. Consider Julian Kenny’s shift 
in perspective. As a multidisciplinary naturalist, he chaired Trinidad and 
Tobago’s Environmental Management Authority during the height of the 
smelter debate. Activists faulted him for not opposing the project publicly, 
but his administrative role constrained him. In that period, he wrote an 
essay titled “Alarmism in Science.” “We seem to be too much distracted by 
climate change hype,” he opined, “and not concentrating on the mess we 
are creating of our immediate environment” (Kenny 2011, 237). Widely re-
spected but considered mercurial, Kenny refused to be interviewed. In 2011 
at the Green Business Forum, I caught him off guard. “What did you really 
think of the smelter?” I asked. I expected him to talk about “our immediate 
environment.” Instead, he shot back, “A couple hundred thousand tons of 
co2. . . . That was my first concern.”53 Kenny, then  eighty- one, died later that 
year, and Kublalsingh lionized him as “an ecological messiah.” Even in tiny 
Trinidad, perhaps, a consensus about the planet may soon supplement the 
obsession with place. Or we all might consider the whole Earth a place, 
bounded by the 20- kilometer depth of its atmosphere. Lying off the sun’s 
shore, our island is small and, more and more, it needs a large vision. 
CHAPTER 5
Climate Change and the Victim Slot
In between forays in the oil belt and conferences with oilmen, I conducted 
ethnography within Port of Spain’s “climate intelligentsia.” I apply this term 
to a loosely linked group of professionally successful men and women, 
born in Trinidad and belonging to African and Indian ethnicities. All had 
earned bachelor’s degrees, and many had studied further in the United 
States, Canada, or Britain. They knew the facts of climate change, and they 
cared enough to join public discussions about it. To these scientists, activ-
ists, policy makers, and energy specialists, I introduced myself as a fellow 
traveler: an environmental anthropologist writing a book on energy policy. 
Together, in 2010, we participated in a round of public consultations on 
the country’s first policy regarding climate change. The participants might 
have considered carbon emissions and means of reducing them. Instead, 
the consultations and the policy centered on impacts: environmental haz-
ards, including even threats to oil’s infrastructure. In a fashion I had not 
anticipated, my informants positioned Trinidad and Tobago as a victim 
of climate change. Evidence suggested otherwise. The country was enjoy-
ing the status of a  middle- income country, with gasoline and electricity so 
amply subsidized that many people consumed them wastefully. Therefore, 
Trinidad and Tobago’s per capita carbon emissions ranked fourth among 
 nation- states (International Energy Agency 2010, 95–97). These statistics 
omit the oil and gas Trinidad extracts for exports. Among hydrocarbon 
producers, Trinidad and Tobago occupies  thirty- eighth place—not an 
enormous contributor, but still larger than Bahrain and Ecuador combined 
(United Nations Statistics Division 2009, 40–72). In short, Trinidadians 
were collectively benefiting from the lethal hydrocarbon system and, in so 
doing, exacerbating climate change. Their seas rise in what Ulrich Beck 
(1992, 23) calls the “boomerang effect”—where pollution bounces back 
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onto the polluter. With these informants, my conversations sometimes 
bordered on arguments, as instructive as they were contentious. No one 
broke off contact, and all seemed to consider our debate one worth having. 
I kept probing for an answer to the question: how and why did the climate 
intelligentsia frame the country as unequivocally innocent? Innocence, af-
ter all, amounts to a license to pollute.
Blame often travels in the simplest form possible—or so cultural ex-
pressions would suggest. Inhabitants of the Torres Straits, for instance, are 
“sinking without a trace [as] Australia’s climate change victims” (“Sinking 
without a Trace” 2008). Victim serves as an absolute category of people 
both vulnerable to and innocent of the given crime. It was not always 
so: psychology of the 1950s and 1960s diagnosed individuals as enabling 
cruelty (Fassin 2009, 122). Some still blame attractive women for rape. 
Experts on climate change have never dabbled in this kind of ambiguity. 
In any case, they would have a hard time blaming the isles of the Straits: 
their carbon emissions barely surpass zero. But the category of victimhood 
has expanded well beyond the shores of this and other  subsistence- level 
archipelagos. In the media, fully industrialized societies—ranging from 
China to Bahrain to Louisiana—represent themselves as victims. Hurri-
cane Sandy swept through the  energy- intensive suburbs of my state, New 
Jersey, leaving millions of victims but no one willing publicly to accept 
partial responsibility. Under new climates, hardship redeems in an almost 
Christian fashion. It renders or maintains the polluter’s conscience pure. 
In this widely distributed form, I argue, victimhood increasingly consti-
tutes a slot.  Michel- Rolph Trouillot (1991) defines this term as an endur-
ing category of thought and enquiry, one that canalizes and disciplines 
scholarly work. Renaissance Europe created the “savage slot,” he writes, 
and anthropologists still explain the Other within its confines. Tania Li 
(2000) uses “slot” slightly differently: as a durable political tool that marks 
and separates “tribal” people from populations nearby and straddling the 
boundary. The victim slot exhibits all these features. It draws strength 
from archaic geographies and cleaves social groups radically and irrevers-
ibly from close comparators. Under climate change, emitters of carbon 
dioxide—even high emitters—have deliberately occupied or accidentally 
fallen into this compartment. Like the savage slot or the tribal slot, the 
victim slot artificially clarifies an inherently murky moral situation. It 
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whitewashes—as innocent—societies, firms, and industrial sectors oth-
erwise clearly complicit with carbon emissions and climate change. To the 
extent that the slot persuades us, it allows good people to do bad things to 
the biosphere. In short, the victim slot disguises complicity and displaces 
conscience.
In the context of climate change, innocence refers to geography as much 
as morality. Consider the movement for international climate justice. Us-
ing cardinal points as a shorthand, activists are pursuing a claim of the 
Global South against the Global North. In the course of industrializing, 
the North has polluted the biosphere, to the detriment of everyone but 
particularly to the detriment of the  resource- dependent societies of the 
South (Davis 2010, 37; Robert and Parks 2007). In essence, Africa, Asia, 
the Pacific islands, and Latin America are suffering from a problem not 
of their own making, and they deserve various forms of compensation. 
This argument gives specific weight to geography and only general weight 
to actions. As all parties acknowledge, the North did not initially embark 
on this  energy- intensive development pathway knowing or intending the 
harm. The South might well have taken the same route if it had access to 
equivalent finance and resources. In fact, China’s rapidly expanding car-
bon footprint suggests an almost irresistible attraction to coal and crude. 
Activism centered on cardinal points then blames people as much for ac-
cidents of  temperate- zone birth as for deliberate actions. The same logic 
exonerates residents of the tropics—people in the right place at the right 
time. Of course, more fine- grained analyses do break apart the reductive 
binary of North and South. Shoibal Chakravarty and his coauthors refer 
to one billion “high emitting individuals who are present in all countries” 
(2010, 11884). In an era of widespread neoliberalism, one might expect this 
 citizen- centered analysis to take hold. It “responsibilizes” the consumer for 
his or her own choices (Goldstein 2005, 39). Yet international negotiations 
and policies continue to denote entire countries or societies as high or low 
emitting. The victim slot, in short, encompasses low- latitude land masses 
and especially their offshore archipelagos. Small and windblown, these 
islands now represent the frailty of victimhood more compellingly than 
does any other geography (Lazrus 2012). How did Trinidad and Trinis gain 
the enviable position of insular victims? Historical accident contributed as 
much as did strategic choices.
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The Island Islanded
Islanders became victims as islands became insular. Sea- girt land forms 
loomed large, sometimes larger than continents in the geographical imag-
ination of 1500–1800. Richard Hakluyt—who chronicled Sir Walter Ra-
leigh’s  sixteenth- century quest for El Dorado—denoted the West Indies 
as “a large and fruitfull continent” (quoted in Lewis and Wigen 1997, 29). 
Indeed, Raleigh and other seafarers constantly sought islands as way sta-
tions that would allow them to cross water. According to historian John 
Gillis, an “Atlantic Oceania” of the Azores, Antillea, Atlantis, and other 
unverified, shifting isles connected Europe to the Indies (Crone 1938; 
Gillis 2004, 86). By 1800, however, new technology disenchanted islands, 
establishing both their actuality and their location. Isles lost their allure, 
and continents gained in importance. In the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, surveying, settlement, and the entire colonial project prioritized 
prairie, savanna, and other large expanses found only on continents. Is-
lands even lost their function as refreshment stations: coal- fired steamers 
sped directly across the Atlantic. Once a patchy Pangea, small islands be-
came wayward dots—“islanded” in Gillis’s (2004) language. Demography 
worked against them too. In the Caribbean, in particular, total or near- total 
genocides almost wiped out islanders. “To the admirers of remote island 
peoples,” writes Gillis, “innocence made them seem like the children to 
which they were frequently compared, vulnerable to the point of extinc-
tion” (2004, 115).
This islanding—and its attendant innocence—did not initially affect 
Trinidad. Gumilla treated the land mass as part of “Orinoquia,” the region 
of Orinoco River and delta. Governor Chacón and his predecessors re-
ported to Caracas, on the Spanish mainland (chapter 1). The British sei-
zure in 1797 might have isolated Trinidad conceptually as well as politically. 
At almost the same moment, however, the epic biogeographer Alexander 
von Humboldt began his five- year trek through South America. In 1799, 
von Humboldt arrived at the T- shaped peninsula of Cariaco. There, the 
Gulf of Paria separates this Venezuelan appendage from Trinidad in a fash-
ion that, for von Humboldt, called for geohistorical explanation. The gulf, 
he wrote, “owes its origin to subsidence and rents caused by earthquakes.”1 
Humboldt believed in a dynamic, visibly fluctuating earth—and also in 
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the reigning theory of oceanic retreat (Rudwick 2008, 106). This larger 
trend would soon desiccate the Gulf of Paria: “Under the actual state of 
things,” he affirmed, “we see the coastal plains growing, gaining over the 
sea.”2 Among literate Trinidadians, von Humboldt’s history—if not his 
predictions—assumed the status of fact. “All Geologists who have re-
garded this Island,” wrote the settler historian E. L. Joseph in 1837, “agree 
in pronouncing it an amputation from the neighboring Continent” (1838, 
4). Maps and texts of the period traced South Trinidad to the Orinoco’s 
alluvium and mountainous North Trinidad to the Andes (de Verteuil 1858, 
345; Joseph 1838, 5). In biological terms too, the island shared kin relations 
with South America. Had he studied Trinidad, Alfred Russell Wallace, Dar-
win’s codiscoverer of evolution, would surely have noted the absence of any 
impassable Wallace Line between it and the continent proper. Species had 
crossed a short land bridge during the last ice age. At high water, the Am-
azon and Negro Rivers easily outspan the channel between Trinidad and 
Venezuela. In retrospect, Wallace’s “Guiana District” of northeastern South 
America encompassed Port of Spain as well as Manaus (Quammen 1996, 
74). In short,  nineteenth- century speculation and observation thoroughly 
blurred the edge of South America.
In more practical ways too, colonial enterprises and schemes straddled 
the Gulf of Paria. Almost as soon as Britain took Trinidad from Spain, 
anti- Spanish agitators launched expeditions from its shores to liberate 
Venezuela. The British themselves coveted Venezuela for different rea-
sons. In 1805, Admiral Alexander Cochrane, the father of Thomas Co-
chrane (see chapter 2), surveyed southern Trinidad. Surely he looked 
across the strait and saw Venezuela, only 11 kilometers distant. “Trinidad,” 
he concluded, “may be said to be the key of South America, to the pos-
session of which, the River Orinoco offers a safe and easy passage” (Co-
chrane 1805). Venezuela liberated and possessed itself in 1811, thwarting 
 cross- channel imperialism. Yet in 1858, Trinidad’s seminal intellectual—
Louis Antoine Aimé Gaston de Verteuil—laid out the most ambitious of 
such plans publicized before or since. Like Joseph, de Verteuil accepted 
von Humboldt’s fast- moving geohistory. “Even at the epoch of its discov-
ery by Columbus,” he wrote, “the Indians entertained the opinion that 
this catastrophe had taken place at a not very remote period” (de Verteuil 
1858, 85). If floodwaters had lately isolated Trinidad, de Verteuil proposed 
to use them to reconnect the island to the mainland. His compendious 
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geography of Trinidad recommended sculpting the nearby delta into 
a series of navigable canals. De Verteuil quoted the colonial governor’s 
statement of ten years earlier: “Port of Spain may eventually become the 
receptacle of trade of that vast tract of country from which the Orinoco 
draws its waters” (1858, 347). Such boosterism came to naught. But it did 
help deny Trinidad what many other political units were acquiring at the 
time: a bounded “geo- body” (Thongchai 1994). Port of Spain extended 
to a fuzzy, indeterminate edge.
In the next century, Trinidadians—still more worldly than innocent—
reoriented themselves toward other continents and islands. Although 
farther away, the British Empire impinged more directly upon Trinidadi-
ans than did South America. So did certain Caribbean legacies, best ex-
pressed by the first generation of black authors. No one accomplished 
more to name and bound a regional and race- conscious identity than did 
the towering intellectual C. L. R. James. Born in Tunapuna, Trinidad, al-
most at the turn of the century, James published his influential account of 
the Haitian revolution in 1938. The Black Jacobins metaphorically recast the 
region in the mold of injustice and reactions to it. “The transformation of 
slaves,” begins James, “trembling in hundreds before a single white man, 
into a people able to organize themselves and defeat the most powerful 
European nations of their day, is one of the great epics of revolutionary 
struggle and achievement” (1938, ix). At that time, he envisaged indepen-
dence throughout Africa and its diaspora. By 1963—as these dreams were 
coming to fruition—James narrowed his unit of analysis. “The history of 
the West Indies,” he wrote in an appendix to the second edition, “is gov-
erned by two factors, the sugar plantation and negro slavery” ( James 1963b, 
391). Cricket was a third, more contemporary factor. As James writes in 
Beyond a Boundary, “The clash of race, caste, and class did not retard but 
stimulated West Indian cricket” (1963a, 72). Caste had arrived with Indian 
indentured workers. Of the Indo- Guyanese batsman Rohan Kanhai, James 
wrote, “I have found . . . a unique pointer of the West Indian quest for iden-
tity, for ways of expressing our potential bursting at every seam” (1966, 1). 
That regional identity seemed to inhere most in the black bowler George 
Constantine. His style provoked James to observe, “We West Indians are 
a people on our way who have not yet reached a point of rest and consol-
idation” (1963a, 148). Restlessly, the West Indies team beat England and 
dominated the world at midcentury. Through sport, James and other Trin-
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idadians identified their island with an archipelagic team. The Orinoco’s 
island was becoming more so.
James’s student Eric Williams pushed this identity home: Trinidad as a 
weaker party now gaining strength. Recall that, as a midcentury historian, 
he sought to demolish Britain’s reputation as a liberator (as explained in 
the introduction to this book). After 1962, as the country’s first prime min-
ister, he continued to draw attention to imperial prejudices. The rhetorical 
high point came in 1977 when Williams spoke at Point Lisas at the opening 
of the nation’s first steel mill. “The colonies were to manufacture not a 
nail, not a horseshoe,” he lectured. “They were to produce raw materials 
only” (Williams 1981, 82–83). That dictum had persisted through sugar 
into the age of oil up to the present rupture. At the Point Lisas industrial 
estate, Trinidad would at last harness the energy of hydrocarbons to make 
steel and aluminum, the latter eventually at La Brea’s ill- fated smelter (see 
chapter 4). In a promise kept, the industrial site would have converted pe-
troleum into downstream plastics. “Point Lisas,” Williams boasted in 1977, 
“is the symbol also of the aspirations of the developing countries of this 
world” (1981, 82–83). More measurably, Point Lisas became an enormous 
point source for carbon dioxide. In this sense, Williams’s speech may mark 
Trinidad’s first exploitation of the victim slot. The prime minister repre-
sented heavy industry unapologetically as a right due to the downtrodden.
Beyond economic policy, geographical themes of fragility, flimsiness, 
and islandness have arisen periodically in public culture. During and after 
Williams’s rule, the island’s two Nobel laureates—V. S. Naipaul and Derek 
Walcott—waged a literary dispute centered on size, among other issues. 
Naipaul hardly refers to his home country without disparaging its scale. 
Born to Indo- Trinidadian parents, he moved to England in 1950, a teenage 
novelist. At the invitation of Eric Williams, he returned to write his first 
travelogue. The Middle Passage (Naipaul 1962)—whose very title seemed 
to relativize slavery—still angers Trinidadians. “Nothing was created in the 
British West Indies,” opines Naipaul, “no civilization. . . . There were only 
plantations, prosperity, decline, and neglect. The size of the islands called 
for nothing else” (1962, 27). “It was hard to attach something as grand as 
history to our island,” he recalls in a memoir (Naipaul 1988, 143). A second 
memoir contrasts Trinidad’s “small- island geography” with the “continen-
tal scale” of Venezuela (Naipaul 1994, 214). Naipaul once joked, “Trinidad 
was detached from Venezuela. This is a geographical absurdity. It might 
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be reconsidered” (1970, 34). Against this belittling of the Antilles, Derek 
Walcott has waged a  decades- long campaign. In accepting the Nobel, for 
instance, Walcott reinflated his homeland in space and time: “There is a 
territory wider than this—wider than the limits made by the map of an 
island—which is the illimitable sea and what it remembers” (1992, 30; cf. 
 Benítez- Rojo 1992). This profoundly cosmopolitan memory centers on 
the true Middle Passage and the voyages of Indian workers over kala pani, 
or “dark waters.” His address closes with a view from Felicity, the Indo- 
Trinidadian heartland, imagining “the light of the hills on an island blest 
by obscurity, cherishing our insignificance” (Walcott 1992, 34). Trinidad, in 
other words, extended across oceans while oceans concealed it from view. 
In various ways, then, encircling water became a focal point of debate—
and available for ensuing claims of victimhood.
Oases as a Diplomatic Card
At roughly the time of Walcott’s Nobel award, Trinidad began to use this 
insular imaginary as a diplomatic trump card. In the 1990s, the country 
faced a choice of alliances: identify with complicit hydrocarbon producers 
or with the world’s innocent archipelagos. Besides Bahrain, only Trinidad 
and Tobago—at that time—could claim belonging among both of these 
groups. Although it did not export enough oil to join opec, Trinidad did 
share oil and gas fields with the  petro- powerhouse Venezuela. In the 1990s, 
it experienced a gas boom, leading to rapid capital accumulation and re-
source nationalism (Mottley 2008). Why did this  mineral- based pride not 
provoke Trinidad and Tobago’s Foreign Ministry to represent the country 
as an oil state? Hydrocarbons never generated wealth fast enough to pro-
voke an  identity- shifting faith in or fear of them. Even the captains of this 
industry did not begin to feel secure until the gas boom of the 1990s. Port 
of Spain’s diplomats, then, have never carried off the swagger of opec. In-
stead, in the 1990s, they chose to huddle at the other extreme of political 
and economic power, with the states most prey to environmental and eco-
nomic shocks. Alienated by the bluster of Tehran, Trinidad performed the 
suffering of Tuvalu. It joined the Alliance of Small Island States (aosis), 
a bloc that soon came to represent those most desperately vulnerable to 
climate change (Lazrus 2009). Indeed, this body “produced” small islands 
as a category and as a blameless, ethical position (Moore 2010, 116). To the 
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main players—whom I tracked down in Trinidad years later and over the 
course of years—geography was the window to the soul.
In fact, Trinidad and Tobago gained admission to the club of small 
islands by creating it. Otherwise, its own carbon emissions might have 
barred Port of Spain from membership. The effort began in a hotel room 
in Geneva in 1990 during a meeting prior to the 1992 United Nations Con-
ference on the Environment and Development, known as the Rio summit 
(Heileman 1993). Lincoln Myers, then Trinidad’s minister of environment, 
and his two advisors agreed on a political strategy. The regional, continen-
tal blocs marginalized states of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. 
These peripheries should unite to form a core, a strong voice. A year after 
the end of my main fieldwork, I returned to Trinidad, mostly so that my 
son could visit his friends. Perhaps because I had rented a car, dropped my 
son west of Port of Spain, and driven to Central Trinidad—all with breath-
less speed and mobility—Myers’s appearance took me by surprise. He 
approached me in his wheelchair, vigorous but appearing meek through 
diminished stature. And his argument about isles matched this body lan-
guage: he converted peril into moral authority. “Where else could it be,” 
he asked, “except in an island like this—a small island like this—where all 
the issues concerning development and climate change can be as stark as 
this. . . . All the issues of development become pronounced in these finite 
spaces.” This hazardous condition actually empowered “the smaller coun-
tries of the world.” “Their resource,” he continued, “the main contribution 
they can make, is the advocacy of justice and fair play. . . . We have to be 
the moral voice.”3 At diplomatic forums, at least, the meek would inherit 
the earth.
Leo Heileman, a marine chemist and one of Myers’s advisors in Ge-
neva, echoed this sentiment. “We didn’t have economic power, political 
power, or military power,” he recounted on a Skype line, “but we had the 
power of influencing the conscience of the world.”4 Weakness, it seemed, 
generated another kind of strength. Myers and Heileman named their 
 thirty- eight- member group aosis deliberately: it sounded like oasis, an 
inverse island. (To me, Myers pronounced the acronym as oasis.) I met 
Heileman over lunch on another return visit to Trinidad. He himself was 
taking home leave from his post directing the United Nations Develop-
ment Program in another petrostate, Equatorial Guinea. “aosis came out 
of my mind, my head,” he claimed, with less meekness than Myers. Regard-
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ing Trinidad and Tobago’s ambiguous position, “I had people back here 
bringing that point to me, raising alarms.” He overrode them because, as 
Heileman put it again, “We [were] more placed to be the conscience of 
the world . . . to consider issues that are based on the environment.” Con-
science broke out, in other words, but only in relation to other countries’ 
actions. Our conversation turned to Trinidad’s current environmental pol-
icy. Heileman dismissed solar energy as “insignificant: . . . the scales are 
not there.” Perhaps, his responsibilities in Equatorial Guinea—which were 
developing oil and gas rapidly—narrowed his sense of the possible. He ad-
vocated natural gas as a bridge fuel and dismissed as “just politics” aosis’s 
current call for an 80 percent cut in carbon emissions. Equatorial Guinea, 
he informed me with equanimity, now sought to join aosis.5
Back in 1990, however, petrostates mostly avoided the bloc. Bahrain, 
whose per capita emissions stood at more than double those of Trinidad, 
did not join. I brought up this notable absence with Angela Cropper, the 
second advisor who had accompanied Myers to Geneva. She had eventu-
ally become deputy secretary general of the United Nations Environment 
Programme. We met in 2012 in her temporary lodgings in Port of Spain. 
She had taken medical leave and looked infirm. As a low- elevation island, 
Bahrain could have joined aosis, Cropper explained. But “they saw the 
whole climate change negotiation treaty as a potential threat.” Naturally 
so: limits to carbon emissions might eventually dampen demand for Bah-
rain’s oil exports. Perhaps the similarly  flood- prone United Arab Emirates 
and mostly insular Qatar stayed away for the same reason. Why did Trin-
idadians—then known as the “Arabs of the Caribbean”—not appreciate 
their economic common interest with these Persian Gulf petrostates? Did 
Port of Spain anticipate switching to renewable energy? No, Cropper and 
her colleagues had no intention of sacrificing their country’s hydrocarbon 
industry. They simply thought about the future only in terms of the im-
pact—rather than the cause—of climate change. Delegates shared “the 
sense that all these small islands were going to be inundated. . . . [The 
threat] appeared more imminent than it has proved to be.” In this low- 
grade panic, Cropper recalled, “Nobody knew where this would go. . . . 
The whole thing evolved really.”6 Without any conspiracy, circumstances 
deferred discussion of cuts to carbon emissions. Perhaps, aosis members 
were practicing what Kari Norgaard (2006, 352) calls “implicatory denial,” 
accepting the fact of carbon emissions but avoiding the moral conse-
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quences. Or, rather, Trinidad’s delegation appreciated only its own moral 
innocence, to the exclusion of its guilt.
After 1990, Trinidad mostly passed as a small island state in climate 
change’s victim slot. High- placed Trinidadians didn’t seem to need to per-
form the role. Mere discretion sufficed. Even so, at the 1992 Rio summit, 
the delegation found itself in an awkward position. Eden Shand, Myers’s 
deputy, recounted the scene to me in the midst of his retirement in Del-
aware, from where he still ran a forestry business in Trinidad. We knew 
each other from my rental of his Cascade house (as described in the in-
troduction). “They were discussing carbon pollution and pointing fingers 
towards the North and the Middle East,” Shand recalled. “Trinidad had 
to be very silent ’round the table,” he continued. “I remember it being an 
embarrassing situation.” Shand winced at me from behind his beer, looking 
all the more pained in his stoop caused by the gravel truck on the Savannah. 
Amid this “strained feeling,” Trinidad’s delegation tiptoed through Rio.7 
Ultimately, the gathering dispelled such unease by creating a group slightly 
larger than aosis, known as Small Island Developing States. Bahrain did 
join this bloc (Kelman 2010, 610), and it attended the first meeting in Bar-
bados in 1994. The resulting Barbados Declaration generously exonerated 
all the signatories as “among those that contribute the least to global cli-
mate change and sea level . . . [while] among those that would suffer the 
most the adverse effects.”8 In that same year, Angela Cropper published 
an article titled “Small Is Vulnerable.” She included no caveat for her own 
country. She even wrote, without qualification, “small islands because of 
their size are often not endowed with . . . fossil fuels” (Cropper 1994, 9). 
As before, Cropper intended no obfuscation. Neither did an early draft 
of the Kyoto Protocol “reaffirming that per capita emissions in develop-
ing countries are still relatively low.”9 Trinidad and Tobago submitted that 
document—on behalf of aosis—to a 1996 preparatory meeting. Silence 
and omissions allowed accomplices to harbor among innocents in the 
victim slot.
Trinidad played no further prominent role in the global politics of 
climate change until November 2009. Concurrent with my fieldwork, 
Port of Spain hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meet-
ing, widely considered a dress rehearsal for the Copenhagen summit on 
climate change the following month. By that point, Eric Williams’s pre-
dictions at Point Lisas had come true. A boom in gas production and 
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downstream industries had advanced Trinidad and Tobago to the cusp of 
what the government heralded as “developed country status.” The nation’s 
per capita emissions had tripled from their 1990 levels—nearly the fastest 
rate of increase of any  nation- state in that period. Meanwhile, in an effort to 
stabilize the climate, aosis was demanding immediate, drastic reductions 
in the use of fossil fuels. “1.5 to stay alive!” its publicity proclaimed, referring 
to their maximum acceptable temperature rise in degrees Celsius. Could 
Trinidad again carry out the trick of 1990, redeeming its emissions through 
international diplomacy? To do so, Prime Minister Patrick Manning would 
have to vindicate the country’s  hydrocarbon- fueled industrial policy. In 
part, he played with the numbers. “The atmosphere does not respond to 
per capita emissions,” he repeated whenever relevant. “It only responds to 
absolute emissions.” In aggregate, Trinidad and Tobago emitted only 0.1 
percent of the global co2 total. Manning might have massaged the data 
further: Trinidad burned much of its gas to manufacture exports. Trinidad 
could have rejected responsibility—as China was doing—for these “off- 
shored” emissions.10 Rather than proffer this rationale, Manning claimed a 
size- related exemption: at 1.3 million, the small national population pushed 
Trinidad and Tobago’s per capita figure artificially high. At the Heads of 
Government Meeting itself—inside the ever- sumptuous Hyatt Hotel—
Manning exercised his influence as chair to call on the Global North to 
compensate the Global South. The resulting document—the Port of Spain 
Climate Change Consensus—stipulated “a dedicated stream [of funds] for 
small island states and associated low- lying coastal states of aosis.”11 As 
before, no caveat excluded Trinidad and Tobago. Manning had maintained 
his country’s position in the victim slot.
Among nongovernmental organizations (ngos), public discussion on 
climate change threatened to burst beyond that restrictive category. In par-
allel with the Commonwealth summit—but at a markedly more plebeian 
hotel—ngos convened the Commonwealth People’s Forum. They invited 
Angela Cropper to give the opening address. Fiery and full of conviction, 
she declared the world to be “moving towards an ecological civilization.” 
Amid loud applause, she asked those in the room to “accelerate the tran-
sition towards a low- carbon economy.”12 Emily Gaynor Dick- Forde, Trini-
dad’s minister of planning, housing, and the environment, rose next to the 
podium. Two months earlier, the minister had claimed, “We emit very lit-
tle.” Grandly, she had also quoted the head of aosis as saying, “We are the 
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conscience of the world when it comes to climate issues.”13 At the forum, 
however, Cropper’s speech seemed to inspire a more humble tone. Dick- 
Forde referred to “that ecological civilization to which we are working.” In 
cutting carbon emissions, she claimed, “We as a nation have been trying to 
do our part.”14 The statement contained more hope than truth, but, in any 
case, it implied responsibility. Had Cropper forced open a door? Manning 
and his ministers might actually have to discuss the country’s own culpa-
bility. Perhaps Trinidad could balance within and outside the victim slot. 
“It is not one or the other,” Cropper later told me wearily, sounding as if she 
felt personally the heavy load of Trinidad’s emissions.15
Assessing Vulnerability
In discussions of climate change, the concept of vulnerability often con-
ceals as much as it illuminates. It has become an indicator in Sally Engel 
Merry’s terms, “creat[ing] a commensurability . . . even though the users 
recognize that these simplified numerical forms are superficial, often mis-
leading, and very possibly wrong” (2011, 86–87). Although dubious, mea-
sures of vulnerability confer credibility upon the victim slot. Above all, 
the notion of vulnerability pushes responsibility to the margins. Often, of 
course, adverse circumstances do reduce one’s scope for choice. People 
rarely desire to live in  flood- prone areas. The housing market consigns the 
poor to riskier, cheaper areas. Meanwhile, climate change has hit colonized 
people like a blow to a downed boxer (Ribot 1995, 2009). In Siberia, for 
instance, Sakha herders are losing their livelihood as permafrost degrades 
into swamp (Crate 2008). Do they possess sufficient ecological knowledge 
and resilience to adapt? One hopes so, and the question and its terms fit 
the Sakha context. In a petrostate, however, resilience is not necessarily 
desirable. One might not hope that oil and gas industries bounce back—
or “forward” in the latest lingo—from Katrina or the next Gulf hurricane 
(Manyena et al. 2011). At root, ExxonMobil and Siberian herders act as 
quite different agents in respect to climate change: the former propels its 
dynamics while the latter struggle to survive through it. The Sakha con-
duct their affairs as historical agents of the old- fashioned sort, generating 
events under conditions not of their own making. Drillers and pumpers, on 
the other hand, wield “technologies that . . . have an impact on the planet 
itself.” A cloud of environmental guilt might settle among such “geological 
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agents,” but Category 3 winds blow it away (Chakrabarty 2009, 206–7). 
Of the three fields where the victim slot operates—islandness, diplomacy, 
and vulnerability—the last discourse is the most powerful and the most 
deceptive. In the discourse of vulnerability, Trinidad’s oil and gas sector 
played the victim card to its greatest effect.
After the Commonwealth summit,  climate- concerned politicians 
steered the country well away from any recognition of complicity. Prime 
Minister Manning began a national discussion on global warming. He 
had avoided the issue for decades. Before entering politics, Manning had 
worked for Texaco as a petroleum geologist. We met in his constituency of-
fice in June 2010. His party had just lost the election (see chapter 4), and—
demoted to a mere mp—he had time to see me. Looking utterly dejected, 
the former statesman recalled a long period of ignorance regarding climate 
change. “At first, I ignored it,” he admitted. He seemed to have educated 
himself on the topic mostly so as to reject Trinidad’s status as a high emit-
ter. Per capita measures, he argued, “discriminate[d] against small states.” 
Had I misunderstood? “We are small. Remember that,” Manning advised 
me. I returned to the issue of per capita emissions. “It’s not right. It’s not 
right,” he insisted. “I fighting that!” In our conversation, he indicted China, 
which had just overtaken the United States to become the highest aggre-
gate emitter. “They just spewing into the atmosphere,” Manning accused, 
“and they don’t care about anybody.”16 He slumped in his chair, aware that 
he possessed even less power than before. Manning did not seem to care 
that the average Trinidadian spewed five times as much carbon dioxide as 
the average Chinese or that China manufactured mostly for other coun-
tries. Shortly after the Port of Spain Consensus, Manning’s government 
put pen to paper again. In March 2010, Dick- Forde’s ministry released its 
“Draft Climate Change Policy.” Of twenty pages of text, the document de-
voted merely two pages to vague means of reducing the country’s carbon 
emissions. Indeed, Kishan Kumarsingh—the document’s author, who had 
trained in chemistry and law—parroted the prime minister’s line: “In a 
scientific context the atmosphere reacts only to absolute emissions and 
not per capita emissions.”17 The prime minister had closed all discussion 
of culpability—and, therefore, of conscience.
This rhetorical erasure became evident in public consultations on the 
climate change policy in early 2010.18 This time, as civil servants, university 
lecturers, and ngo leaders flocked to a middle tier of hotels, each event 
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began with Kumarsingh’s note of alarm: “Sometimes a whole island is 
a coastal zone.” For emphasis, he widened his eyes like a startled deer 
(figure 5.1). At the first consultation, in Port of Spain, comments from the 
floor backed Kumarsingh into a corner. Some participants, including my-
self, mentioned Trinidad’s carbon emissions and suggested that the docu-
ment include targets for cutting them. Eden Shand, who had returned to 
Trinidad for this meeting, agreed with me. He suggested Trinidad identify 
less with Tuvalu and more with Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. “If we 
admit our per capita prominence,” he continued before his unconvinced 
audience, “we get to sit at the table with the big players.”19 Kumarsingh 
parried both of us with, “We have to bear in mind with regard to what you 
are asking a small country to do.” Further discussion restored Trinidad to 
the victim position, but now as prey to solar and wind power. “Imagine 
that you get no electricity tomorrow,” Kumarsingh warned, “because it is 
a green economy.” In the event, the consultation did result in one concrete 
proposal regarding emissions. “We want Tobago to be a  carbon- neutral 
destination,” declared John Agard, a biologist and member of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change.20 Much less industrial and less popu-
5.1 Kishan Kumarsingh, 2009. Reprinted with permission from the Earth Nego-
tiations Bulletin.
clImAte chAnge And the vIctIm slot  135
lated than Trinidad, Tobago already bore the brand of a tropical paradise. 
Krishna Persad’s eco- resort hugged its leeward coast (see chapter 3). Tour-
ists burned jet fuel to get there, of course, but Tobagonian individuals and 
firms emitted little carbon. A good many already lived without electricity. 
They would sacrifice less going green. Fifty thousand Tobagonians, Agard 
implied, could more easily shoulder a burden that 1.25 million Trinidadians 
were too vulnerable to bear.
At a different venue, Agard almost—but not quite—dislodged Trini-
dad from the victim slot. In January 2010, we met in his office at the Uni-
versity of the West Indies. He was preparing for the climate policy consul-
tations and had met recently with Patrick Manning. The two had debated 
the salience of per capita emissions. Manning, of course, cared only about 
Trinidad’s low aggregate pollution. “Think about what it means,” Agard 
responded, “to be a contributor to a problem of which you are also a vic-
tim. . . . Forget about the arithmetic!”21 Nowhere else had I encountered 
such a pithy and forceful summary of Trinidad’s ambiguous position. 
Hoping for more such directness, I attended Agard’s professorial inaugu-
ral lecture on campus the next month. The bulk of the talk presented four 
scenarios in the global approach to climate change: markets first, policy 
first, security first, and sustainability first.22 The first three scenarios re-
sulted in capitalist or authoritarian dystopias of various kinds. Sustain-
ability first, however, would allow the world to shift from fossil fuels to 
renewable energy with democracy and economic well- being. “That is the 
vision,” Agard declared, beaming at his audience.23 What did the vision 
mean for Trinidad’s oil and gas? I queried in the  question- and- answer ses-
sion. “That is easy,” Agard shot back, “[because it is] a wasting resource” 
and will run out anyway. After the formal program, I walked forward and 
asked Agard if he was really advocating business as usual: that Trinidad 
should just use up its hydrocarbons. No, he confided, it made sense to 
“leave something for the future” in the ground. In that case, the finitude 
of Trinidad’s reserves made no difference: the country would stop produc-
ing oil and gas before—not because of—exhausting supplies. Ecuador 
had made a similar proposal to leave oil underground (Rival 2010), but 
nothing in Agard’s presentation suggested such deliberate forbearance as 
a development model. Agard had overlooked this logical extension of his 
own sustainability first principle. It required the country to accept respon-
sibility rather than mere vulnerability.
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Fear, however, soon overwhelmed all other sentiments. By April 2010, 
drought and fire were scorching the country. At the second consultation, 
a geologist—identifying himself as “from oil”—spluttered, “There is no 
one alive who can remember a dry season as dry as this one.”24 This gath-
ering actually took place in the petroleum belt almost in the shadow of 
the Paria Suites’ mock oil rig. After Kumarsingh’s presentation, a faction, 
smaller and less vocal than that at the Port of Spain meeting, raised the 
issue of Trinidad’s emissions. This time, the oil and gas sector did not wait 
for Kumarsingh but responded on its own behalf. Shyam Dyal from Petro-
trin insisted upon business as usual: “We have to realize that Trinidad is 
 energy- based,” he reminded us. “Adaptation should be given a higher pri-
ority than mitigation,” he insisted before rushing out of the meeting.25 Dyal 
had, in fact, overseen a study of Petrotrin’s exposure to sea level rise and 
extreme weather events—the only risk analysis conducted in the country. 
Modeling of storm surges showed “catastrophic effects to onshore opera-
tions and offshore platforms.”26 “Trinidad is a small island developing state 
so we are vulnerable,” he had told me in his office, alongside the country’s 
oil refinery. “We have wells that could fall into the sea.”27 In this way, encir-
cling water generated sympathy for the very industry perpetrating climate 
change. Back in the second public meeting, big oil became the biggest vic-
tim to global impacts. The topic of mitigation did not arise until nearly at 
the end, when a man objected to the draft policy’s brief mention of public 
transport. “All I see is Rapid Rail running through Central Trinidad and 
demolishing endless houses,” predicted the man, having identified him-
self with the populist “rum shop perspective.”28 The audience saw itself as 
doubly vulnerable: to climate change and to sustainability. I returned de-
jectedly to Port of Spain by ferry, where I fought fires with Akilah Jaramogi 
above St. Ann’s. “This is reality ah climate change,” she announced, weep-
ing, “I am exhausted. I am exhausted. I am exhausted.”29 Climate change 
would blight her life.
In more intimate spaces such as these, an environmental conscience at 
last seemed to be taking shape. Toward the end of my ethnographic year, 
I met Winston Rudder and Keisha Garcia of the Cropper Foundation, 
an ngo originally created by Angela Cropper. In public the organization 
had criticized the oil and gas sector only for its lack of fiscal transparency 
(Cropper Foundation 2008). Private—but still official—communications 
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opened up much broader issues. Submitted to the Ministry of Planning, 
Housing, and the Environment, Rudder and Garcia’s written comments 
derided the draft policy on climate change. “Does the atmosphere not 
respond to this?” they asked in line- by- line criticism regarding increased 
emissions in multiple sectors. In its authors, this sarcasm must have 
touched a personal nerve. Garcia’s husband worked for an international 
gas firm, and Rudder’s son had trained as a petroleum engineer. Perhaps 
for this reason, these two environmentalists conveyed the compromises 
and contradictions of ecological subjectivity with uncommon sensitivity. 
“We want to have our cake and eat it,” said Garcia, as the three of us chatted 
at the foundation’s office. Trinidad and Tobago, she meant, wanted to be-
come rich without relinquishing the exemptions of a poor country. Rudder 
agreed but was not sure how Trinidad should adjust its deep- rooted invest-
ments. “Can we go about development,” he asked, “in a way that makes 
sense given our [environmental] responsibility and given the fact that we 
live on this piece of earth . . . that has a certain capacity, that has certain 
natural resource wealth?”30 The question balanced parochial and univer-
sal concerns, a love of community with an awareness of its transgressions. 
More than a year later—on a  follow- up trip—I shared lunch with Rud-
der at my hotel. The new government had shelved Manning’s policy on 
climate change. Rudder seemed even less sure than before. He described 
a “goodness feeling about the smell” of the country’s refinery. “You don’t 
question the oil industry,” he almost commanded. And, in the midst of all 
this silence, “We conspire in our own demise.”31
Faced with climate change, it was easy for islanders to sound the alarm. 
Rising seas threatened them immediately and visibly—and also exoner-
ated them. Especially in a  European- dominated milieu, encirclement by 
water suggests frailty and weakness. Atolls have lain prone before natural 
elements as well as total genocide, slavery, and colonialism. They can credi-
bly pass as victims in waiting of the next great injustice. Ecology still marks 
them as “tropical island Edens” (Grove 1995). Mostly, then, small island 
states do belong in the category of climate change innocents. The Maldives 
recently committed to cutting its carbon emissions to zero. Except under 
those absolute conditions, however, some islanders surely belong in the 
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guilty camp of high emitters. Too few acknowledge this responsibility—
except perhaps on the exceptional Marshall Islands. Marshallese blame 
themselves for impending inundation—a consequence, they believe, of 
allowing the United States to explode nuclear weapons on Bikini (Rudiak- 
Gould 2011). Their sense of guilt exceeds, so to speak, the climatological 
science. None of my Trinidadian informants contested that paradigm, but 
almost all rejected blame either tacitly or explicitly. Instead, the climate 
change intelligentsia situated Trinidad in a multiplex victim slot. In consid-
ering their land mass, in performing at diplomatic forums, and in planning 
for hazards, these experts represented their nation and their institutions as 
innocent. A generous pardon, it extended all the way to the country’s gas 
rigs and petroleum refinery. The slot “rendered technical” all the thorny 
questions of conscience and complicity that would otherwise arise (Li 
2007). Petro- Goliath entered the slot and passed as a greenwashed David. 
In this sense, climate change had the misfortune of being recognized by 
residents of small islands.
Imagine, by contrast, what can happen once continentals—in a strong 
nation—recognize climate change. Franny Armstrong’s (2009) film fol-
lows the reckoning of a petroleum paleontologist living in New Orleans. 
To Alvin DuVernay, “Oil smells so much like money it’s just beautiful.” 
Then he smells corpses rotting after Hurricane Katrina. The scales fall 
from his eyes. We are living, he concludes, in “the age of stupid” (the title 
of the documentary). The charge of stupidity overlooks much complex-
ity, but it is not a bad place to start. This portrayal leads more rapidly to 
accountability than does victimhood. Trinidad’s new government has as-
serted victimhood less vocally than did Manning’s administration. At the 
same time, no official in Port of Spain is accepting partial responsibility for 
climate change. Far from it: in 2012, the Ministry of Energy was simultane-
ously exploring for gas and launching a program of enhanced oil recovery. 
Still, outside the energy sector and outside government, some Trinidadi-
ans are reconsidering their nation’s complicity with climate change. In our 
2012 discussion, Cropper turned her earlier assumption about insularity 
on its head. She referred to Trinidad and Tobago as “this tiny country—
which lends itself so well as a crucible for getting things done.” One of 
those “things” could be a postcarbon society.32 Trinidad’s small size might 
allow it to overcome the indecision endemic to larger polities. Perhaps the 
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proximity of everything in Trinidad throws hydrocarbons into stark relief. 
One can actually smell them. Perhaps, Trinidadians might appreciate the 
connection between hydrocarbons and sea level if they considered only the 
place, rather than the planet. They might understand climate change as the 
boomerang of their own pollution rather than as a harpoon thrown from 
another hemisphere. An awareness of such self- destruction might form the 
core of a new co2- specific consciousness. With luck, Port of Spain and New 
Orleans will assemble and export a product too rare to have a recognized 
name: carbon conscience. 
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CONCLUSION
I was living in Port of Spain when the Deepwater Horizon oil platform ex-
ploded and sank in the Gulf of Mexico. British Petroleum (bp) had drilled 
into the Macondo field under 5,000 feet of ocean water and through 13,000 
feet of rock. Geologists and engineers had joined the heroic effort to find 
oil in ever- more difficult and dangerous circumstances. On April 20, 2010, 
gas surged up the well under high pressure. The blowout preventer failed, 
and the blowout killed eleven workers (Konrad and Shroder 2011). My 
Trini informants sympathized immediately with the dead, men largely for-
gotten in the frenzy of American reporting. Then, these experts criticized 
bp: it operated in a slipshod, unprofessional manner, lining its well with 
inferior cement. A Trinidadian firm manufactured better cement, and even 
bptt—the local subsidiary of bp—would not have made such stupid, irre-
sponsible errors. Safety started to sound self- righteous. As the well bled oil 
in its second month, I visited the office of bptt. Just to enter the building, I 
had to endure a  fifteen- minute safety video—mostly about where to flee in 
case of fire. I wondered when the industry would look up from local flames 
to see the spill everywhere. For the geologist Rick Bass, the Macondo well 
served as a teachable moment. In a new foreword to Oil Notes—written 
in the midst of the spill—he calls for “a truer accounting of the full costs 
of dirty carbon” (Bass 2012, xix). At about that time, however, as the spill 
entered its third month, my informants began to rekindle, in themselves, 
Bass’s original enthusiasm for oil exploration. “Now do you get it?” they 
asked me. British Petroleum had done nothing but perforate the caprock, 
and geological pressure was producing huge volumes every day. This is 
how it comes up, they explained. It seemed beautiful, natural, and inevi-
table. No one said as much, but the hemorrhage at the bottom of the sea 
seemed to prove that oil should come up, not that it shouldn’t.
How does an anthropologist position himself in the midst of such harm 
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and such harmful thinking? When burned in large volumes, hydrocarbons 
wreak havoc. One cannot think otherwise without denying the findings of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Here science and ethnog-
raphy stand at  cross- purposes. The ethnographer frequently searches for 
the common decency and goodwill that binds informants, readers, and the 
ethnographer himself. This thread does the work of translation, rendering 
the unfamiliar somewhat familiar. As a literary theme, hydrocarbons could 
do this job: they circulate nearly everywhere. Bass embraces his audience 
when he declares, “We are all complicit: the oil finders and the oil users” 
(2012, xix). I could have written that sort of book. But another principle 
of ethnography compels me to describe difference. The oil finders differ 
fundamentally from the oil users, a billion of whom consume next to zero 
anyway (Malm and Hornborg 2014, 65). Even heavy consumers driving 
American roads relate but distantly to the substance. Many could switch 
to other power sources and other technologies: buses, bicycles, or cars 
running on electricity generated from sunlight and wind. “Finders” work 
precisely to delay that substitution. They prove up supplies even as proven 
reserves greatly exceed what the atmosphere can safely absorb before 2050 
(McGlade and Elkins 2015). These petroleum professionals live from oil, 
and the most passionate live for oil as well. No ethical choice would be easy 
for them. Most fail even to see the essential ethical choice. Christine Bader, 
for instance, identifies herself as a “corporate idealist.” In the early 2000s, 
she started bp’s program for social responsibility, emphasizing the rights of 
oil workers and neighboring communities. The spill “broke her heart.” Cor-
porate idealists, she concluded, should ask, “What are the greatest tensions 
that the core business of this company and industry have [sic] with the 
best interests of society?” (Bader 2014, 128, 193). Those tensions, Bader be-
lieves, center on mishaps or malfeasance at the point of production. She has 
only scratched the surface. Canada’s  industry- created Ethical Oil campaign 
suffers from a similar shallowness. The core business of any oil company 
damages the whole world. Conscience cannot abide the spill everywhere.
Near Misses
Fossil fuels were never foreordained. Near misses and contingencies have 
pushed Trinidad and much of the world toward hydrocarbons. Yet the 
most sweeping accounts of energy transitions suggest an unstoppable 
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juggernaut. Vaclav Smil (2008, 380) refers to a “law of maximized energy 
flows” under which civilizations continually exploit denser fuels in more 
efficient ways. Nuclear fission and the latest experiments in fusion, argues 
the geographer Alfred Crosby, “count as triumphs in the quest of the chil-
dren of the sun for more energy” (2006, 5). Perhaps the notion of a quest 
confers nobility on something ultimately squalid, reframing missteps as 
breakthroughs. Even critics—who wish to derail the train of fossil fuels—
trace environmental ruin to the dna of our species. Homo erectus walked 
resolutely out of Africa, recalls Elizabeth Kolbert, a leading popularizer of 
climate science. Modern humans settled the world and burned its forests 
and much else as well. “And now we go to Mars. We never stop” (Kolbert 
2014, 251).1 So far neither Kolbert nor the paleoanthropologist she quotes 
has left Earth, and no one lives on Mars. The possible technology, in other 
words, only becomes real under the right circumstances. Meanwhile, other 
possibilities bear no fruit at all. In Trinidad, chance favored oil and gas, fuels 
that perform far worse—in environmental terms—than the alternatives.
The island thus missed moments and movements that were both solar 
and utopian. In part, sunshine lacked competent champions. In 1732, Jo-
seph Gumilla noticed a sunlit floral feast, harvested effortlessly by Amerin-
dians and equally available to Spanish farmers. Cultivators of cacao would 
have to immigrate. No ship could load insolation and carry it across the 
Atlantic. That tether to place made solar energy more democratic. Elites 
could only monopolize it by monopolizing the land—a common occur-
rence now but less feasible in the  eighteenth- century Americas. If settlers 
had come, they might have proved Gumilla right. Madrid, however, did not 
take the Jesuit seriously enough to fund his idea or even to value local life-
ways. Very likely, his spellbound demeanor—inspired by the enchantment 
of energy and nature—failed to impress those who allocated vessels and 
supplies. This conundrum accompanied solar power: wonder at its unseen 
plenty discouraged the quantitative and managerial approach necessary to 
exploit it. Certainly, Conrad Stollmeyer failed to square this circle. Still, in 
1845, he and Adolphus Etzler got farther than Gumilla. They recruited and 
transported Englishmen to a utopian colony to be powered by sun, wind, 
and tropical nature in general. Tropical pathogens slew the settlers before 
Stollmeyer and Etzler could build a converter of solar into mechanical 
power. In fact, the two men barely grasped the design specifications of their 
Satellite. In 1861, the French mathematician Augustin Mouchot patented 
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the first  solar- powered pump (Butti and Perlin 1980, 67). But, by that time, 
Stollmeyer was working—very competently now—with hydrocarbons. 
For Trinidad, the sun rose, so to speak, just a little too late.
Timing also failed in the case of somatic power. At the end of the eigh-
teenth century, Josef Chacón knew how to harness the energy of muscle 
and bone, and he did harness it. He transported “arms” from other islands to 
Trinidad and across the wide Atlantic. Plantation slaves flowed like fuel—
indeed, as the first transoceanic global fuel commodity. There was nothing 
utopian about this arrangement: elites monopolized the trade and, through 
their racism, monopolized the very idea of humanity. If solar power opened 
one’s vision, slavery narrowed it to a thin slit. And slavery contaminated the 
very idea of harnessing human energy. In the nineteenth century, Trinidad 
tacked from one extreme to another: from the utter exploitation of human 
energy to revulsion at the mere hint of it. Earl Lovelace begins The Dragon 
Can’t Dance—arguably Trinidad’s national novel—with a reminiscence of 
Laventille, Port of Spain’s slum. The residents’ ancestors “took a stand in 
the very guts of the slave plantation, among tobacco and coffee and cotton 
and canes, asserting their humanness in the most wonderful acts of sab-
otage they could imagine and perform, making a religion of laziness and 
neglect and stupidity and waste. . . . After Emancipation . . . they turned 
up this hill to pitch camp here on the eyebrow of the enemy, to cultivate 
again with no less fervor the religion with its Trinity of Idleness, Laziness, 
and Waste” (Lovelace 1979, 2–3). Anyone anywhere may enjoy leisure. But 
it may be particularly difficult in Trinidad, the United States, and other 
postemancipation societies to propose muscle as a performer of work. At 
one of the policy consultations on climate change (see chapter 5), I rec-
ommended tree- lined bicycle lanes in Port of Spain. From Laventille or 
from my own neighborhood of Cascade, I suggested further, one could 
pedal to work in the cool shade, free of traffic and parking problems. “But I 
don’t want that,” wailed one consultant. His response seemed natural, and 
no Trini environmentalist challenged it.2 Through its overreach, slavery 
exalted idleness and invalidated a low- carbon source of energy.
Even then—having rejected so many alternatives—Trinidad might 
have reaped the maximum social reward from petroleum. Agriculture and 
industry on the island might have used pitch, oil, and gas to underwrite 
postemancipation equality and leisure. Here, too, individual temperaments 
misaligned with technological possibility. Stollmeyer had once wished to 
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obviate all human labor. He distilled pitch into fuel after, rather than before, 
his encounter with freedmen and their trinity. That experience shriveled 
Stollmeyer’s faculties. He appears to have grown racist and even vindictive, 
far more eager to see blacks bent double under bitumen loads than to see 
them lounging under a tree. He and other capitalists deflected a potential 
leisure dividend toward more production. I first learned of Stollmeyer’s 
humanitarianism through Johnny Stollmeyer, who lived along my jogging 
route in St. Ann’s. He worked as a horticulturalist. I met him among oppo-
nents to La Brea’s aluminum smelter. “We need to be preparing ourselves,” 
he advised me, “to all live within the photosynthetic carrying capacity of 
our bioregion.”3 His family had certainly changed its tune, I joked. Not find-
ing this quip funny, Johnny informed me of his  great- great- grandfather’s 
idealism. Following consciously in those footsteps, the younger Stollmeyer 
dreamed of  small- scale agrarian villages—subsidized, presumably, by the 
country’s wealth in hydrocarbons. Perhaps pitch and fraternal substances 
could, at last, pay a utopian dividend. Meanwhile, Johnny was planting 
trees for the liquefied natural gas plant, helping it to compensate for the 
destruction of landscapes in Point Fortin. Afforestation satisfied him in the 
short term. For one reason or another, the most free- thinking Trinis have 
failed to criticize the principle of burning oil and gas itself.
I lived through one of the more evident missed opportunities in 2010. 
Trinidad’s antipollution movement had identified carbon dioxide as one of 
a number of risks. Was a movement against hydrocarbons about to begin? 
Activists protested the multipollutant smelter complex. Then, as Wayne 
Kublalsingh and others defeated the smelter itself, they acquiesced to the 
adjoining power plant, the complex’s only emitter of carbon dioxide. Crit-
ics might have quashed both facilities. But carbon emissions did not rank 
high enough as a moral and environmental issue. The following year, as 
La Brea’s power plant rose from the ground, it provoked a different kind 
of concern. Absent the smelter, how could the electrical grid benefit from 
a 50 percent boost in wattage? In 2011, a panel of the Green Business Fo-
rum considered this question. “We have a lot more power capacity than 
we do demand,” lamented Dax Driver of the Energy Chamber.4 Surplus 
electricity had already invalidated plans for a wind farm. Joth Singh, head 
of the Environmental Management Authority, conceded, “What I see . . . 
is a percentage of renewable energy on the grid, if it is going to happen at 
all.”5 No percentage will happen unless the country’s environmental poli-
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tics undergo a sea change. Now considered the environmental conscience 
of Trinidad, Kublalsingh has been protesting the route of a new highway 
not far from La Brea. He conducted a  months- long hunger strike in 2014. 
From his bed, the emaciated man wrote against imperialism, capitalism, 
plantations, and—more diffidently—against heavy industry too. “The 
lands should be used,” he insists, “to create an altered, supplementing the 
oil and gas paradigm, economic platform for the island and the Caribbean” 
(Kublalsingh 2014, 4; emphasis added). “Supplementing” is not sustain-
able. To mitigate climate change, Trinidad and all the petrostates will need 
to replace the paradigm of hydrocarbons. So far, contingencies, political 
will, and (mostly absent) conscience have backed Trinidad’s status quo.
Against Fuel
Closer to my home, the politics of oil are changing. On the streets of Wash-
ington and New York, people are now challenging the spill everywhere 
with mixtures of hope, fear, and anger. In 2011, Bill McKibben launched a 
movement against the importation of oil derived from Alberta’s so- called 
tar sands. A generation before, he had published The End of Nature, the first 
jeremiad against climate change for a popular American audience. “How 
should I cope,” he asked in the book, “with the sadness of watching nature 
end in our lifetimes, and with the guilt of knowing that each one of us is in 
some measure responsible?” (McKibben 1989, xxv). This literary shift into 
a moral key did not inspire masses of American readers either to protest 
fossil fuels or to cut their own emissions. But, in the tar sands, McKibben 
found a stirring set of symbols: the heavy hydrocarbon—which also flows 
through La Brea—requires strip mining and  chemical- intensive process-
ing. Extraction has polluted the Athabasca River and sickened many First 
Nations people living downstream. If approved by the U.S. president, the 
Keystone xl pipeline to Houston could cause the same damage in the 
heartland of the United States—and would certainly raise carbon emis-
sions. Through this geography, McKibben linked local spills to the global 
spill. In 2011, he forged a broad alliance between indigenous people and 
ranchers in the Great Plains and more conventional, coastal environmen-
talists. I too joined immediately, as did Eden Shand, Trinidad’s former 
deputy minister of the environment, then living in Delaware. “I was at the 
front of the march,” he related breathlessly to me on the streets of Washing-
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ton, DC, in 2013, posting a photo to his Facebook page (figure c.1). (Note 
his stoop, damage done by the gravel truck on the Savannah.) Meanwhile, 
McKibben and his organization, known as 350 .org, targeted all fossil fuels 
everywhere. In 2014, close to 400,000 of us marched in Manhattan. Finally, 
a popular movement against hydrocarbons was emerging in the United 
States. It has a long way to go. A tv news reporter captured my family at the 
end of the New York march. “David Hughes and teenage son Jesse drove in 
from New Jersey,” she narrated—inaccurately—that night. The reporter 
had not asked us about our means of transport. She assumed that people 
cross distance in cars, and most of her story concerned the demonstration’s 
disruption of city traffic.6 What will it take to get more—and more influen-
tial—Americans and Trinis to rethink business as usual?
To start with, producers and users might rethink hydrocarbons en-
tirely, as something more than fuel. A cultural reform—complementing 
the more explicitly political dissent—is long overdue. Geologists, econo-
mists, and other experts on oil and gas still propagate a myth of liquidity 
and inevitability. Stratigraphy is destiny, they feel, and the Earth practi-
c.1 Shand’s Face-
book post of Feb-
ruary 19, 2013. He 
added the caption, 
“That’s me with 
Bill McKibben, 
leader of the Cli-
mate Action rally 
in D.C. He’s there 
for the children of 
the future.”
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cally ejects hydrocarbons. “That oil is coming up,” Krishna Persad always 
assured me. Otherwise it would be “stranded,” like a shipwrecked sailor 
on a desert island. What if we thought of oil as stranded in the fashion of 
 nineteenth- century Africans, relieved to be left on their coast as the last 
slave ship sails away? With emancipation, elites turned their back on an 
energy source. Plenty of it still remained, and it still carried out a useful 
economic function. Somatic energy of course continued to power produc-
tion—through wage labor—but never with the same throughput as in the 
body- consuming, body- killing sugar plantation. Simply put, no one legally 
uses people as fuel in industry anymore. Few can even imagine such a mo-
tivation, so immoral is slavery now considered. Oil might become the new 
slavery. At least some writers have suggested the analogy.7 Canadian critic 
Andrew Nikiforuk refers to a “new servitude” in which “the values of one 
energy system have been neatly imposed on the other.” Like masters of the 
Old South, high emitters consume energy profligately and mostly in the 
pursuit of luxuries and luxurious degrees of comfort (Nikiforuk 2012, 70). 
The historian Jean- François Mouhot confesses to his own participation in 
bondage because, as he argues, “Suffering resulting (directly) from slavery 
and (indirectly) from the excessive burning of fossil fuels are now morally 
comparable” (Mouhot 2011, 329). Perhaps the strain in this comparison 
will fade. Masters of oil will have to leave it in the ground, like slave masters 
relinquishing their human property and leaving Africans alone. People of 
good conscience will eventually strand conscienceless forms of energy. Oil 
will pass from inevitable to immoral to impossible.
This “new abolitionism” recalls the old, enchanted sensibility toward 
energy (Hayes 2014). How might one undo the monochromatic, flat at-
titude encapsulated in the idea of fuel? How might one revive the “moral 
panic” that accompanied movements for emancipation (Wahab 2010, 100)? 
Before that point, long before any pipelines were built, Chacón devised the 
idea of a disenchanted, rootless,  ocean- crossing standard unit of energy. 
Unwittingly, he replaced Gumilla’s full- throated adoration of God- given, 
 plant- powering sunlight. Blessings became barrels. As is now clear, oil car-
ries a vast negative blessing, a curse. Through combustion and conversion 
into carbon dioxide, hydrocarbons spread a scourge upon the face of the 
Earth, destroying natural and human communities. Increasingly, this al-
most religious, apocalyptic indictment rings true. But its less censorious in-
verse may catch on more quickly: imagine oil as a positive blessing, indeed, 
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so powerful and so precious that one would want to use it sparingly, rev-
erently. One might drive a car rarely and with immense fulfillment. Mimi 
Sheller proposes this approach to aluminum. Each 12- ounce can takes 
3 ounces of gasoline equivalent to produce. Currently, we treat those con-
tainers as “cheap  throw- away material.” “We must become reenchanted,” 
she pleads, “with the magic of aluminum’s contribution to our capacity for 
lightness, speed, mobility, and flight but also wary of . . . environmental 
destruction” (Sheller 2014, 261). Moralized in this way, combustion would 
constitute a vice, pricking the conscience as a risky pleasure. Traders might 
still measure oil in barrels and transport it as a global commodity. Dia-
monds come in carats too, and the consumer proceeds with caution, releas-
ing the mineral genie only when necessary or truly important. Of course, 
much else must happen: governments need to regulate oil, gas, and coal. 
They need to provide cheap, widespread public transportation. They need 
to convert electrical grids to wind and solar power. Overall, states need 
to undo the  short- term,  profit- driven capitalism under which so much of 
the world now lives (Klein 2014). Meanwhile, and in a less economic and 
political sense, anyone may help end domination by fossil fuels through 
veneration for them.
By the same token, anyone can embrace green energy through an act 
of imagination. Capitalism, markets, and so on hardly constrain us; for 
sunlight exceeds the bounds of any commodity form. Continuously, the 
sun sends 162,000 terawatts of energy into the atmosphere of the Earth, 
of which 128,000 remain in the terrestrial environment. By comparison, 
fossil fuels contribute less than 12 terawatts, a drop in the solar bucket.8 We 
enjoy star rays everyday—and not primarily as electricity from solar pan-
els. Michel Cazabon painted energy in two forms: the Pitch Lake in 1857 
and, through his entire life, solar power. As described in a recent novel, he 
was constantly “trying . . . to see the light falling on bamboos” (Scott 2012, 
459). Rays make art. They also enable surprisingly strategic alternatives to 
fossil fuels. Shortly after he joined Trinidad’s Carbon Reduction Strategy 
Task Force, Krishna Persad invited me to a one- day cricket match. Sitting 
in stands named after Conrad Stollmeyer, he shared his idea of piping 
natural gas to every home in Trinidad. Residents would run their clothes 
dryers directly on natural gas, rather than less efficiently on electricity de-
rived from gas. “I’ve got something better than any of that,” I boasted, “a 
 solar- powered clothes dryer.” “Really?” he turned away from the game and 
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toward me. “What’s the technology?” “It’s a long, thin technology,” I said 
coyly, “fairly cheap and widely available.” “It’s not available here,” he con-
tradicted me. “Do you have it up in the States?” “Yes, but it works much 
better in Trinidad, at lower latitudes. We went around like this, slowly and 
somewhat stupidly because of the rum Persad had thoughtfully brought. 
Finally, laughing, I disclosed the technology: a clothesline. Sunlight will 
not be bottled—at least not nearly all of it.
Like the young Conrad Stollmeyer, I dream of a utopia. Utopias begin with 
a revolution in political and economic conditions and culminate in a “new 
person.” Imre Szeman calls for “new ways of making subjects, which can be 
the only hope for the planet we collectively inhabit” (2014, 462). Such a re-
form may unfold with less effort than Szeman implies. It begins with filling 
the moral void around energy. In that space, high emitters would express a 
growing sense of responsibility for climate change. Anyone might wonder 
at energy. Fusing both sentiments, this new subject would subscribe to a 
postfuel notion of the ability to do work. In connection with wind power, 
for instance, Robert Righter (2002) describes “energy landscapes” pulsing 
with blades both beautiful and technologically sublime. Harvesting energy 
from the planet’s surface in this way invites people to reengage with their 
surroundings. Neighbors of turbines see energy daily. Rather than merely 
consuming it by the gallon or the kilowatt, they cohabit with it. Or they 
collaborate even more concretely. Andrew Mathews (2014, 6) refers to 
“domesticating the carbon cycle” as Italian foresters gather energy from 
biomass. They are not merely cultivating, harvesting, or harnessing wood. 
On a larger scale, they understand their role in a  planet- wide circulation 
essential to life and due for rebalancing. Thus, new thinking about energy 
might focus simultaneously on the near at hand and on far- reaching jour-
neys. I do not mean to suggest only that one treat certain commodities as 
fetishes of good conscience (Carrier 2010). We should consume less and, 
first of all, notice the flow of these substances into and through our lives. 
Sustainability, then, benefits from attention and mindfulness to objects 
and the energy consumed in making them. In this form, we might find an 
attainable utopia: a way of treasuring the ability to do work.
At root, I am asking you to imagine what energy has lost. As the history 
and ethnography in these pages make clear, energy has become an object of 
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political economy—and merely that. Readers may interpret the foregoing 
chapters in two ways. First, I have traced the pathways of various hydro-
carbon commodities: bitumen, oil, and natural gas. In each case, supply 
and demand became and remained robust. Even before hydrocarbons, cer-
tain residents of the Caribbean demanded slaves and, in so doing, strung 
together the first intercontinental energy market. None of these protago-
nists, though, has simply bought and sold. They have imagined energy as 
one thing and not as another. Here is the second gloss on Energy without 
Conscience. From Chacón to Stollmeyer to Persad to Kublalsingh to Man-
ning, influential Trinis have constructed a mental model of the ability to do 
work. As they bought, sold, and debated that good, they branded it as one 
thing: as a necessary, available, unquestionable means to everything mod-
ern. Even as modernity transformed one product after another—from 
sugar through to plastics—producers and consumers perpetuated this 
narrow vision of energetic means. In imagining those means as fuel, they 
cut off other ways of thinking about energy. Not deliberately—but sys-
tematically, nonetheless—all parties to Trinidad’s oil economy exempted 
the substance from moral analysis. Here is the greatest complicity: the 
failure to consider alternatives and to apply conscience to those choices. 
Throughout the hydrocarbon age—in Trinidad and beyond—so many 
people have extracted and burned so much with so little pause or reflec-
tion. What if one did pause and consider paths not taken, options once 
available and perhaps still at hand? Only a handful of my informants—peo-
ple like the  politician- turned- protester Eden Shand—willed themselves 
to see the profound decision all around them. So many other people have, 
in a blandly unimaginative way, brought the world to the brink of disaster.
The nagging question that remains is one of attitude. In what tone—
and on what common ground—should one write or speak of fossil fu-
els and their loyalists? What can an anthropologist and an ethnographer 
contribute through writing? Occasionally, in Energy without Conscience, 
I have employed the condescending, judgmental tone of one who sees 
the future. Perhaps I should apologize for insulting some Trinidadians, 
for labeling them as complicit and conscienceless in the face of planetary 
harm. Rather than retract, I will end more bluntly still: the  petro- geologists 
among my informants are in the wrong and doing wrong. I did not find 
them to be exceptionally greedy or underhanded, but I did detect a moral 
problem. They take credit for producing hydrocarbons while disavowing 
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blame for climate change. The costs of this abdication remain obscured, 
but soon they will break into view and provoke a widespread rejection 
of fossil fuels. I write with a bias for optimism—what the economist Al-
bert Hirschman once called “a passion for the possible” (1971, 26). Others 
share this hope for a low- carbon future. Indeed, virtually the whole world 
already acts in accord with this positive scenario. Few among us are pre-
paring in any practical way for the converse: the runaway rise in sea level 
and extreme weather that more hydrocarbons guarantee. Trinis are not 
moving from the coast. Illogically perhaps, they refuse to surrender it to 
the planetary depredations of their own leading industry. We are all bank-
ing on a rapid economic and political shift to sustainability. Perhaps some 
believe carbon capture and storage will solve the problem singlehandedly. 
The rest of us consign oil firms to an ash heap, worthy of condescension 
and worse. Perhaps this is the most hopeful finding of all: on the plane of 
unacknowledged assumptions, governments, firms, and individuals have 
already replaced coal, oil, and gas. All the dissident must do now is recog-
nize and assert what so many assume. Any tone in any medium will help. 
Humor and wonder and science and art—as well as outrage and rage in the 
streets—will move the world to burn far less fossil fuel. Conscience will 
replace complicity. Obama has prohibited construction of the Keystone 
xl pipeline. Shand has returned to Trinidad and wishes to install wind 
turbines on the north coast. 
NOTES
Introduction
 1 Edwin Drake drilled a well in 1859 in Titusville, Pennsylvania, which is often 
credited as the world’s first. The Drake well, however, produced very little oil.
 2 With a less masculinist and more nationalist cast, Machel Montano sang the 
lyric with David Rudder in “Oil and Music” in Montano’s Flame On album 
(2008). I am grateful to Marc White for his assistance in tracing the phrase.
 3 “Este libro versa sobre una novela que no existe. Y no hay en ello ninguna 
híperbole. No se da en Venezuela una novelística del petróleo, como, por 
ejemplo, está presente en el ámbito hispanoamericano una novelística de la 
revolución mexicana” (Carrera [1972] 2005, 27).
 4 The photographer titles this section “Oil Wells, Kuwait.” Oddly, the section 
titled “Oil, Baku, Azerbaijan” shows pipes, valves, rigs, and no oil at all.
 5 “Cracha noir. . . . C’est du charbon. . . . J’en ai dans la carcasse de quoi me 
chauffer jusqu’à la fin de mes jours” (Zola [1885] 1968, 37).
 6 “Greffes” (Zola [1885] 1968, 133).
 7 “Bête mauvaise . . . la guele toujours ouverte, qui avait englouti tant de chair 
humaine!” (Zola [1885] 1968, 442).
 8 Appel, Mason, and Watts (2015a, 10) refer to representations that reduce oil to a 
“mere metonym” for modernity, money, geopolitics, violence, and commodities.
 9 “Oro se engendra en tierras estériles y adonde el sol tenga fuerza.” Carta- 
Relacion del Cuarto Viaje de Cristobal Colon, Jamaica, July 7, 1503 (Pérez de 
Tudela et al. 1994, vol. 3 1527; cf. Gómez 2008, 400). 
 10 For a more materialist reason, Sharife (2011) refers to a contemporary “coloniz-
ing” of the atmosphere through carbon pollution.
 11 Crutzen and Stoermer (2000) first coined the term in a less widely circulated 
publication.
 12 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this comparison.
Chapter 1: Plantation Slaves, the First Fuel
 1 From Joseph Gumilla to Governador y Capitán General, Guayana. Archivo 
General de Indias (agi), Signatura Santo Domingo 632 (quoted in Gumilla 
1970, xvii n3).
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 2 M. Roume de St. Laurent to Don Juan de Catilla, March 20, 1777 (reprinted in 
Borde 1882, 380–82).
 3 “L’établissement de la Colonie de la Trinité et Moyens de la porter prompte-
ment à sa perfection.” Philippe Rose Roume de Saint Laurent, June 2, 1783, agi 
Caracas 443 (cf. Besson 2010, 34). 
 4 Borde (1882, 382ff.) reprints the cédula.
 5 “Libertar para siempre à los Esclavos de todo derecho de Importacion, atend-
iendo al aumento que el ello resultaría à la agricultura.” Francisco de Savaadra, 
June 30, 1784, agi Caracas 443.
 6 Josef Maria Chacón, Informe, November 22, 1784, agi Caracas 444.
 7 Reprinted from the Trinidad Gazette, June 1825, in Fraser (1971, 194).
 8 Some other observers and other colonies clearly treated the labor force as a 
machine, a semidurable apparatus that itself consumed fuel. Slaves needed to 
eat. Roume, a planter himself, had articulated the need for estates to provide 
space for food crops. Jamaica took this thinking a step further; it imported 
breadfruit trees from Polynesia precisely to feed the enslaved population 
efficiently and cheaply (Newell 2010). In an even more machinelike way, a slave 
population might produce more slaves. The owners of Mount Airy, a tobacco 
estate in Virginia, bred humans like livestock (Dunn 2014). In effect, the female 
population functioned as a reproductive factory. Even when female and male 
slaves produced sugar, they functioned physically as “dehumanized cogs in a 
very inefficient machine” (Dunn 1972, 324). Through what Marx (1976, 283ff.) 
calls a social “metabolism,” they fashioned foodstuffs and the land itself into 
commodities. 
 9 “Acclimitasés.” Roume de St. Laurent to Secrétariat d’État de la Marine, Feb-
ruary 3, 1785, Archives Nationales d’Outre- Mer, Col. C8A F˚ 344, http://anom 
.archivesnationales .culture .gouv .fr/ark:/61561/zn401wqsrwwo.
 10 “Ademas de estranar al clima . . . demas arboles de cavezuela menor descuida 
de los blancos que estan all . . . es beneno que los mata.” Josef Maria Chacón to 
Josef de Galvez, October 8, 1784, agi Caracas 152.
 11 “Nosotros no huvieramos podido cumplir lo pactado sin grandes perdidas se 
ella huviera introducido en los 4 ultimos meses los 4000 Negros que ofreció.” 
Josef Maria Chacón to Josef de Galvez (no. 8), February 22, 1785, agi Caracas 
152.
 12 “Qualquier Casa de Comercio Europea que consiga vender annualmente 4 o 
6000 Negros al contado al precio de 750 pesos cada uno; puede mui bien fiar el 
numero de 7000 Negros pagados al termino de un año.” Josef Maria Chacón to 
Josef de Galvez (no. 8), February 22, 1785, agi Caracas 152.
 13 “Es una de las tareas que me ocupan insesantemente. Los esclavos de la parte 
de la costa de Africa que frequentan los Portugueses son preferibles à los que 
nos traen los Ingleses, Franceses, y Americanos, asi por mas dóciles, como por 
mas haviles y robustos.” Josef Maria Chacón to Sr. Marques de Sonora (no. 87), 
March 10, 1787, agi Caracas 152. 
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 14 “Atraher Colonos que tengan Esclavos y fondos para hacer Casas, y dedicarse 
desde luego al cultivo de la tierra.” Circular sobre Poblacion de Trinidad, Janu-
ary 1, 1786, agi Caracas 444.
 15 Josef Maria Chacón, November 22, 1784, agi Caracas 444.
 16 “Que reemplasan el numero de los que han muerto.” Josef María Chacón to Sr. 
Marques de Sonora, March 10, 1787, agi Caracas 152 and 444.
 17 “Las enfermedades que causan las primeras exalaciones de unas tierras que no 
habian visto el Sol quizá desde que salieron de las manos del Criador.” Josef 
María Chacón, August 18, 1792, agi Caracas 444.
 18 “La perdida que han sufrido este año por falta de Mulas con que moler las 
cañas y atender a los demas trabajos de sus haciendas.” Josef Maria Chacón to 
Sr. Don Diego de Gardoqui (no. 79), June 19, 1796, agi Caracas 153 and 444.
 19 “Destruido enteramente el monton de Negros fugitivos . . . enteramente sose-
gada la Isla y los Esclavos con toda sugecion, y seguridad.” Josef Maria Chacón 
to Sr. Josef de Galvez (no. 10), [month illegible] 15, 1784, agi Caracas 152.
 20 “Acantonamientos . . . propuse à su Magestad el establecimiento de una Com-
pania de Dragones . . . suficiente para attajar y coger los Negros fugitivos.” Josef 
Maria Chacón to Antonio Valdez, March 7, 1788, agi Caracas 152.
 21 “Los Ingeleses y Holandeces en la precision de reconocer Independentes los 
esclavos fugitivos, comprando à expensar de tratados bergonzosos una Paz 
que no havian podido conceguir con la fuerza, y en la que por consiguiente no 
pueden afianzar su confianza.” Josef Maria Chacón to Antonio Valdez, March 7, 
1788, agi Caracas 152.
 22 Josef Maria Chacón to Antonio Valdez, March 7, 1788, agi Caracas 152.
 23 “Grave daño de sus Amos, y de si mismo pues una vez sacudida la Esclavitud, 
andan errantes, y entregados à la desidia y al vicio, de que siguen perniciosas 
Conseqüencias.” Francisco de Savaadra to Josef Maria Chacón, June 30, 1784, 
agi Caracas 443.
 24 How necessary was all this preparation? When combustible petroleum came, 
in the 1850s, elites would likely have embraced this dense energy package as 
supremely useful under any circumstances. It might have gained currency on 
this basis alone, unassisted by a prearranged cultural understanding. Still, the 
construction of other prototypes indicates a sense among planters that some-
thing new was required. The abolition of slavery in 1838 provoked a search for 
nonsomatic substitutes: “The great aim of the planter,” wrote the French creole 
Louis Antoine Aimé de Verteuil in 1848, “must now be a reduction in manual 
labour” (de Verteuil 1848, 2). In an essay commissioned by the governor, this 
first geographer of Trinidad considers the problem of exhausted soils. Yields 
were falling on Trinidad’s leading cane plantations. Before Emancipation—and 
especially with Chacón’s incentives—planters might have dispatched slaves to 
cut new plantations perilously from the forest. De Verteuil does not even men-
tion this possibility. His “scientific principles of agriculture” call for chemical 
means of restoring extant fields (1848, 3). “The solid and liquid excrements of 
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animals,” de Verteuil details, “are the best manures of those plants upon which 
they have been fed,” including cane (1848, 56). The fuel is dense. Of course, 
dung had long fertilized fields, but de Verteuil applied newfound quantitative 
principles: a horse defecates 50 pounds per day, which, when distributed at 
60–75 cartloads per acre, will raise yields from as little as 1,000 pounds to 
as much as 2,200 pounds of sugar per acre (1848, 58–60). Here is a whole 
scientific system of production, distribution, and application. Although issuing 
from the backside of an animal—rather than the topside of a well—manure 
performs the same job in the same way. So does bat guano, and much of the 
world participated in the guano rush in the mid- nineteenth century (Hager 
2008). Loosely speaking, all these fuels substituted for bonded men in the farm 
field. Once invented, slavery / fuel constantly reinvented itself.
Chapter 2: How Oil Missed Its Utopian Moment
 1 “Le jeune Bastien, pour se reconnaître envers Celiante qui l’a obligé dans divers 
services, ne manquera guère de lui offrir la preuve de gratitude qu’un jeune 
homme de vingt ans peut offrir à une dame de cinquante” (Fourier 1840, 7).
 2 C. F. Stollmeyer, “Satellite,”Morning Star, October 11, 1845, emphasis in original.
 3 “The Second Tropical Emigration Society,” Morning Star, October 18, 1845.
 4 “Tropical Emigration Society Report of the Directors, Read and Adopted at 
the Annual Meeting Held January 4th, 1846,” Morning Star, January 17, 1846.
 5 Excerpted in “Review,” Morning Star, May 3, 1845.
 6 “Review,” Morning Star, June 7, 1845. Although printed entirely in quotation 
marks, this passage appears to have adapted, paraphrased, and expanded upon 
Hall (1827, 103–4).
 7 “Review,” Morning Star, June 7, 1845. Again, quotation marks indicate that  
Duncan attributes this passage to Hall, but Hall’s text contains nothing resem-
bling it.
 8 Excerpted in “Review,” Morning Star, July 12, 1845.
 9 James Elmslie Duncan, “On Climate, Particularly of Venezuela and the Trop-
ics,” Morning Star, May 31, 1845.
 10 From Thomas W. Carr and Charles Taylor to the Directors of the Tropical Em-
igration Society, October 20, 1845; printed in the Morning Star, November 29, 
1845.
 11 From Thomas Carr to C. F. Stollmeyer, March 4, 1846, printed in the Morning 
Star, April 18, 1846.
 12 From W. E. Prescod to the Directors of the Tropical Emigration Society, 
March 7, 1846, printed in the Morning Star, April 18, 1846.
 13 C. F. Stollmeyer to the Secretary of the Tropical Emigration Society, Janu-
ary 20, 1846, printed in the Morning Star, February 28, 1846.
 14 Gazette (Port of Spain), May 5, 1846, reprinted in “The Tropical Emigration 
Society,” the Morning Star, August 1, 1846.
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 15 Gazette (Port of Spain), May 5, 1846, reprinted in “The Tropical Emigration 
Society,” the Morning Star, August 1, 1846.
 16 Charles Stillwell, “On Climate; Particularly of Venezuela and the Tropics,” 
Morning Star, June 14, 1845, emphasis added.
 17 C. F. Stollmeyer to the Secretary of the Tropical Emigration Society, Janu-
ary 20, 1846, printed in the Morning Star, February 28, 1846.
 18 Gazette (Port of Spain), May 5, 1846, reprinted in “The Tropical Emigration 
Society,” the Morning Star, August 1, 1846.
 19 From Thomas W. Carr to C. F. Stollmeyer, March 4, 1846, printed in the Morn-
ing Star, April 18, 1846.
 20 Thomas Powell to the Editor, May 21, 1846, printed in the Morning Star, July 4, 1846.
 21 C. F. Stollmeyer to W. E. Gladstone, Secretary of State, Port of Spain, Febru-
ary 20, 1846, Public Records Office, London, co 295/151, 22, emphasis added. I 
am grateful to Selwyn Cudjoe for sharing this document.
 22 “Numancia,” Trinidadian, December 1, 1852, emphasis in original.
 23 “Emigration to Venezuela,” Trinidadian, November 6, 1852.
 24 “A few Words on Emigration to Venezuela,” Trinidadian, December 8, 1852.
 25 “Manufacture of Fuel from Bitumen,” Trinidadian, August 10, 1853.
 26 “The Future Prospects of Trinidad,” Trinidadian, February 16, 1853.
 27 “Immigration and the Prospects of Trinidad,” Trinidadian, January 22, 1853.
 28 Conrad F. Stollmeyer to Arthur Craig, December 1855. I am grateful to Steven 
Stoll for sharing this document, which is in his private possession.
 29 “Most Violent Assault upon the Editor of the The Trinidadian,” Trinidadian, 
August 6, 1853.
 30 C. F. Stollmeyer vs. J. Kavanaugh, Supreme Civil Court, Port of Spain, re-
printed in Port of Spain Gazette, October 7, 1853.
 31 “Most Violent Assault upon the Editor of the The Trinidadian,” Trinidadian, 
August 6, 1853.
 32 “The End,” Trinidadian, December 24, 1853.
 33 For example, Trinidadian, March 9, 1853.
 34 Conrad F. Stollmeyer, “Raw Asphalt as Auxiliary Fuel with Megass, Wood, or 
Stone Coals,” November 1871, Cochrane Family Papers, Box 8, Duke University 
Library Archive, Durham, North Carolina.
 35 That country contained enough petroleum—from which kerosene could also 
be distilled—to serve illuminative and mechanical purposes. 
 36 Conrad F. Stollmeyer to the Editor, Trinidad Chronicle, August 7, 1866.
 37 Quoted in de Verteuil (1994, 100). Anthony de Verteuil, who is a descendent of 
L. A. A. de Verteuil, gives no further information on the letter or on its original 
language.
 38 Conrad F. Stollmeyer to Arthur Craig, December 1855. I thank Steven Stoll for 
sharing this document with me.
 39 Conrad F. Stollmeyer to James McAlley, November 8, 1871, Cochrane Family 
Papers, Box 8, Duke University Library Archive.
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 40 Creole Bitters, May 3, 1904.
 41 There are, in fact, many ways in which to calculate this figure. For a discussion, 
see de Sousa (2008). 
 42 “La machine est la rédempteur de l’humanité, le Dieu qui rachètera l’homme 
des sordidœ artes et du travail salarié, le Dieu qui lui donnera les loisiers et la 
liberté” (Lafargue [1880] 1994, 59).
Chapter 3: The Myth of Inevitability
 1 The scientific term for tar sands—also known as oil sands—is bituminous 
sands.
 2 Lately, however, the exploitation of shale gas in the United States has provoked 
a reevaluation.
 3 The figures are 2,795 versus 565 gigatons of co2. The former number includes 
oil, gas, and coal (McKibben 2012). Bridge and Le Billon (2013, 65–66) give a 
figure of 620 gigatons of co2 for proven oil and gas reserves, still higher than 
the climate boundary. See McGlade and Elkins (2015) for the most thorough 
analysis.
 4 Scott (1998) has provoked much debate on bureaucratic,  improvement- 
oriented, and homogenizing ways of seeing. Ferguson (2005) argues that oil 
companies, by contrast, see territory in a way that emphasizes heterogeneity. 
I write of oil “producers” so as to distinguish the same actors’ view of under-
ground resources from their models of aboveground risk.
 5 Coll (2012, 541) quotes an offended advisor to President Obama on energy 
issues.
 6 I borrow the terms traverse and columnar from Rudwick (1976, 164).
 7 Krishna Persad, conversation with the author, La Romaine, Trinidad, January 5, 
2012.
 8 Krishna Persad, “Future Hydrocarbon Prospects in Trinidad and Tobago’s Ex-
plored Basins,” presentation to the Energy Conference, Port of Spain, Trinidad 
and Tobago, February 6–8, 2012.
 9 The Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers and the Society of Exploration 
Geophysicists also coauthored the document (Society of Petroleum Engineers, 
et al. 2011).
 10 Larry McHalffey, remarks at the release of the National Gas Reserves Audit, 
Port of Spain, July 13, 2010. See Breglia (2013, 62–63) for a similar account from 
Mexico.
 11 Renuka Singh, “Ten Years Left,” Express, July 14, 2010.
 12 David Renwick, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, July 12, 2010.
 13 “Energy Chamber to Govt on Falling Gas Reserves: Take Action Now,” Express 
(Port of Spain), July 21, 2010.
 14 Philip Farfan, remarks at the Understanding Reserves workshop, Energy Con-
ference, Port of Spain, February 8, 2012.
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 15 In fact, Neanderthals went extinct, except to the extent that they interbred with 
modern humans.
 16 Farfan, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, January 7, 2013.
 17 For recent mentions of this term, see Bridge and Le Billon (2013, 21) and 
Moors (2011, 11).
 18 Prior to 2010, in fact, the group was known as the South Trinidad Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce.
 19 Thackwray Driver, conversation with the author, New York, April 4, 2012.
 20 Driver, conversation with the author, Maracas Beach, Trinidad and Tobago, 
January 6, 2013.
 21 Krishna Persad, presentation to the workshop Business Opportunities from 
Green House Gas Mitigation Measures, Port of Spain, January 27, 2013.
 22 Persad, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, January 27, 2013.
 23 Persad, conversation with the author, La Romaine, February 24, 2010.
 24 Clyde Abder, conversation with the author, St. Augustine, Trinidad and To-
bago, April 26, 2010.
 25 Shiraz Rajav, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, April 22, 2010.
 26 Selwyn Lashley, remarks at the launch of the Carbon Reduction Strategy Task 
Force, Port of Spain, April 28, 2010.
 27 Port of Spain, May 11, 2010.
 28 Abder, conversation.
 29 Persad, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, June 3, 2010; emphasis in 
original.
 30 Carolyn  Seepersad- Bachan, remarks at the Green Business Forum, Port of 
Spain, March 23, 2011. She did not mention Persad by name.
 31 Persad, conversation with the author, San Fernando, January 5, 2012.
 32 Persad, La Romaine, February 24, 2010.
 33 Vincent Pereira, remarks at the Energy Conference, Port of Spain, February 6, 2012.
 34 Persad, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, January 7, 2012.
 35 Peter Wyant, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, January 8, 2012.
 36 Persad, La Romaine, February 24, 2010.
Chapter 4: Lakeside, or the Petro- pastoral Sensibility
 1 “Se hundió una mancha de tierra por donde estaba el camino, y luego en su 
lugar remaneció otro estanque de Brea, con espanto y temor de los vecinos, 
recelos de que quando menos piensen, suceda lo mismo dentro de sus Pobla-
ciones” (Gumilla [1745] 1945, 47).
 2 Arthur Forde, conversation with the author, La Brea, February 11, 2010.
 3 Ethelbert Monroe, conversation with the author, La Brea, March 2, 2010.
 4 Errol Jones, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, June 10, 2010. 
 5 Conversation with the author, La Brea, March 7, 2010.I never got his name, 
and, if I had, I would be using a pseudonym anyway.
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 6 Virginia Piper, conversation with the author, La Brea, January 28, 2010.
 7 Joshua Logan, conversation with the author, La Brea, February 11, 2010.
 8 Noah Premdas is a pseudonym.
 9 Conversation with the author, Union, Trinidad, October 27, 2009.
 10 The reading taken downstream from the reservoirs, at the mouth of the Vessi-
gny River, showed 87.0 mg/L, as compared with Trinidad and Tobago’s limit of 
10 mg/L. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency stipulates only 0.01 mg/L 
as the threshold for safe drinking water (Institute of Marine Affairs 2003, 41). 
See Agard (1988) for data regarding petroleum pollution in the Gulf of Paria.
 11 Noah Premdas, conversation with the author, Union Village, October 27, 2009.
 12 Isaac Gregory, conversation with the author, La Brea, October 28, 2009. Isaac 
Gregory is a pseudonym.
 13 Adam Chalant, conversation with the author, La Brea, November 16, 2009. 
Adam Chalant is a pseudonym.
 14 Alfred Antoine, “Why They Arrest Here,” handwritten calypso lyrics, 2010.
 15 Conversation with the author, La Brea, 19 May 2010.
 16 Xante, “The wanderer,“ track 10 on “Jump Start” compact disc, no date.
 17 Roger Achong, conversation with the author, La Brea, March 15, 2010.
 18 Wendy Kalicharan, conversation with the author, San Fernando, January 15, 
2010.
 19 Ayana Kalicharan, conversation with the author, San Fernando, January 25, 
2010.
 20 “Ivan Kalicharan mas 2010” [brochure], n.d.
 21 Molly Gaskin, conversation with the author,  Pointe- a- Pierre, January 13, 2010.
 22 Reeza Mohammed, conversation with the author, Point Lisas, February 12, 
2010.
 23 Douglas de Freitas, conversation with the author, Freeport, April 29, 2010.
 24 Conversation with the author, Port of Spain, January 25, 2010.
 25 Chalant, conversation, November 16, 2009.
 26 Burton Sankeralli, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, September 16, 
2009.
 27 Conversation with the author, Port of Spain, February 4, 2010.
 28 Wayne Kublalsingh, conversation with the author, Arouca, September 18, 2009.
 29 Kublalsingh, remarks at the Republic Day Conference of Civil Society Organi-
sations, Port of Spain, September 24, 2009.
 30 Wayne Kublalsingh, “The Avatar Threat to La Brea, Claxton Bay,” Trinidad and 
Tobago Guardian, January 13, 2010, a25.
 31 Dennis Pantin, conversation with the author, St. Augustine, December 17, 
2009.
 32 Norris Deonarine, conversation with the author, St. Augustine, June 16, 2010.
 33 Deonarine, remarks at Trinitrain Public Consultation, Tunapuna, April 8, 2010.
 34 Tim Gopeesingh, quoted in the transcript of the Trinitrain Public Consulta-
tion, Port of Spain, April 6, 2010.
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 35 Remarks at Trinitrain Public Consultation, Chaguanas, April 7, 2010.
 36 Stephan Kangal, remarks at Trinitrain Public Consultation, Chaguanas, April 7, 
2010.
 37 Anderson Wilson, remarks at Trinitrain Public Consultation, Chaguanas, 
April 7, 2010.
 38 Many may have confused the 1- kilometer- wide study area with the eventual rail 
corridor, sure to be a fraction of that width. 
 39 Kublalsingh, conversation with the author, Trincity, February 5, 2010.
 40 Pantin, personal communication, St. Augustine, January 30, 2010.
 41 This notice was distributed widely via e- mail. 
 42 Cathal Healy- Singh, speech at the People’s Democracy rally, Woodford Square, 
Port of Spain, November 22, 2009.
 43 Cathal Healy- Singh, interviewed by Gideon Hanoomansingh, Issues and Per-
spectives, Heritage Radio 101.7 fm, Port of Spain, January 19, 2010.
 44 According to publicized projections, the train would reduce national co2 emis-
sions by 414,000 Mt annually (Trinitrain 2010, 6), 1.1 percent of the country’s 
emissions of 38.0 million Mt in 2008 (International Energy Agency 2008, 46). 
The per capita figure would fall from 28.37 to 28.06 Mt. However, the projec-
tions applied to 2032, the anticipated completion date of the entire rail system. 
Regarding the smelter, the corporation building it (Alutrint) projected its daily 
consumption of natural gas as 121 mcf (in public presentations at Vessigny on 
December 13 and 17 and March 5 and 11, 2007, and at Couva on December 17, 
2007; Rapid Environmental Assessments 2006). At that rate, the plant would 
generate 2.5 million Mt of co2 per year, a 6.5 percent addition to the 2008 
national output. The per capita figure would rise to 30.21 Mt. When completed 
in late 2011, the power plant was only running at 35 percent capacity (250 of 720 
mw). Therefore, the increase in carbon emissions at that point amounted to 2.3 
percent.
 45 Annabelle Davis, remarks at Meet the Candidates forum, St. Ann’s Cascade 
Hololo Community Group, Chinese Association, St. Ann’s, May 18, 2010.
 46 Wayne Kublalsingh, “The Correct Way to Stop the Smelter,” Trinidad and 
Tobago’s Newsday, June 20, 2010. 
 47 Kublalsingh, conversation with the author, St. Augustine, March 26, 2011.
 48 Kublalsingh, conversation, March 26, 2011.
 49 Goldstein (2012, 35), citing oral comments by Charles Hale.
 50 Healy- Singh, interview by Hanoomansingh. He was speaking of myself and 
Simone Mangal.
 51 “Texaco était ce que la ville conservait de l’humanité de la campagne” (Cham-
oiseau 1992, 360, my translation).
 52 “La ville . . . saccade des pollutions de l’insécurité; elle . . . menace les cultures 
et les différences comme un virus mondial” (Chamoiseau 1992, 443–44; my 
translation).
 53 Julian Kenny, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, March 24, 2011.
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Chapter 5: Climate Change and the Victim Slot
 1 “Les deux golfes [Paria and Cariaco, to the west of the peninsula] doivent leur 
origine à des affaissemens et à des déchiremens causés par des tremblemens de 
terre” (Humboldt and Bonpland 1816, III, 231). 
 2 “Dans l’état actuel des choses, on voit s’agrandir, en gangnant sur la mer, les 
plaines humides” (Humboldt and Bonpland 1816, III, 232).
 3 Lincoln Myers, conversation with the author, Gran Couva, Trinidad, July 2, 
2011. Cf. Griffith and Oderson (2009, 21–86) and Leggett (2001, 24–27).
 4 Leo Heileman, conversation with the author via Skype, July 19, 2011.
 5 Heileman, conversation with the author, Gran Couva, January 4, 2013.
 6 All quotations are from Angela Cropper, conversation with the author, Port of 
Spain, January 7, 2012.
 7 Eden Shand, conversation with the author, Newark, Delaware, June 20, 2011.
 8 Declaration of Barbados, Part One, Article III, Clause 2.
 9 “Draft Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction,” submitted on May 17, 1996, 
as Paper No. 1 by Trinidad and Tobago on behalf of aosis for consideration by 
the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate, fourth session, Geneva, July 9–16, 
1996, http://unfccc .int/resource/docs/1996/agbm/misc02.pdf.
 10 Surprisingly, in this period, the government invoked none of the available 
arguments, such as off- shoring, historical debt, or the distinction between 
subsistence and luxury emissions (cf. Agarwal and Narain 1992, 24ff.).
 11 “Port of Spain Climate Change Consensus: The Commonwealth Climate 
Change Declaration,” Port of Spain, November 28, 2009, Clause 13.
 12 Cropper, remarks at the Commonwealth People’s Forum, opening plenary 
session, Port of Spain, November 23, 2009.
 13 Emily Gaynor Dick- Forde, remarks at the Heath, Safety, Security, and the En-
vironment Conference, Port of Spain, September 29, 2009. The origins of the 
quotation are unclear.
 14 Dick- Forde, remarks at the Commonwealth People’s Forum, opening plenary 
session, Port of Spain, November 23, 2009.
 15 Cropper, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, January 7, 2012.
 16 Patrick Manning, conversation with the author, San Fernando, June 29, 2010.
 17 Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, “Draft National Climate 
Change Policy for Trinidad and Tobago,” 2010, 7.
 18 The government held four meetings in total.
 19 Shand, remarks at the National Consultation on Climate Change Policy, Port 
of Spain, March 23, 2010.
 20 John Agard, remarks at the National Consultation on Climate Change Policy, 
Port of Spain, March 23, 2010. 
 21 Agard, conversation with the author, St. Augustine, Trinidad, January 29, 2010.
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 22 Agard was summarizing chapter 9 of a large report (unep 2007). He had been 
one of three lead coordinating authors of that chapter.
 23 John Agard, “Environment in Development: From Plantation Economy, Biodi-
versity Loss and Global Warming towards Sustainable Development,” lecture 
at the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, February 25, 2010.
 24 Remarks at Public Consultation on Climate Change Draft Policy, La Romaine, 
April 6, 2010.
 25 Shyam Dyal, remarks at Public Consultation on Climate Change Draft Policy, 
La Romaine, April 6, 2010.
 26 As presented by Garret Manwaring to the Health, Safety, Security and the 
Environment Conference of the American Chamber of Commerce of Trinidad 
and Tobago, Port of Spain, September 29, 2009. 
 27 Dyal, conversation with the author,  Pointe- a- Pierre, March 3, 2010.
 28 Remarks at Public Consultations on Climate Change Draft Policy, La Ro-
maine, April 6, 2010.
 29 Akilah Jaramogi, personal communication, Port of Spain, April 6, 2010.
 30 Winston Rudder and Keisha Garcia, conversation with the author, Port of 
Spain, July 2, 2010.
 31 Rudder, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, January 4, 2012.
 32 Cropper, conversation with the author, Port of Spain, January 7, 2012.
Conclusion
 1 She is quoting Svante Pääbo.
 2 Remarks at the National Consultation on Climate Change Policy, Sangre 
Grande, April 20, 2010.
 3 Johnny Stollmeyer, remarks to author, Port of Spain, January 5, 2010.
 4 Dax Driver, remarks at the Green Business Forum, Port of Spain, March 24, 
2011. 
 5 Joth Singh, remarks at the Green Business Forum, Port of Spain, March 24, 
2011. Emphasis in original.
 6 “Thousands Fill NYC Streets for Climate March,” Fox 5 News, September 21, 
2014, http://www .myfoxny .com/story/26588335/thousands- fill- nyc- streets 
- for- climate- march.
 7 See Meadows (1998) for an earlier version of this argument.
 8 All the energy statistics derive from Hermann (2006) and Hermann and 
Simon (2006). He uses the term exergy “as a common currency to assess 
and compare the reservoirs of theoretically extractable work we call energy 
resources” (Hermann 2006, 1685).
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